Konoe Nobutada (1565-1614)- Meditating Daruma

one supple line

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, more than a quarter of a million Americans work professionally as graphic designers. Each designer produces many images, many of which are reproduced widely. Of course, other countries also have designers and commercial artists. Thanks to them all, we are awash in billions of images: illustrations, logos, advertisements, cartoons, explanations, warnings, decorations, and more.

Coming after modernism, today’s designers often produce abstracted images of real-world objects, highly simplified for impact and legibility. I assume that we can interpret such images because of conventions that we learn, plus the natural inclination of the human eye and brain to match patterns to observed realities (Gombrich 1961).

I illustrate this post not with a contemporary graphic image but with a painting by the noble courtier Konoe Nobutada (1565-1614) entitled “Meditating Daruma.” Daruma is the Japanese name for Bodhidharma, who probably lived about one thousand years before Nobutada and is credited with introducing Chan Buddhism to China. In turn, Chan evolved into Japanese Zen.

One of the main stories about Bodhidharma tells that the Emperor Wu of Liang asked this barbarian monk how much merit he had earned for his generous support of Buddhism. Bodhidharma said “none,” because the emperor had acted with worldly intent. The monk then meditated in front of a wall for nine years. I assume this is what he is doing in this painting. The text says: “Quietness and emptiness are enough to pass through life without error.”

I would submit that this image is very fine. I tried copying it freehand, and every version that I made was worse than Nobutada’s. Thus the image passed Leon Batista Alberti’s test of beauty (“nothing may be added, taken away, or altered, but for the worse”). However, I was the one conducting the test. I can easily imagine that many of the professional graphic artists working today could reproduce it perfectly, or indeed rival it.

In the process of trying to copy this painting, I discovered that each of my outlines of a hooded figure looked like a person who was staring into the distance, albeit at a different distant point each time I drew it. Although Bodhidharma is often depicted as irascible, here we cannot see his expression, and his back conveys peace.

The design of a meditating monk is simple, and today we are surrounded with highly effective simplified designs; but I find this one far more moving that most others. The reason is its source. This is not a logo for some modern business. Instead, it is an object that is about four centuries old (from long before the deluge of mechanically reproducible images), made by an artist who pioneered a new form of Zen art. The simplification here is his invention, not a prevailing style.

In his discussion of Nobutada, Stephen Addiss writes, “Ignoring the colorful and delicate style of court artists of his day, he brushed simple ink paintings of Zen avatars on coarse, sometimes recycled paper. Like his new style of calligraphy, these paintings were revolutionary” (Addiss 1989, p. 23).

Furthermore, by representing Daruma in meditation, this artist presented an aspirational self-portrait. Although Nobutada was a rich courtier rather than a monk, he must have performed sitting meditation, or at least honored it. Thus the image is a trace of a real person’s life, which, in turn, was inspired by the person he depicts.

We might consider that art, in general, has these two dimensions. One is the form of the object as perceived by human beings, with our naturally evolved eyes and brains. We tend to match the form to objects in our environment. The other is the story of the object’s origin within a larger historical context. Here, for example, we see a single line that conjures the idea of person wrapped in a robe, and we also see also an artifact of Konoe Nobutada, of early 17th-century Japan, and of the Zen tradition extending back for a thousand years. The provenance of the painting not only raises its monetary value but also makes it more genuinely moving than a contemporary image would be.

This idea–an abstract and universal concept is also the outcome of a human act–seems resonant with Buddhism. Although Bodhidharma is quasi-mythical, he has long been associated with the Lankavatara Sutra. That text begins with the standard formula, “Thus I have heard,” and it purports to be a recollection of the actual Buddha by his disciple Ananda (he of the perfect memory). But it can’t possibly be historical, or told by Ananda, or written by Bodhidharma. Its authorship is a fiction excused by the thesis that it conveys: namely, that “There is no one who speaks, nor is there anyone who hears. Lord of Lanka, everything in the world is like an illusion.”


