Here is a quick interview of me for Tufts’ Center for Expanding Viewpoints in Higher Education. I think the question was something like this: “Why is it important to include diverse points of view?” Even though I appear to be looking heavenward for answers, I stand by my claim that ethical reasoning is comparative; and we need direct exposure to diverse views to be able to make comparisons.

A subtle point: for reasons that Andrew Perrin and Christian Lundberg present in this Boston Globe editorial, I don’t love the metaphor of viewpoints. It implies that each person has a stance that explains all their specific views, and we either stand in the same place as another person (in which case our mentalities are identical) or in a different place (therefore destined to disagree). I prefer to think in terms of networks of beliefs that may overlap.* Nevertheless, John Stuart Mill’s basic argument for diversity of values applies.

I would also note that the argument for value-diversity conflicts with the goal of objectivity. If we can use objective methods to settle issues related to policy or social criticism, then it doesn’t matter what values we bring to the conversation. On the other hand, if values are simply manifestations of our viewpoints or identities (or preferences), then there is no point in reasoning about them. Ethical reasoning is neither subjective nor scientific but discursive and comparative.

*See Mapping Ideologies as Networks of Ideas (Journal of Political Ideologies 29 (3), 464-491) and People Are Not Points in Space: Network Models of Beliefs and Discussions ( Critical Review 36 (1-2), 119-145)