political science and the public

At the Midwest Political Science Association meeting over the weekend in Chicago, the distinguished political scientists Arthur Lupia, Jeffrey Isaac, Marc Lynch, Rogers M. Smith, and Lynn Vavreck discussed “Political Science and The Public: It’s Time for More Effective Engagement.” As the program promised, the panel was “about what we are, and can be, doing right now to increase the public relevance of political science.”

Lupia began the panel with a forceful argument that the problem is not with the public. People are overwhelmed with data and opinion; the competition for their attention is fierce. The problem is with us if we fail to communicate effectively. Several panelists noted that we now have many venues for doing so, and political scientists are using them. Lynch, for example, is one of the leaders of The Monkey Cage, the Washington Post’s blog for political scientists; Vavreck is often on TV.

Everyone acknowledged pitfalls and challenges. Writing for the public may not help get tenure; it takes time; and it can seduce you into trading scholarly rigor for public attention. I think the general view was that scientific expertise adds value to public debates. As Vavreck said, there is a difference between data and anecdotes. Political scientists should contribute reliable data (as well as sensitive readings of texts) and not abuse their professional standing by merely opining or making empirical claims outside their expertise. “Stay in your lane” and “Don’t write about the Red Sox” were suggestions made from the podium.

I see important truth in all of this and tried to address similar issues in my Knight Foundation/Aspen Institute White Paper on Civic Engagement and Community Information. But I think Isaac hinted at difficult issues regarding expertise. A simplistic fact/value distinction would encourage political scientists to write about facts for public audiences and leave the public to draw their own value distinctions. That would be a neat division of labor. Unfortunately …

Research programs are always deeply imbued with values. That’s easiest to see when one objects to the values. Plenty of critics have complained that neoclassical economics makes assumptions about social welfare, choice, individualism, etc. that should be controversial. But to say that a research program makes normative assumptions is not to undermine it. Good research programs have good values. For instance, I know and admire the work of Smith and Vavreck, each of whom (in different ways) helps to expand the exercise of political power in the US. That is a good thing to do. But political science, as a science, cannot tell us whether or why it is good.

Further, research is always aimed at some kind of audience and has effects on that audience, whether anticipated or not. Neoclassical economics gives corporate lobbyists arguments to use when they influence voters and policymakers. Sociological research on community organizing should assist community organizers. Choosing an audience is a political act. Expertise cannot distinguish whether that act is good or bad.

One way in which experts affect audiences is by influencing their sense of what is known, what is knowable, and who can know what. For instance, the Monkey Cage announces, “H.L. Mencken said ‘Democracy is the art of running the circus from the monkey cage.’ Here at The Monkey Cage, we talk about political science research and use it to make some sense of the circus that is politics.” That implies that a person who knows political science can make more sense of the democratic system than someone who doesn’t. I don’t disagree, but the implications are complex. Should people who don’t know political science not participate in politics? In 1914, the APSA’s Committee of Seven argued that citizens “should learn humility in the face of expertise.” Nobody would say that now, but why not? If there is expertise, and some lack it, shouldn’t they be humble in its face?

In short, as Isaac said, there is not one political science and one American public. Fairly diverse political scientists hold a range of normative positions and use a range of tools to various ends; and Americans belong to whole set of competing publics. Asserting that political scientists should communicate facts to the public overlooks complex political and normative issues: Which political scientists? (And who gets to be one in the first place?) Which publics? What kinds of facts? To what end?

Political science, as an empirical research program, can contribute to addressing these meta-questions. For example, it can help us to know which forms of communication are likely to affect which audiences by changing their minds on the issue or by raising or lowering their estimation of their own capacity. But it cannot tell us whether these results are good or bad.

Frontiers of Democracy Conference, Boston, July 16-18, 2014

Please join the Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service, the Democracy Imperative, and the Deliberative Democracy Consortium for:

Frontiers of Democracy: July 16-18, 2014
At Tufts University’s Boston, MA campus

Register  |   Preliminary Agenda

Who’s on the bus, and where is it going? The state of the civic field

Civic work is proliferating: many different kinds of people, working in different contexts and issue areas, are expanding the ways in which citizens engage with government, community, and each other. It is increasingly clear that growing inequality, social and political fragmentation, and lack of democratic opportunities are undermining our efforts to address public priorities such as health, education, poverty, the environment, and government reform.

But attempts to label the responses – as “civic engagement,” “collaborative governance,” “deliberative democracy,” or “public work” – or to articulate them as one movement or policy agenda under a heading like “civic renewal” or “stronger democracy” – immediately spark debates about substance, strategy, and language.

Though it is clear we have many principles and practices in common, we differ on what we should call this work and where it is headed. In order for “overlapping civic coalitions”* to form, the potential  partners would have to work through goals, assumptions, and differences. Register now and join us July 16-18 for an invigorating, argumentative, civil discussion on the state and future of the civic field.

Visit the Frontiers of Democracy website for more information and a preliminary agenda.

* Peter Levine, We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For, chapter 7 (“Strategies”)

 

Chief Justice Roberts on corruption

I yield to very few people in my concern about money-in-politics, having worked for Common Cause from 1991-93 and consistently studied the issue since then. Yesterday’s McCutcheon decision, although generally anticipated by experts on campaign finance law, is deeply discreditable.

