universities and newsrooms as laboratories or debating societies

Higher education and the press are important sources of knowledge and insight in modern societies. I think that many people who are interested and concerned about these institutions view them as similar to either 1) labs or 2) debating societies. Both metaphors contain some truth but also mislead.

If you imagine an academic program or a newsroom as similar to a lab, then you will presume that its outputs are information and knowledge. You will probably expect the professionals (professors or reporters) to apply rigorous methods. Any good method counters biases, emotions, and other forms of subjectivity. For example, your own political views should not affect the results of a survey that you conduct if your sample is representative and your statistical techniques are appropriate. In this respect, sampling Americans’ views of Donald Trump is just like taking water samples to measure pH levels. Likewise, your opinions shouldn’t matter if you report on the municipal budget after interviewing a range of insiders and experts.

On this model, you would expect students and novice professionals to learn methods and to be aware of the best supported findings of previous research. Methods and findings should constitute the primary content of education.

When you see a professional consensus about a topic, that is a sign that its methods are working well. Disagreement is problematic, although you can hope that new data or new methods will resolve any temporary dispute.

On the other hand, if you imagine a college as similar to a debating society, then you will think first of a seminar room where there is a free-flowing discussion of a contentious issue (or perhaps a late-night argument in a dorm room). Similarly, you will think first of the op-ed page of a newspaper or a broadcast talk show.

Then you will expect to observe people expressing opinions. Disagreement is desirable–a debate is pointless if everyone agrees–and consensus can be a warning that the whole institution is biased. When someone makes an authoritative claim, along the lines of “We know that X,” you will be quick to suspect them of suppressing alternative views. Your evaluative criteria may include whether the expressed opinions are diverse, whether participants are appropriately open to alternative opinions, whether certain views should be excluded because they are out of bounds, and whether the institution reflects the range of opinions of some appropriate population. (For example, maybe a US broadcast network should present all opinions popular in the US electorate–although that claim is debatable.)

One drawback of the debating society model is that it overlooks the main activities of most professors and reporters: collecting information, applying methods, and reporting results. A session of a college course is much more likely to be spent discussing p-values or prosody than debating politics. In the case of journalism, the number of Americans paid to collect news has fallen by about 77 percent, on a per capita basis, since 1990. There may also be a declining public commitment to academic research across a range of fields.

Also, people who see universities and newsrooms as debating platforms may simply fail to reckon with stubborn information. Sometimes a professional consensus reflects facts, whether we like it or not.

However, if you assume that a university or a newsroom is like a lab, then you will not admit that any question pursued by a journalist or a professor reflects values–beliefs about what is important and why–and assumptions about which methods and sources are legitimate. There may be a neutral way to apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to a dataset, but there is no such thing as a neutral dataset. Someone chose to measure certain things because they seemed important.

Instead of being willing to debate and justify your own values and hear critiques of them, you may try to claim that values are irrelevant to your professional work. You will be most comfortable with domains where methods and findings seem relatively uncontroversial, such as the natural sciences and certain kinds of “hard news.” (There either was or was not a fire on Main Street last night).

As topics become controversial, you will become increasingly wary of the observers’ objectivity. For instance, humanities scholars study religion without endorsing specific religions, but you may wonder why something as contestable as a religious belief is a worthy topic, let alone whether an interpretive scholar of religion can be reliable.

For people who see research as value-free science, ethics is unintelligible. It clearly isn’t like a lab science, but if it’s just a matter of opinions, then it isn’t a discipline at all. At best, ethics is a set of legalistic boundaries around the research enterprise, like “Don’t collect data without people’s permission.”

In the modern world, we are confronted with the challenge of navigating both facts and values when the two are deeply connected. We must respect both rigorous methods and free debates. We are trying to grasp truths and honor other people who believe different things. These combinations are difficult.

We might also remember that institutions that are a bit like labs and a bit like debating societies are also other things. Colleges are literal homes for resident students, large-scale employers, institutional investors, landlords, developers, performance venues, and gatekeepers to valuable credentials. Many news agencies are for-profit companies, employers, advertising platforms, and entertainers. Blindness to those realities can make us too comfortable with either model–the lab or the debating society.


See also: when does a narrower range of opinions reflect learning?; what must we believe?
Max Weber on institutional neutrality etc.

Americans’ attitudes on the Bicentennial and at age 250

I played a very modest advisory role in the new NBC News Poll with More Perfect headlined “America 250.” As the graph above shows, most Americans say that we have succeeded (either a great deal or a fair amount) “over these 250 years in achieving the ideals for which this country was founded, as you understand them.”

