the Civic Studies Institute spreads to Ukraine

Thanks to our colleague Dr. Tetyana Kloubert of the University of Augsburg and a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst), the Summer Institute of Civic Studies that we hold annually at Tufts is adding a parallel institute in Ukraine, which I will help to teach in 2015. Ukrainian scholars and practitioners are strongly encouraged to apply. We will also consider applications
from Germany, Belarus and Poland. Please feel free to circulate this announcement.

Summer Institute of Civic Studies and Civic Education
Call for Applications

We are happy to invite you to participate in the Summer Institute of Civic Studies and
Civic Education that will take place in Ukraine from 3-16 August 2015 (at the Chernivitsi National Yuriy Fedkovych University).

The Summer Institute of Civic Studies and Civic Education is organized by a team from Tufts University (Prof. Peter Levine), the University of Maryland (Prof. Karol Soltan) and the University of Augsburg (Dr. Tetyana Kloubert).

Objectives and topics

The Summer Institute of Civic Studies and Civic Education is an intensive, two-week, interdisciplinary seminar bringing together advanced graduate students, faculty, and practitioners from diverse fields of study.

The Summer Institute of Civic Studies and Civic Education deals with issues of development of civil society, the role of an individual/citizen in society, the role of education in promoting democracy, the role of institutions in the development of a civil society and questions related to the ethical foundation of civic issues in a (democratic)
society. These topics will be examined in international and comparative perspectives, considering European (especially German) and US-American civic traditions. International examples will be discussed in the context of consolidation of democracy in
Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine.

The Summer Institute of Civic Studies and Civic Education engages participants in challenging discussions such as:

  • What kinds of citizens (if any) do good regimes need?
  • What should such citizens know, believe, and do?
  • What practices and institutional structures promote the right kinds of citizenship?
  • What ought to be the relationships among empirical evidence, ethics, and strategy?

Summer Institutes of Civic Studies have been annually organized by Peter Levine and Karol Soltan at Tufts University since 2009.

How to apply

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two perspectives on our political paralysis

Let’s define “governing” in a democracy (and I mean really governing, as opposed to administering or muddling through) as putting an agenda before the people, achieving a mandate, and enacting the agenda before the next election offers a verdict.

No one has governed the United States, in this sense, for at least a quarter century, except for transient and incomplete moments: Reagan cutting taxes in 1980-82, Clinton raising taxes to balance the budget in 1992-4, G.W. Bush cutting taxes and passing the Patriot Act after 9/11, and Obama passing the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010. But those names also remind us of abandoned agendas. Under Reagan, taxes and spending rose as a percentage of GDP and the federal service added a net 230,000 jobs. In retrospect, it’s hard to say what the domestic policy agendas of Clinton or the two Bushes were. Obama stopped governing (in the sense I mean here) when he lost his House majority in 2010. No one expects anything except paralysis through at least 2016. Gallup reports that “2014 was … the first year since 2007 that the economy was not the top ranking issue, and it was the first year ever in Gallup records that dissatisfaction with government topped the list.”

Here are two ways of interpreting this situation.

First, political scientist Juan Linz would note that every presidential system other than the US has collapsed. Individual legislators are not held accountable for the performance of the country but do get credit for criticizing the president. Thus a legislature has every incentive to undermine the executive branch. When the two branches are separately elected, you are bound to see legislative obstructionism (on one side) and executive unilateralism (on the other) whenever power is split.

That is just what we have seen in the US since ca. 1986. Why not before? Because until the 1980s, Congress always had at least three effective political parties, the Democrats being composed of two radically different wings (the Southern conservatives and Northern liberals). Thus a president could normally put two of the three congressional blocs together to obtain a majority. He was basically in the position of a Prime Minister, assembling a majority in the legislature. That opportunity vanished when the parties sorted neatly into left and right, so now we face the Linzian nightmare. Presidents will rule by executive order and congresses will obstruct until the system fails.

Alternatively, political scientist James A. Morone has argued that the US system was designed to avoid governing (in the sense of this post.) That is not only true of the federal constitution, with its famous checks and balances, but also of new institutions that we have developed subsequently, such as the New Deal regulatory agencies and the ACA. They always incorporate numerous veto points because they cannot come into being unless their opponents are mollified by such barriers–and because Americans profoundly fear governing as a form of tyranny.