Sources: Gombrich, E. H. Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (1961); Stehen Addiss, The Art of Zen (Echo Point, 1989); The Lankavatara Sutra, translated by Red Pine (Counterpoint, 2013). The digital image and translation of the Chinese verse come from the Mountain Cloud Zen center. See also Verdant mountains usually walk; the sublime and other peopleIto Jakuchu at the National Galleryon inhabiting earth with inaccessibly beautiful things; and (from 2004), aesthetics and history.

Special Issue: Call for Manuscripts on Dialogue, Deliberation, and Community in Civic Life

The Good Society: A Journal of Civic Studies is pleased to announce a special call for manuscripts for an upcoming issue focused on the theme: “Dialogue, Deliberation, and Community in Civic Life.” This special issue aligns with the 2024 Annual Civic Learning Symposium’s theme, which centers on the crucial role that dialogue, deliberation, and community play in our education system and our democracy.

Guest Editors:

  • Dr. David J. Roof, Ball State University
  • Dr. Sarah Surak, Salisbury University

(I am not directly involved, but these two are friends, and I am on the journal’s editorial board.)

Theme Overview: In an era marked by increasing polarization and division, fostering open, constructive dialogue and thoughtful deliberation is more essential than ever. This issue seeks to explore the multifaceted dimensions of dialogue, deliberation, and community within the context of civic education. We invite contributions that build bridges across diverse perspectives, promote understanding, and cultivate a culture of civic agency. Potential topics for submission include, but are not limited to:

  • Encouraging open and respectful dialogue among students, educators, and community members, regardless of ideological or cultural differences.
  • The importance of deliberation in shaping informed and thoughtful decision-making processes. How institutions and communities foster deliberative skills among students, educators, and community members?
  • The role of schools, educational institutions, and communities in preparing students and citizens to become active and engaged participants in democracy.
  • Exploring strategies for enhancing democratic practices within schools and/or communities. How do student-led forums, community dialogues, and participatory decision-making contribute to the strengthening of democratic values and community cohesion?
  • Highlighting successful initiatives and best practices for empowering individuals to become effective advocates for positive change in their communities. What role do educators, community organizers, and civic leaders play in promoting dialogue, deliberation, and community engagement?

About The Good Society: Civic studies is an interdisciplinary effort to understand and strengthen civic society, civic initiatives, civic capacity, civic learning, civic politics, and civic culture. Viewing citizenship as a distinctive civic ideal and set of practices involving creative agency and a commitment to civic-minded co-creation, civic studies is an emerging focus in many disciplines and fields of human endeavor. The Good Society draws from a wide array of academic disciplines, including political science, sociology, economics, communication, and adult education, focusing on:

  • The development of civic society
  • The role of the individual/citizen in society
  • The significance of lifelong learning in promoting democracy
  • The role of institutions in civic society development
  • The ethical foundations of civic issues in democratic societies

The Good Society is dedicated to publishing outstanding research and theory from all disciplinary traditions, addressing pressing contemporary issues. In today’s globalized world, effective civic perspectives demand that we not only bridge ideological divides within our own countries but also engage meaningfully with perspectives from around the world. This global orientation expands our vision, challenges our assumptions, and fosters dialogue beyond our own echo chambers. The journal maintains high standards of scholarly excellence and rigorous peer-review. It is indexed in the European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS), IBZ, MLA International Bibliography, and SCOPUS.

Submission Guidelines: We invite scholars, educators, and practitioners from all relevant disciplines to submit manuscripts that offer fresh perspectives and rigorous analysis on these themes. Submissions should align with The Good Society’s commitment to interdisciplinary research and fostering dialogue across ideological, cultural, and international divides.

