comparing Minnesota to the rest of the country after a year of grassroots resistance

On Tuesday, the Charles F. Kettering Foundation awarded an annual Democracy Prize to the people of the Twin Cities, saying:

The response of the people of the Twin Cities—Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, and the surrounding communities—to the immigration enforcement action nicknamed Operation Metro Surge in early 2026 was a rapid, sophisticated mobilization that reactivated the mutual aid and community defense networks first established after the 2020 murder of George Floyd and the protests that followed.

I totally agree with this. As a member of the Kettering board, I am proud that we made this award.

The Kettering Foundation and Gallup also conducted a national survey about democracy and civic engagement in April-June 2026. It asked a rich array of questions, including timely ones like: “Are you concerned about people being harmed by federal agents, military, or law enforcement during peaceful protests?”* Its 23,683 nationally representative respondents included 392 people from Minnesota, allowing comparisons between Minnesotans and other Americans.

I hypothesized that Minnesotans would show especially high levels of engagement. My premise was based not only on the headlines about events last winter and after George Floyd’s murder but also many previous studies that have found that the state has among the highest level of social capital: participation, membership, and trust. Robert Putnam (2001, p. 69) displays a map of civic engagement by state that resembles a weather map, observing a “high pressure” zone over the Mississippi’s headwaters and a “low pressure” zone over Louisiana and much of the former confederacy.

I found that after this winter’s intense resistance, Minnesotans were more likely to report protesting, volunteering in groups to improve local conditions, and following the news than other Americans. They reported spending less time on social media and attending religious services less often. These differences were statistically significant.

I also expected that Minnesotans would hold different opinions about relevant current events and issues. The following differences were statistically significant:

Overall, I would observe a higher level of concern about threats to democracy and more negative appraisals of our system in Minnesota. It is especially interesting that Minnesotans are less optimistic about democracy’s long-term future than other Americans are. But they do trust their own families and friends more.

These results generally met expectations, although I had wondered whether Minnesotans might have become more optimistic after what I regard as their partial victory on the streets of the Twin Cities. This does not seem to be true.

I did not expect them to report less time on social media, but that might be an important finding. They were on the streets, not on Instagram.

I would not have expected Minnesotans to attend religious services less than other Americans. Congregations can be important drivers of civic engagement, and some of the Minnesota resistance has been faith-based. However, this finding is consistent with my recent analysis of the national data, which showed that religious attendance was negatively related to pro-democratic values right now. I think this pattern is changeable, and some people are working inside Christianity to change it.

I would also note that the differences shown so far are not very large. They are detectable because of the large sample but not necessarily dramatic.

And I found no statistically significant differences on these questions:

  • Are you concerned about people being harmed by federal agents during peaceful protests?
  • How often do you attend events in your community, such as festivals, town halls, arts performances, etc.?
  • Are the beliefs and experiences of people like you valued and respected by other people in the country?
  • Are people in your community willing to help their neighbors?
  • How much power do ordinary citizens have to create change in our nation?
  • Do you identify as an American? As a member of your local community?
  • How much do you trust religious leaders, business leaders, and education leaders?
  • How well are the people playing their role in the democratic process?
  • What word or phrase would you associate with the word “democracy” (Choices include free and fair elections, by the people, freedom, equality, etc.)
  • Do you agree or disagree that democracy is the best form of government?

In many cases, Minnesotans gave more desirable responses (per my own values) than other Americans did, but not to a statistically significant extent.

As we would have expected, Minnesotans are somewhat more involved in democracy. They also display more critical, skeptical, or pessimistic views than other Americans.

If you had assumed that Minnesota is a beacon of civic life and that no other metro area could rise to the occasion as the Twin Cities did last winter, this post might make you more optimistic. I did not compare Minnesota to individual other states, but I could imagine that some might perform as well, and even the average is not so far behind.

Our democracy has much room to improve, but Minnesota is not a positive outlier. The whole US shows democratic potential.