I was a little surprised that these answers were quite similar at the Bicentennial–just a bit more positive in 1976 than they are today.

However, there are very big differences in how various groups answer these questions. More than twice as many older people than 18-24s think that we have achieved “a great deal” in pursuit of our ideals. Republicans are nearly four times more likely than Democrats to agree with that statement (51% of Republicans versus 13% of Democrats). Compared to both Blacks and Asian-Americans, both Whites and Latinos are far more likely to say that we have achieved a great deal toward our ideals.

IPSOS asked the same question this April and got the same response (77% thought we have succeeded a great deal or a fair amount). IPSOS also asked in what ways we have affected the world over 250 years, for good or ill. I show those responses below.

In brief, a plurality of respondents think that our impact on every category has been mixed, but more people perceive positive than negative outcomes. People see the biggest positive impact on technology and scientific innovation and the smallest on education and literacy, with democracy in between. As with the NBC poll, there is a sharp upward gradient with age.

I share these results without editorial commentary, except that I was a bit surprised that these surveys do not show much change compared to 50 years ago.

how markets predict news

I am absolutely no expert on Iran or international relations more generally. I happen to hold a theory, for whatever it might be worth. I think that the Iranian regime is hoping that the current war will cause a real economic crisis in the US–not a modest uptick in our inflation rate, but a serious recession.

For the Iranian leaders, a crisis would have two major advantages. First, once the American public believes that tangling with Iran can cause a recession, that would deter future US attacks. Second, once we’re in crisis, the Iranian regime may be able to get substantial cash or put pressure on Israel at the negotiating table.

They may be surprised (as I am) that a recession has not begun so far for the USA. (Other countries are already in serious pain.) But they are betting that the US will hit a recession before they lose power.

If this theory is true, then we would expect repeated news stories about negotiations (offers, counteroffers, boasts, and promises), yet no real progress. All statements about a pending “deal” would be meaningless.

If I were an investor who made independent decisions about stocks, then my prediction would have encouraged me to get out of the market early in the war. In that case, I would have missed a 16 percent increase in the S&P between the first day of bombing and June 1–a lot of profit. Even today, the market is well above where it was on Feb. 28.

On an hourly basis, the markets have risen when either combatant suggests that a deal is on the table but have fallen whenever either side acts aggressively. From my perspective, these moves are irrational because no such news has any meaning. But again, my superior wisdom would have prevented me from earning a 16% return if I were an independent investor.

For me, the interesting question is how to think about the predictive power of markets. Millions of decision-makers who have the means to obtain specialized information and the motivation to focus on reality should make better decisions than any individual. In this case, investors have been right, and I have been wrong.

Yet I suspect that many of those investors expect a crisis to hit, or at least they view it as a risk. One explanation for their behavior is rational but short-term thinking. Even if we treat any statement from Donald Trump as hot air, it is also reasonable to predict that the market will rise immediately after he says something optimistic. So it is rational to bet on the short-term gain.

Another explanation is that masses of investors are being misled by mistaken premises, including the assumption that the two parties are motivated to negotiate and that the US side is competent.

Friedrich Hayek made a powerful case for markets, but his theory would not rule out systematic bias in a situation like this. He argues that the world at large is too complex for anyone to model it, yet alone predict it. No one knows what will happen. However, markets typically function because actors need not predict the future state of the society or the world. If you own a business, you must only predict the costs of your inputs and the willingness of consumers to pay for your products. External events like wars and elections may affect those variables a bit, but usually you can make predictions by knowing your own market. Such choices aggregate to produce prices and market conditions.

When the critical variable is a non-economic event like a war, then large numbers of investment decisions do not reflect such local knowledge. Like surveys, markets simply aggregate what lots of people believe about the world despite their cognitive, informational, and motivational limitations and biases. And in this case, the demographic traits of many investors (based in the US and the global north, familiar with business, but unaccustomed to war) may make them systematically biased to trust Donald Trump to resolve a problem that he cannot come close to managing.


See also: how markets “think” about politics; The truth in Hayek.

is your consciousness a stream?

I recommend do-it-yourself (DIY) phenomenology. It is good for mental health to attend closely to our own experience, especially the ambiguous aspects of our inner lives, such as how we experience the will, the past, or our relationship to our own bodies. We should think about what we find when we introspect.