Important Dates

  • Call for Manuscripts: Open
  • Submission Deadline for Abstracts: 10-October-2024
  • Notification of Abstract Acceptance: 30-October-2024
  • Full Manuscript Submission Deadline: 15-Janurary-2024
  • Peer Review Decisions: 30-Feburary-2024
  • Final Revised Manuscript Due: 15-March-2024
  • Publication Date: April 2025

Submission Process: Please submit your abstracts and manuscripts through the submission portal at: https://www.editorialmanager.com/gs/default2.aspx. Or email directly to the editor at CECL@bsu.edu. Submissions will undergo a rigorous double-blind peer review process. Accepted manuscripts will be published in a special issue of The Good Society.

varieties of skepticism

If you are a skeptic–or tempted by skepticism–you might want to consider which varieties of skepticism appeal to you and why. Here is a list of types that differ in significant ways:

  • Pyrrhonian skepticism (named after Pyrro of Elis, ca. 300 BCE, who founded the Skeptical School): A cultivated habit of refusing to believe or disbelieve all important matters, including skepticism itself. Its purpose is to accomplish mental peace by abandoning troubling questions and commitments. It advises the regular use of techniques that reduce our anxiety about the things we might believe or about not knowing what is true. For example, we can rehearse arguments on both sides of important questions to teach ourselves to suspend judgment.
  • Academic skepticism (the position adopted by the Academy, which Plato founded, but roughly six centuries after his death): A method that employs the arguments invented by the Pyrrhonists to refute the views of other philosophical schools, without a goal of landing in permanent agnosticism or promoting mental health. The term “academic” is apt, because this kind of skepticism is more like a toolkit for specialists than a way of life.
  • Cartesian skepticism (named after Rene Descartes, although practiced by others before and after him): A philosophical method that begins by doubting everything that is possible to doubt, especially deep and general beliefs, in order to identify any indubitable beliefs, which then become the foundations of a more secure philosophy. Here, the psychological goal is to accomplish certainty, not to escape from belief.
  • Edmund Husserl’s epoche: A more radical form of Cartesian skepticism, in which the analyst drops all the categories and vocabulary developed in the history of philosophy and tries to describe experience itself without preconditions. Although Husserl’s motives seem academic, there are similarities with meditative techniques that aim to transcend various kinds of dualities; and Husserl admired the Buddhist Pali Canon. As with Cartesian skepticism, the goal is truth, not freedom from belief.
  • Fallibilism: A belief that I could be wrong, which accompanies my other beliefs. This ancillary belief reminds me to check for errors, hedge against uncertainty, plan cautiously, and revisit assumptions. The psychological goal is more like permanent disquiet than calmness, although it may be possible to enjoy the constant pursuit of truth.
  • Intellectual humility: If fallibilism is about beliefs, humility is about people. (At least, that is how the words ring for me.) It’s the attitude that people who disagree with me may be right and I may be wrong. Its consequences can include a genuine receptivity to other people’s claims, an investment in generous listening, and a tolerance for rival views. Humility can be uncomfortable if it means self-reproach; but if it means an appreciation for our fellow human beings, it can satisfying.
  • Organized skepticism (one of the definitive features of science, according to Robert K. Merton): A set of procedures and practices that guide interactions among people who pursue truth together. Examples include double-blind peer-review or replicating other people’s experiments. Many of these techniques are supposed to be proof against the mental state of the scientist. Scientific methods do not attempt to make people humble in their hearts, but rather convert doubt into procedures.
  • Liberalism as self-correction: This is a cluster of ideas about how to design institutions that begins with worries about our ability to understand, judge, and plan wisely and thus recommends constantly challenging and revising the status quo. Proponents differ in their enthusiasm for elections, adversarial trials, individual rights, debate and deliberation, and/or markets as mechanisms for self-correction. For myself, I prefer a mix of these tools, because then each can check the others.
  • Specific distrust: This is belief that a given belief, person, group, or institution is probably wrong. It can be warranted, based on evidence–such as a record of lying or incompetence–or it can itself be mistaken. Unlike doubt about a belief, which is about content, distrust focuses on the source. If I say P, and you think not-P, that is a disagreement. But if you think, “I doubt that guy Peter Levine would be right about P,” that is distrust.
  • Social distrust: This is a variable measured by social scientists, and one classic measure is a question about trusting other people that has been included on the General Social Survey for decades (see the graph below). Although the question is vague and does not distinguish among kinds of trust or categories of people, individuals’ responses predict many valuable outcomes. Thus the measure is conceptually vague yet empirically valid. Distrust is a character trait that can be affected by social circumstances.
  • Institutional distrust: In contrast to a view that a specific institution should not be trusted, this is a general stance of skepticism about the influential institutions of a society, or at least a wide swath of them. It does not accept that institutions exhibit organized skepticism or liberal self-correction but takes them to be self-interested or even hostile. Like social distrust, this is a character trait that relates to social circumstances.