Chief Justice Roberts asserts that since Buckley v Valeo, “This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. … No matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable governmental objective to ‘level the playing field,’ or to ‘level electoral opportunities,’ or to ‘equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates.’

I do not completely disagree with this. I’d argue that it is constitutional to regulate campaign contributions to further democratic-process objectives, such as making political campaigns relatively more competitive or to reduce the disproportionate impact of big donors. But the most effective way to “level the playing field” among candidates or among citizens is not to rely on limits; it is to subsidize campaigns. Regulatory limits are cheap and popular, hence much easier to pass than subsidies, but they are not especially effective. And they do raise genuine First Amendment concerns. Congress could set limits so high as to be irrelevant, but it could also intentionally set the limits so low as to prevent challengers from getting their messages out. Incumbents actually have an interest in low campaign spending, and that is a reason to be somewhat skeptical about spending limits as a tool for changing the balance of power in elections.

However, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett (2011), the Supreme Court also struck down public subsidies for candidates who agreed to limit their spending. The Arizona case left as the only permissible remedy a system of public financing that coexists with unlimited private money.

Roberts concedes that regulation is constitutional to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. But in yesterday’s decision, he defines “corruption” very narrowly:

Moreover, while preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—“quid pro quo” corruption. … Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption. … And because the Government’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access. … The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights.

There is no doubt that people and organizations that make large campaign contributions are doing so to obtain influence. That is the case even when their spending is basically defensive–when they are hoping to avoid trouble rather than purchase benefits. Today’s New York Times quotes a lobbyist who says, “We hate [the McCutcheon decision.] We were joking around with the partners today: Guess my kids are going to community college. There is going to be no end in sight. Campaigns now will take as much as you will give.” If these lobbyists feel they must give money to avoid falling into the bad graces of politicians, that is quid pro quo corruption. It is simply not provable as such in a court, because there is no explicit deal of money for a vote. Donors are not trying to “control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties” but increasing the odds of favorable treatment. If you think their payments are “free speech,” you have a debased sense of freedom, reason, and citizenship.

The word “corruption” must be given a much broader definition than explicit bribery. We must be able to determine that our system is corrupt in the sense of violating its own high principles, and we must be able to address that problem through legislation. A Supreme Court that blocks such remedies is itself corrupt, in the fundamental sense of the word.

As I write in We Are The Ones We Have Been Waiting For,

The Citizens United decision was the logical conclusion of a half century of retreat from notions of the public good. … This decision capped a century-long process in which special interests became “civil society,” Madison’s factions became “constituencies” or “stakeholders,” propaganda became “public relations” and “communications,” corporate pressure became “government relations,” and lobbying morphed from a disreputable matter of hanging around hotel lobbies and button-holing politicians into a white-collar profession.

I should not have written that Citizens United was “the logical conclusion” of our slide into corruption. McCutcheon is that. Americans should be angry and ashamed.

a portrait of American teenagers’ out-of-school life

Earlier this week, we released CIRCLE Working Paper #80 by Kei Kawashima-Ginsberg: “Harry, Hermione, Ron, and Neville – Portraits of American Teenagers’ Extracurricular Involvement, and Implications for Educational Interventions.” Kei uses cluster analysis to divide all American high school seniors into six groups, depending on their extracurricular activities. Each group has strikingly different social class backgrounds and divergent prospects for academic success and civic engagement after high school.

Extracurricular activities provide crucial opportunities to learn skills, develop networks, and explore passions. We must invest in opportunities for the roughly 35% of American high school seniors who are largely left out of after-school activities. (And that is an underestimate, because Kei assesses only those students who have stayed in school until 12th grade.)

Following in the tradition of an excellent 2001 paper that associated groups of real American teenagers with characters from the movie “The Breakfast Club,”* Kei identifies each cluster of American teens with a different character from the Harry Potter series. This is partly a mnemonic, but it also makes the point that characters are complex and trajectories are changeable. If we called 16% of American youth “slackers” (because they do not report being involved in anything constructive out of school) that would present a unidimensional image and suggest that they are irretrievably lost to civic society. But by associating them with the Weasley Twins, Kei reminds us that they have complex and varied characters and are subject to change.

* Barber, B. L., Eccles, J. S., & Stone, M. R. (2001). Whatever happened to the jock, the brain, and the princess? Young adult pathways linked to adolescent activity involvement and social identity. Journal of Adolescent Research, 19(5), 429-455

my Fox News piece on ObamaCare

In lieu of a substantive post here today, I’ll link to my own op-ed (on the somewhat unlikely venue of FoxNews.com), entitled “ObamaCare and America’s youth — why lessons of 2014 will last a lifetime.” I argue that the big question is what ideological conclusion the Millennials draw from ObamaCare, because their fundamental political orientation will be set in their youth. If the Millennials decide that Obamacare was a fiasco, they’ll move right. If they conclude that it worked as designed, it will boost the technocratic center-left of Clinton and Obama. But they could decide that it was a tool for citizen groups to increase coverage and cut costs–a participatory democratic lesson. That would require that we tell a different story about ObamaCare and that we strengthen the actual participatory elements of the Act.