*I have paraphrased this item and others. The original dataset is here. The reference is: R.D. Putnam (2001) “Community Based Social Capital and Educational Performance” in Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society, edited by Diane Ravitch and Joseph P. Viteritti (Yale University Press), pp. 58–95. See also: community engagement and concern for democratic values; church attendance, religious identity, and politics” [revisited]; the state of nonviolent grassroots resistance, etc.

the growth of undergraduate public policy majors

Laura Pappano has an article in the syndicated Hechinger Report entitled “Students want hands-on training in the work of democracy. Colleges are answering.” It is mainly about the growth of undergraduate majors in public policy, which often originate in policy schools that traditionally served graduate-level professional students.

In the article, I say:

The focus on experiential learning appeals to today’s students, who tend to be “anxious about whether what they’re studying is going to get them a job, … And public policy seems pretty concrete, like you could work in state government.” Many young people right now are “very alienated from national politics. That’s “going to turn some of them, I think very wisely, to state and local politics [which] they may have been overlooking.”

Public policy majors are growing and spreading. Pappano writes, “Jodi Sandfort, dean of the Evans School of Public Policy & Governance at the University of Washington, whose public service and policy major started last year, said eight students graduated with it last spring — and 118 applied to the major this fall.”

It so happens that I visited the Evans School last week. While I was there, I made an appearance in a large undergraduate course. I acknowledged that federal civil service is only one form of public service. But I added that few young people have been interested in federal jobs during this century, even those who vote to expand federal programs. This is an anomaly: many young people who supported FDR, JFK or LBJ also aspired to work in Washington, and many did. But in ’08, when I asked college students who supported Obama whether they wanted to work for the executive branch, almost none said they were considering it. Nor did students flock to Washington to work for the expanded government led by Joe Biden.

I realize that many students would not want to work for the Trump Administration (although some do), but I invited the University of Washington students to imagine that a 2028 presidential candidate proposes to fill many of the 400,000 federal jobs that have been lost under Trump by hiring idealistic newcomers. Would they follow a generational call to rebuild and renew the civil service?

The other two programs that Pappanno describes are based in the University of Wisconsin’s LaFollette School and in the Olin College of Engineering. I am privileged to be friends with LaFollette’s Amber Wichowsky and Olin’s Erhardt Graeff (both mentioned in the article), each of whom took a summer institute with me. So this feels like a network.

Undergraduate-level public policy can be compared to Civic Thought curricula, which are often more historical and humanities-based and concerned with a “tradition”; Politics, Philosophy, and Economics (PPE), which is often more contemporary and concerned with questions of political economy; and Civic Studies, which addresses the question “What should we do?” in contrast to the question, “What should the policy be?” In Civic Studies, social movements and voluntary associations are often more prominent than constitutions and governmental institutions.

All of the above are growing these days. I’ve also made a case that Black Studies is a form of Civic Studies. The differences among them are interesting, but a thousand flowers should bloom.


See also a generational call to rebuild; is Black Studies Civic Studies?

a chatbot for civic action

Last spring, I had the pleasure of working with a team of Tufts computer science students who built Sage, a chatbot that can help people who face a threat or consequences of wildfire to “take informed action and work together with their communities to rebuild and move forward.”

The underlying theory is that effective groups need documents: recruitment messages, agendas, budgets, job descriptions, mission statements, and more. An application of a large language model can not only draft such documents but also help people see what documents they need.

Democracy and local communities would be stronger if more groups of concerned people gelled into effective organizations that collected time and money from their own members, used their resources to build their own capacity, made collective decisions, and acted.

I am all for teaching people how to do those things, but it’s unrealistic to offer civic education of this type to millions of adults. An alternative is to help groups organize themselves effectively so that they can focus on the substance of their work. And one way to help them is to draft useful documents.

