Author Archives: Peter Levine

public work and multiculturalism

Here is a somewhat different way of analyzing the campus battles over

"great books" versus "multiculturalism" or "diversity."

Participants can be sorted into groups depending on what kind of works

they think should be available or required in schools, colleges, and other

venues. "Canonical classicists" want everyone to read great

works from Plato to NATO. "Diversity proponents" want everyone

to be exposed to works written (or composed, or painted) by people

of multiple ethnic, cultural, religious, sexual, and racial identities—in

order to promote empathy, respect, tolerance, etc. And true "multiculturalists"

want people of different cultural backgrounds to be able to study intensively

works created by people like them, so that a campus will be home to multiple

cultural communities.

This is one dimension that we can use to categorize the antagonists in

the campus culture wars. But there is also another dimension. At one end

of this second spectrum are those who emphasize that students should experience,

appreciate, understand, or at least be exposed to works created in the

past or in other places. Somewhat contentiously, I’ll call this the "consumerist"

approach. At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who stress that

we should create new cultural products, including stories and paintings,

performances, critical interpretations, and historical narratives.

Putting the two dimensions together, we see that there are at least six

possible positions in the debate:

canonical classicism
diversity
multiculturalism
consumerism
a
b
c
creativity
d
e
f

The standard conservative view is (a)—there is a fixed supply of

great works from the past that students should experience and appreciate.

The standard diversity view is (b)—everyone should experience works

by authors of color. And the standard multiculturalism view is (c)—people

should be encouraged to study works by members of their own groups, using

their own cultures’ criteria of excellence. These positions are "zero-sum":

adding a text to the curriculum may require taking another text out. In

contrast, options (d)-(f) are potentially "win-win," and I think

they are underdeveloped. There is a fair amount of (e)—i.e., people

of all colors and creeds should collaborate because this will create the

most interesting new works of art. But I think conservatives should work

on developing (d), if indeed it is a viable position. And multiculturalists

should develop (f), which would amount to the view that people of various

cultures should be assisted in producing new works, thereby contributing

to the global commons.

Brian Barry on inequality

Brian

Barry spoke at Maryland on Friday, making a good old-fashioned case

for economic equality. He cited the following statistics as evidence that

we do not have much social mobility in the US: If you are a male

born in the poorest tenth of the population, you have only a 1.3 percent

chance of reaching the top ten percent during your lifetime, and just

a 3.7 percent chance of becoming at all wealthy (in the top fifth). If

you are born in the bottom tenth, the odds are more than even that you

will never make it out of the bottom fifth. Barry’s source is Samuel Bowles

and Herbert Gintis, "The Inheritance of Inequality," Journal

of Economic Perspectives 16 (2002) 3 – 30, p. 3.

online privacy

I have just published a new

article on "information privacy." "Information

Technology and the Social Construction of Information Privacy: Comment,"

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Volume 22, Issue 3, May-June

2003, Pages 281-285)

The abstract says:

Privacy is not merely "socially constructed"; it is a good

thing. We should defend privacy because it supports freedom, property

rights, informed consent, personality development, happiness, equality

of power, an appropriate separation of society into multiple zones,

and rights of association, while helping to prevent discrimination and

defamation. Accountants have a professional responsibility to help protect

information privacy.

This short, commissioned piece begins with some comments about the methodology

of another article in the same journal; these remarks are not very interesting

for general readers. I think the main value of my piece (if it is useful

at all) is that it lists the goods and rights that we can enhance by protecting

online privacy. None of the items on my list is original, but they are

all together in one place.

public work in the private sector

When I spoke a few weeks ago at Berkeley, Philip

Selznick made an interesting point about the value of commercial

firms that are not profit-maximizers. As he noted, the genteel old

publishing houses needed to cover their costs, and probably wanted to

make a comfortable profit, but they were at least as committed to producing

public goods in the form of high-quality literature. By contrast, a publicly

traded firm must maximize profits, so if it generates public goods, they

come as unintentional collateral benefits (at best). My friend Harry

Boyte has promoted a whole philosophy of "public work,"

which prizes the ability of every citizen to generate public goods, often

in collaboration with others. One hallmark of public work, it seems to

me, is an intentional focus on public benefits. That is what is

missing in profit-maximizing firms, but it’s very evident in certain less

economically efficient private enterprises. Boyte’s schema is useful,

in part, because it allows us to reshuffle the traditional categories

of state/market/civil society. Public work can take place in any of these

sectors, or it can be absent or suppressed in any of them. For example,

if a state apparatus becomes heavily bureaucratic and rigid, then civil

servants will stop performing public work. Likewise, if traditional publishing

houses are bought by international conglomerates that relentlessly aim

at efficiency, then their editors must cease to do public work. (Obviously,

I owe an argument here about why public work is valuable. In brief, I

think there are objective benefits to the community and subjective or

psychological benefits to public workers.)

legacy preferences

At a seminar today, some colleagues and I discussed Senator John Edwards’

proposal

to eliminate the preference for "legacies" (children

of alumni) in college admissions. Some people are saying that legacy preferences

are on the same footing with affirmative action for racial minorities

and women. If we ban affirmative action as a form of discrimination that

undermines meritocracy, we should ban legacy admissions as well. If we

keep one, we may (or must) keep the other. A third problematic policy

is the preference that public universities often give to in-state students.

Isn’t it discriminatory for UC Berkeley to prefer Californians?

(It is worth noting that being denied admission to Harvard because one’s

place went to a "legacy" is not a tragedy—there are many

other fine schools. Being denied admission or financial aid at Michigan

because one lives in Kentucky is at least as unfair.)

I think this issue is fairly complicated. First, there are practical

considerations. Presumably a policy banning legacy preferences would cause

at least some rich alumni to curtail their contributions, thus removing

some financial support from scholarship and education. Likewise, a policy

banning in-state preferences could lead states to withdraw support from

their own colleges. However, either or both of these fears might turn

out to be unwarranted.

If one justifies legacy preferences mainly on practical, economic grounds,

then it doesn’t make sense to prefer the children of alumni who have never

contributed anything to a college. Yet most colleges deny that they prefer

donors’ children; that would be too crass. Implicitly, their argument

seems to rest on freedom of association and the value of preserving their

membership as a community over time.

Private universities probably have a right as associations to prefer

their own members (alumni, staff, and current students). That doesn’t

make a legacy policy morally admirable, however. It certainly has the

disadvantage of preserving a heriditary elite and undermining meritocratic

competition. Thus we might want to use the leverage of federal funding

to discourage such preferences. On the other hand, maybe it is admirable

to build community bonds within private associations. In that case, is

it equally acceptable for states to treat themselves as exclusive communities

that prefer their own citizens? Should federal policy allow or discourage

this?