The goal is not to discover truths that will make us happy. Instead, we want to reveal complexities and depths that we can appreciate. By seeing ourselves as much more than suffering machines, we can increase how much we can enjoy being ourselves.

Here is an example of a phenomenological question that might attract your curiosity: Is your consciousness (or, you might say, your attention) a single “stream”?

William James coined the phrase “stream of consciousness” in 1890 as part of an argument that consciousness “does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life” (James 1890, p. 239, italics in the original).

James acknowledges that we can be interrupted, but he thinks that interruptions are always absorbed into the stream. For example, “what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it” (p. 241). He also acknowledges that our consciousness has an uneven pace. He says,

As we take, in fact, a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us first is this different pace of its parts. Like a bird’s life, it seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this, where every thought is expressed in a sentence, and every sentence closed by a period (p. 243).

However, other close observers of themselves do not find anything that looks like a “stream.” The philosopher Galen Strawson finds this metaphor “inapt.” For him, “Thought has very little natural continuity or experiential flow—if mine is anything to go by. It keeps slipping from mere consciousness into self-consciousness and out again” (Strawson 2018, p. 350). Strawson observes that his own consciousness seems to launch repeatedly from “prior state[s] of complete, if momentary, nonconsciousness. …. It’s as if consciousness is continually restarting. It keeps banging out of nothingness. It’s a series of comings-to.” (p. 380)

I do not think this dispute has been resolved, which is good news if you want an open question to whet your curiosity about your inner life.

It could be (as Strawson thinks) that people vary. Some of us have streams of consciousness, while for others, experience comes in disconnected blocs. If that is the case, an interesting question arises about what consciousness is, if it is subject to such variation. (This question is relevant to debates about whether a computer can be conscious.) Or it could be that either James or Strawson is right about consciousness, and the other one is interpreting his own inner life wrong.

Meanwhile, you are free to decide for yourself.


Sources: William James The Principles of Psychology, 1918 (first edition 1890); Galen Strawson, Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, the Self, Etc. (New York Review Books, 2018). See also: joys and limitations of phenomenology; some basics; people as clusters of attention

the worlds we can lose when intelligence becomes artificial

In 1958, Hannah Arendt could see where were were headed:

This future man, whom the scientists tell us they will produce in no more than a hundred years, seems to be possessed by a rebellion against human existence as it has been given, a free gift from nowhere (secularly speaking), which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has made himself. …

It would be as though our brain, which constitutes the physical, material condition of our thoughts, were unable to follow what we do, so that from now on we would indeed need artificial machines to do our thinking and speaking. If it should turn out to be true that knowledge (in the modern sense of know-how) and thought have parted company tor good, then we would indeed become the helpless slaves, not so much of our machines as of our know-how, thoughtless creatures at the mercy of every gadget which is technically possible, no matter how murderous it is. (Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, p. 3)

What is “human existence as it has been given”?

For most of our history, most human beings have lived with other people whose names they know. They have worked individually and collaboratively with materials in their context to make an environment that I will call a “world.”

A world has these features:

  • It is imbued with moral significance, because other people have made it, given it meaning, cared about it, and been affected by it. An individual cannot interact with a world without causing good or harm to other people.
  • It is real, not imaginary, and therefore it is stubborn. It rarely turns out the way we want, but we can learn from experience to work more effectively with it.
  • The other people involved in any world hold partially conflicting interests and goals and can be stubborn in their own way. Both the materials and the people resist any single will.
  • Each person has partial and even biased knowledge, beliefs, and feelings about the world. But their varied ideas can accumulate as they express them and record them. Each person can therefore explore not only a world but the accumulated human experience of that world.
  • Because we must act in the company of other people and learn by acting, our “thinking and speaking” are closely connected.
  • Because our deepest concerns (moral, spiritual, and otherwise) relate to the world that we shape with our minds and hands, our “thought” is also connected to our “know-how.”
  • Each world typically predates each human being and survives the person’s death, yet each person can affect it. In fact, the birth of any human being automatically changes the world, if for no other reason than a birth turns people into parents, siblings, and other kinds of relatives.
  • There is not one world but many human worlds. But worlds can interact to various degrees without becoming subsumed into one bigger world.

Why it is good to live in a world

It is not obvious that living in this kind of world is the best imaginable form of life. Most people have envisioned heaven or a political utopia differently. (For instance, in an ideal world, the other people usually become less stubborn!) But I could make three arguments in favor of living in a world like this.