To put my own cards on the table: I admire fallibilism, humility, and institutionalized skepticism, in both science and politics. I accept that they can promote disquiet, but discomfort may be necessary for responsible action.

I also think there is a limited wisdom in Pyrrhonism. Although radical skepticism encourages passivity and removes motivations to care about other people, Pyrrhonist techniques for promoting doubt can counter anxiety and what Keats called an "irritable reaching after fact and reason." We need to know when to pursue truth and when to let it go. Furthermore, recognizing that there are matters beyond our ability to know or to capture in language is (for me) a source of comfort.

Specific distrust can be warranted, although we should strive to replace doubt about the source of a given claim with justified doubt about the claim itself. Disbelieving something because of who said it is an ad hominem argument, which is a logical fallacy. It is better to consider whether the claim is valid or not. The problem in the modern world is that no individual can assess most important beliefs, because they depend on countless people's previous contributions. To a large extent, we must trust or distrust the messenger, such as a teacher, physician, or engineer. And, in turn, that messenger learned from other specialists, who learned from others. The whole structure depends on trust.

Distrusting other people and institutions is understandable. The solution is not to hector people that they should trust more. Nevertheless, general distrust is harmful. It robs people of the advantages of modernity, such as the results of science.

An optimist might hope that by making institutions actually more fallibilist and self-correcting, we can encourage wider trust. However, in a world of propaganda and ideology--and deep inequality--such solutions may fail, and people may continue to distrust ideas that merit their belief.

One more version of skepticism is my favorite:

  • Michel de Montaigne read the Skeptics, particularly a 1562 translation of Sextus. He remained an active participant in public life--indeed, much better respected as a statesman than a writer during his own lifetime. However, his moderate skepticism influenced his politics. "I am firmly attached to the sanest of the parties, but I do not desire to be particularly known as the enemy of the others beyond what is generally reasonable" (1145). "During the present confusion in this State of ours my own interest has not made me fail to recognize laudable qualities in our adversaries nor reprehensible ones among those whom I follow" (1114). He felt that he had generally done his civic duty (1115), yet he reserved most of his time for private reflection. And in that domain, he avoided trying to know what was true (or whether previous authors were right or wrong) but rather made a study of himself. "I would rather be an expert on myself than on Cicero" (1218). When he looked within, he found numerous inconsistencies and imperfections. Rather than making him dissatisfied or irritable, these explorations gave him some "peace of mind and happiness" (1153). His equanimity palpably improved between "To Study Philosophy is to Learn to Die" (before 1580) and "Of Experience" (ca. 1590).

I quote Montaigne from M.A. Screech's translation. See also: Foucault’s spiritual exercises; does skepticism promote a tranquil mind?; Montaigne and Buddhism; against the idea of viewpoint diversity; Cuttings version 2.0: a book about happiness; thinking both sides of the limits of human cognition

Foucault the engaged scholar

I admit that I had long understood Michel Foucault as a “universal intellectual” — a thinker who conveys an original and general stance to the public, the nation, or the masses, serving as their conscience. If this intellectual is radically critical of the status quo, and his audience is the whole public, then the implication is: Revolution! Examples of revolutionary universal intellectuals include Rousseau, Marx, and Sartre.