Morone argues that at several points in American history, the federal government (blocked by design from changing its policies) has become manifestly out of step with a changing country. To name one example, Washington could not recognize unions but was faced with a militant labor movement ca. 1932. In such cases, Americans typically denounce their hobbled government as corrupt and elitist and demand that power shift to “the people.” They are invoking a myth, because the population is not unified; in fact, one of the reasons that government is paralyzed is that it reflects citizens’ conflicting interests. Nevertheless, by invoking “the people,” the reformers win new political rights or procedures (white male suffrage in the Jacksonian Era, regulatory agencies in the Progressive Era, collective bargaining under the New Deal, community action agencies in the 1960s). These new rights and procedures change who is effectively enfranchised and thus shift policy outcomes. Once a new equilibrium is reached, the system returns to paralysis, but in better alignment with the underlying social/economic situation.

If Linz is right, our challenge is largely unprecedented, and we are in big trouble. If Morone is right, we have faced the same circumstance at least five times before and the time now looks ripe for a new set of populist institutional innovations. Based on the past waves of reform, we should expect “an exuberant mix of democratic images and contemporary organizational methods: open meetings, civic education, broad opportunities to participate, professional staff support” (The Democratic Myth, 1990, p. 28). Today that might mean Participatory Budgeting, online games for city planning, and service corps, among other examples. These reforms will adjust the political balance and policy outcomes before they ultimately disappoint by puncturing the myth of a unified people.

Neither argument is exactly rosy, but both should be taken seriously if we hope to find better ways forward.

author’s colloquium on We are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For

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As I prepare to take a 2-week winter break from blogging, I’ll post the video of me, Jane Mansbridge and Marshall Ganz of the Harvard Kennedy School, and Jenny Sazama, Director & Co-Founder of Youth on Board, talking about my book We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For in a discussion moderated by Meira Levinson (Harvard Grad School of Ed). The event was a CMEI Colloquium/Gutman Library Distinguished Author Event last October 21.

questions about “collective impact”

The concept of “Collective Impact” suddenly seems to be everywhere. No meeting is complete without it. FSG defines it as “the commitment of a group of actors from different sectors to a common agenda for solving a complex social problem.” And they propose five conditions:

Common Agenda: All participants share a vision for change that includes a common understanding of the problem and a joint approach to solving the problem through agreed-upon actions.

Shared Measurement: All participating organizations agree on the ways success will be measured and reported, with a short list of common indicators identified and used for learning and improvement.

Mutually Reinforcing Activities: A diverse set of stakeholders, typically across sectors, coordinate a set of differentiated activities through a mutually reinforcing plan of action.

Continuous Communication: All players engage in frequent and structured open communication to build trust, assure mutual objectives, and create common motivation.

Backbone Support: An independent, funded staff dedicated to the initiative provides ongoing support by guiding the initiative’s vision and strategy, supporting aligned activities, establishing shared measurement practices, building public will, advancing policy, and mobilizing resources.

I definitely see the purpose and value of such efforts, but I would pose these questions for critical reflection whenever the framework is being used:

  1. When is a group with a shared agenda and “backbone” organization a “collaboration” or a “community of practice,” and when is it a cartel or a clique?
  2. When is reducing competition among NGOs a valuable a way of reducing waste and allowing them to work toward a broader goal, and when is reducing competition a way of protecting incumbent organizations from challenges by newcomers? (In short, when is a cooperating group a monopoly?)
  3. Who gets to decide on the common agenda, and to whom are they accountable?
  4. What makes you eligible to join the “diverse set of stakeholders”

(A civics textbook would say that the people should ultimately decide on the agenda for their community, mainly by choosing elected representatives who deliberate and vote–all subject to judicial review. We already have a smooth tessellation of political jurisdictions across America, each with its own elected leaders. But in the Collective Impact model, governmental agencies are just some of the “participating organizations.” )

Foucault and neoliberalism

If you’re intellectually and ideologically eclectic, then you will find important ideas all over the map. It will not surprise you to learn that a person generally associated with the left has benefited from F.O. von Hayek or Gary Becker: leading libertarians. An excellent example is James C. Scott, who likes to call himself (I suspect partly for the frisson of it) “a crude Marxist,” but who has been deeply influenced by Hayek. Scott’s analysis of the high-modernist state is indispensable, however you choose to classify it.