Since 2025, I have offered a Civic Helpdesk on this site that can help people address any issue. The Tufts students who built Sage chose to focus on one topic, wildfire. They built a considerably more sophisticated application than mine. It is informed by a substantial set of documents that I helped to choose for them, reflecting what I consider good practices for organizing voluntary groups. It favors paid local journalism as its source of information. And it encourages people to get off the AI and interact with other humans.

Sage could be relatively easily repurposed for other issues.

it wasn’t the economy

According to the AP exit polls, “About 4 in 10 U.S. voters nationally say the economy is the most important issue facing the country, as most express concern about gas prices and the cost of groceries.”

This finding does not mean that economic circumstances determined the outcome. For one thing, six in ten respondents had other top priorities. And even for those who picked the economy as the single most important issue, other issues may have influenced their decisions.

But more importantly, the claim that economic performance explains this election–or US elections, in general–is tenuous. The economic statistic that is generally found to correlate best with electoral outcomes is the change in real median household income (i.e., income adjusted for inflation). In the graph that accompanies this post, I show that statistic for election years, along with the change in the vote share of the party that had won the election two years before.

As you would expect, the two lines correlate negatively–lower growth in real income goes along with worse performance for the party that had won the last time. But the correlation is not very high, at -0.33. I also tried some other economic statistics, such as the change in real disposable income one quarter before each election and the change in median household income, but the correlations were even weaker.

It was 1992 when James Carville said, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Indeed, economic discontent probably helped his boss, Bill Clinton, win the White House that year. But the graph shows that real disposable income rose in 1992, yet the incumbent Republican lost the White House and the Democrats lost vote share and nine seats in the House.*

Furthermore, the 2026 election has reduced the correlation between economics and electoral outcomes. I had to use projected or predicted statistics for 2026. I guessed that the annual change in median income, adjusted for inflation, will be +1 percent for this year as a whole. And I guessed that Democrats will take 56% of the national vote when all the ballots are counted. The graph shows that the collapse in Republicans’ vote far exceeds what one would expect from the modest change in real income.

I know that people dislike paying $4/gallon for gasoline. Inflation may also support a broader verdict of broken promises, corruption, and incompetence. But $4/gallon gasoline does not explain one of the biggest swings in electoral support in a half century.**

I want to counter a relatively cynical interpretation–that Americans would have supported a would-be authoritarian president, except that prices happened to rise on his watch. I really don’t think they like this president or what he stands for.


*I acknowledge that a lot of the economic growth happened at the end of 1992, too late to save George H.W. Bush. However, in the second quarter, real disposable income had already risen by 2.8 points, which should have helped him.

**Many would say it’s the biggest swing since 1974. My graph makes it the second-biggest change, because I chose to compare each year to two years prior, not four years prior. There are arguments for either approach.

organizing against data centers–the start of something big?

Anusha Mathur has a very well reported piece in The Washington Sun entitled “How the Data Center Debate Revived Local Politics in 2026.” She describes vivid examples and characters from communities like Festus, MO, “One of the first places, as far as I could tell, where the data center debate sent a jolt of life into an otherwise sleepy local political scene.” There, and in some other places, opposing a local data center has brought people into official politics for the first time and has even had benefits that “extend beyond politics”:

“People are getting together and talking,” [Festus zoning board member Rick] Belleville said. “They’re having barbecues and potlucks, getting to know their neighbors.” In a strange way, data centers have helped revive civic life in Festus. “We have subdivisions of 80 homes, for example, near the proposed site where they never really talked to each other much,” Belleville told me. “Their HOA was falling apart. Now that all 80 people know each other and they’re a real tight-knit community, this has brought them together.”

I’m quoted, saying things like this: “You can’t vote on regulating Silicon Valley. It’s not on the ballot … But if they’re going to build a data center in your community, you could block that. It’s just a leverage point, and once it’s a leverage point, it’s also an organizational opportunity.”

I think that’s true, but the article makes it real.