Placed in that tradition, Foucault can be frustrating. He held a distinctive and original (albeit evolving) stance, he participated in radical politics in Tunisia and France, and he reached a global audience, yet he eschewed recommendations and explicit moral judgments. He seemed to conceal his own views, to the extent that he held them.

My take on Foucault has been changed (and my appraisal has been much improved) by reading three interviews conducted between 1976 and 1981 that are included in Rabinow’s and Rose’s The Essential Foucault anthology. These conversations have also revised my understanding of his major works.

In the 1976 interview, Foucault describes “universal intellectuals” as I did at the start of this post, but he says that “some years have passed since the intellectual has been called upon to play this role” (1976, 312). A universal intellectual works alone and addresses everyone. In contrast, a “specific intellectual”–a type that emerges after World War II (1976, 313)–works within an institution where knowledge and power come together. Examples include nuclear physicists, psychiatrists, social workers, magistrates, administrators, planners, and educators. They possess genuine knowledge that gives them influence. Since the failed revolution of 1968, it has become clear that beneficial social change depends on them, not on revolutionaries who fight the state (1976, 305). Specific intellectuals are becoming politically conscious and connected across disciplines and national borders (1976, 313).

And Foucault works with them. He doesn’t go into much detail about his own activities in these interviews, but we know that psychiatrists have read his works about mental illness and sexuality, prison administrators have read his book on prisons, and people who train professionals have assigned his texts; and he acknowledges their influence on him. Thus his audience is not “the people,” and his contribution is not a philosophy. Instead, he is a professional historian who contributes information and insights to various conversations that are also informed by the behavioral and social sciences and law.

In a 1981 interview, Didier Erihon suggests that “criticism carried about by intellectuals doesn’t lead to anything” (1981, 171). This is meant as a challenge to Foucault, whom Erihon assumes is an intellectual.

Foucault first notes that the previous twenty years have seen substantial changes–beneficial ones, I presume–in views of mental illness, imprisonment, and gender relations, issues on which he had worked intensively.

Next, he observes that progress does not result from political decisions alone; any policy requires implementation, and its impact depends on the people who implement it. At any rate, that is how I would gloss these words:

Furthermore, there are no reforms in themselves. Reforms do not come about in empty space, independently of those who make them. One cannot avoid considering those who will have to administer this transformation (1981, 171).

It follows that to influence the “assumptions” and “familiar notions” of practitioners is “utterly indispensable for any transformation” (172). (Compare my recent post on institutions).

Foucault concludes his response by criticizing the ways that universal intellectuals (whether famous or aspiring to fame) typically criticize society. He says, “A critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they are. …. Criticism consists in uncovering [everyday] thought and trying to change it” (1981, 172).

The key point, for me, is that “trying to change” something requires a strategy, and Foucault wants to abandon the strategy of changing everything all at once by telling The People that society is bad and should be different. His alternative strategy is to engage well-placed practitioners.

In the 1980 interview, Foucault elaborates his doubts about criticism that takes the form of denouncing existing things, ideas, or people:

It’s amazing how people like judging. Judgment is being passed everywhere, all the time. Perhaps its one of the simplest things mankind has been given to do. And you know very well that the last man, when radiation has finally reduced his last enemy to ashes, will sit down behind some rickety table and begin the trial of the individual responsible (1980, 176).

Foucault diagnoses Parisian intellectuals’ love of denouncing each other as a result of their “deep-seated anxiety that one will not be heard or read.” This anxiety motivates the “need to wage an ‘ideological struggle’ or to root out ‘dangerous thoughts'” (1980, 177).

The interviewer counters, “But don’t you think our period is really lacking in great writers and minds capable of dealing with its problems?” (1980, 177). Later, the same interviewer asks, “If everything is going badly, how do we make a start?” (1980, 178).