First, it seems plausible that homo sapiens evolved for such a life. Our brains, senses, and bodies are equipped to navigate it.

For instance, newborn infants already recognize faces, which are designed to communicate information and emotions. And our languages and cultures have accumulated deep resources for sharing a world with finite other human beings. The Proto-Indo-European language already used first-, second-, and third-person verbs and indicative, imperative, and subjunctive moods to make distinctions that are useful for group discussions about a common world. Thus a world is arguably our habitat.

Second, the combination of agency and humility seems morally compelling. It is fitting that we can affect our environment but not do just anything we individually want with it. And we should see our context as imbued with moral significance.

Third, navigating a world is a way for creatures like us to achieve comprehension, to make sense of matters. As Arendt writes:

There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great relevance to man in the
singular, that is, to man in so far as he is not a political being, whatever else he may be. Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves (1958, p. 4).

Threats to human worlds

Each human world has always been fragile, subject to destruction if invaders arrive, a plague strikes, or the community breaks down.

In addition, tyrants threaten any shared world because they can turn individuals into means to their solo ends.

Mass society puts each world at risk by bringing us into relationships with millions of others, whose names we will never learn. And mass economic exploitation makes matters worse. In Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt says, “loneliness, on the experience of not belonging to the world at all, … is among the most radical and desperate experiences of man. [It is] is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time.”

When history seems to move quickly and beyond anyone’s control, humans cease to feel that they are agents in any recognizable world.

Ideology can be defined as any system of thought that substitutes core assumptions for actual engagement with other people in a common world.

Finally, although media can enrich any given world, it can also disrupt it. Imagine people sitting alone or in passive company before a TV screen that tells them about gruesome crimes. Their actual world may be safe, or less dangerous than it was in the past, but the mediated world is cruel.

New threats in the age of AI

This theoretical framework comes from Arendt, who drew on Heidegger’s fundamental insight that the human form of being (Dasein) is always “‘in’ the world in the sense that it deals with entities encountered within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with familiarity” (Being and Time, H105, trans. by Macquarrie & Robinson). Arendt makes Heidegger’s theory political and republican by emphasizing that people can talk and decide what to do with their worlds.

I have sketched this view to help make sense of a new phenomenon: intelligence that is artificial (AI). But Arendt already feared that we might “need artificial machines to do our thinking and speaking.”

When a person expresses a view, the content of what they say helps us to understand the world that the person inhabits. Even when people are flat-out wrong, the fact that they err or lie is part of our reality. In addition, a human view comes from a creature that can suffer. As such, it makes a claim on our compassion. In short, we attend not only to the content of the statement but also to the person who expressed it.

In contrast, when a large language model (LLM) answers a query (typically in the first-person singular and with emotive language like “I will be glad to …”), it does not reflect any particular perspective, nor does it come from a body that is capable of suffering. It just pretends to be a fellow participant in our world. We can attend to the words but not to the speaker.

Walter Cronkite was not really a visitor to Americans’ living rooms in 1970. He just appeared on TV screens. But he was a real person who could be assessed as such. An LLM is qualitatively different.

An LLM can be just another tool or resource, like a Heidegger’s hammer or perhaps like a library. I have collaborated with teams of Tufts engineering students to build the Civic Helpdesk and other applications of AI that are not yet publicly available. Working with them to fine-tune instructions or to design a user interface feels very much like collaborative work in a shared world. Note that I naturally said we “built” these tools, because the work feels roughly like building a shed, or perhaps an organization.

I have also developed what I think is a fairly tight practice of asking Claude about the Sanskrit and Pali original words in texts that I can only read in translation. This feels like a modest expansion of my inner life, if not a contribution to any shared world. (By the way, Claude is probably pulling these definitions from a finite set of published lexicons that have human authors.)

On the other hand, as Pope Leo notes in Magnifica humanitas, “current AI systems are more ‘cultivated’ than ‘built,’ for developers do not directly design every detail, but instead create a framework within which the intelligence ‘grows.’ As a result, fundamental scientific aspects — such as the internal representations and computational processes of these systems — remain, at present, unknown.” This sounds more like Arendt’s nightmare of a time when our thoughts cannot grasp what we have done.

The deepest concern is that we have developed biologically and culturally to flourish in what Arendt would call a world, but an individual who uses AI is no longer there.


See also: the papal encyclical on AI; Reading Arendt in Palo Alto; the human coordination involved in AI; the difference between human and artificial intelligence: relationships; the design choice to make ChatGPT sound like a human; and love of the world