Foucault resists both pessimistic premises. “But everything isn’t going badly,” he exclaims (1980, 178). He describes a “plethora,” an “overabundance” of interesting ideas and people who have pent-up curiosity. The task, he proposes, is to “multiply the channels, the bridges, the means of information” so that more people with “thirst for knowledge” can learn from more other people (1980, 177).

In a passage that reminds me of Dewey’s The Public and its Problems (1924), Foucault describes his “dream of a new age of curiosity” (1980, 178). He says, “I like the word [curiosity]. It evokes ‘care’; it evokes the care one takes of what exists and what might exist.” (1980, 177). In the age of curiosity that he envisions, “people must be constantly able to plug into culture in as many ways as possible” (178-9).

Given Foucault’s understanding of his own role as a “specific intellectual,” he must have been at least somewhat concerned about his reputation. He was not only a historical specialist who helped fellow practitioners to become conscious of shared prejudices and to discover alternatives. He was also (and mainly) a world-famous French philosopher, a purported representative of movements like post-structuralism and postmodernism, whose public lectures on general subjects in venues like the Collège de France and UC-Berkeley were packed with aspiring philosophers, and whose interviews about the condition of the world were published in Le Monde and Libération.

I am not sure how he navigated this tension, not having read the biographies. But it’s clear that it worried him. In the 1980 interview, part of a series on major intellectuals in Le Monde, Foucault asks not to be named. The interview (still archived on Le Monde’s website), is headlined, “The Masked Philosopher.” It begins:

Here is a French writer of some renown. Author of several books whose success has been affirmed well beyond our borders, he is an independent thinker: he is not linked to any fashion, to any party. However, he only agreed to grant us an interview about the status of the intellectual and the place of culture and philosophy in society on one explicit condition: to remain anonymous. Why this discretion? Out of modesty, calculation or fear? The question deserved to be asked–even if, by the end of this conversation, the mystery will undoubtedly have dissipated for the most perceptive of our readers…

Foucault explains that he would like to try being anonymous “out of nostalgia for a time when, since I was quite unknown, what I said had some chance of being heard” (my translation). In other words, we cannot hear Foucault well unless we shake the model of a famous thinker who offers big ideas. He wants us, instead, to ask whether the claims about specific phenomena that we find in his works ring true or false and whether they are useful or not for our purposes.


Sources: Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power” (1976), “The Masked Philosopher” (1980), and “So is it Important to Think?” (1981), all in Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, The Essential Foucault (The New Press, 2003), but I retranslated the 1980 interview myself because of a misplaced modifier in the anthology. See also: Vincent Colapietro, “Foucault’s Pragmatism and Dewey’s Genealogies: Mapping Our Historical Situations and Locating Our Philosophical Maps,” Cognitio, 13/2 (2012), p. 187-218; Foucault’s spiritual exercises; does skepticism promote a tranquil mind?; and Civically Engaged Research in Political Science

civic themes at #APSA2024

Anyone who is attending this year’s annual American Political Science Association meeting in Philadelphia and who is curious about engaged research might consider:

Cutting Edge Community Empowerment through Civically Engaged Research: A Roundtable Discussion and Panel

This session will include five original papers and 8 responses, almost all by people who have been part of our annual Institute for Civically Engaged Research (ICER) at Tufts’ Tisch College of Civic Life. There will also be an ICER reception on September 7 from 7:30-9:00 PM, which anyone at APSA can attend. ICER will continue in 2025 and beyond, so these are good opportunities if you think you might be interested.

Another aspect of this year’s meeting is a mini-conference on “Civic Learning on Campus” (part 1 and part 2). One of my contributions to that strand will be a talk about Elinor Ostrom’s 1997 APSA presidential address. In that talk, she defined civic education as learning to address problems of collective action at all scales, not as studying the national government.

Finally, the Civic Studies Group brings you a panel on Innovations and Theories for Public Engagement, with papers on forms of self-governance at the community level.