On the other hand, if you’re a committed leftist intellectual, it may well come as a surprise to you that Michel Foucault read Hayek and Becker and said positive things about neoliberalism. That is the theme of Daniel Zamora’s forthcoming volume Critiquer Foucault: Les années 1980 et la tentation néolibérale. In the left magazine The Jacobin, Zamora presents it as puzzling and even potentially scandalous fact that Foucault should have showed “indulgence … toward neoliberalism.”

I do not know the relevant texts and statements by the late Foucault. But I think the affinity between Foucault’s style of critique and libertarianism is important although not very surprising, and I would understand it in the following contexts:

1. The “revolution” of May 1968 was led by activists and intellectuals who considered themselves Marxists and often especially favored Maoism. Yet their successful concrete demands were for greater individual freedom, especially vis-a-vis the state. They won a lower age of consent for sex (1974), abortion rights (1975), freedom of information (1978), and many other reforms traditionally recommended by classical liberals. They also reformed the state by reducing the power of the president, making elections more important, and strengthening NGOs. In Marxist terms, ’68 was a bourgeois revolution, not a proletarian one. So it shouldn’t be shocking that perhaps the greatest political thinker of ’68 was a bourgeois liberal (of a kind).

2. The most evident social issue of 19th century Europe was the oppression of the industrial working class. But economic growth made countries like France pervasively affluent by 1968. Industrial jobs had shrunk while social welfare programs and unions had improved the everyday life of those who still had such jobs–to the point where they could reasonably look like a kind of elite. As Zamora perceptively argues in the Jacobin article, the contrast between organized blue-collar workers and various “excluded” populations (new immigrants and disadvantaged racial minorities, the disabled, the very poor) became a central concern. But the “excluded” were not in a position to seize the commanding heights of the economy, or even to win elections, as the proletariat might have been in 1910. They were especially likely to suffer at the hands of the welfare state in poor schools, prisons, clinics, and conscripted armies. The neoliberal solution–reducing barriers to their market participation–might look more attractive than the traditional social-democratic solution of enrolling them in welfare programs that were sites of surveillance and discipline.

2. Many of the great disasters of the 20th century were attributable to high-modernist states that sought to count and measure society in order to control it–sometimes in the interest of laudable goals, like equality. One of the worst such states was Mao’s China, but French intellectuals of 1968 romanticized that regime as some kind of participatory democracy. Their misconception about China gradually faded, and in any case, China became capitalist. More to the point, the left intellectuals of Foucault’s generation were already able to see that other high modernist states were disastrous. It was appropriate and natural for the left to turn away from statism. But once they opposed the state, why should they not become libertarians? As Zamora asks in a follow-up article, “How could we seriously think that discrediting state action in the social domain and abandoning the very idea of social ‘rights’ constitutes progress toward thinking ‘beyond the welfare state’? All it has done is allow the welfare state’s destruction, not a glimpse of something ‘beyond.'” (An alternative could be anarchism, but anarchism in practice often looks like neoliberalism.)

3. Foucault and his generation emphasized a whole range of oppressions and invidious uses of power that might not arise between a capitalist and a worker but rather between a man and a woman, a parent and a child, a teacher and a student, a doctor and a patient, a white person and an immigrant, and other such pairings. They were correct to recognize these problems. But once oppression is seen as multifarious and omnipresent, we no longer want the working class to rule through the state or unions. Individual expressive freedom and various kinds of diversity become high priorities.

Zamora writes:

Foucault was highly attracted to economic liberalism: he saw in it the possibility of a form of governmentality that was much less normative and authoritarian than the socialist and communist left, which he saw as totally obsolete. He especially saw in neoliberalism a ‘much less bureaucratic’ and ‘much less disciplinarian’ form of politics than that offered by the postwar welfare state. He seemed to imagine a neoliberalism that wouldn’t project its anthropological models on the individual, that would offer individuals greater autonomy vis-à-vis the state.

Foucault “seemed to imagine” this because, indeed, a lightly regulated market economy in an affluent society is less bureaucratic than a social welfare state and does generate autonomy and diversity. Perhaps a market system also reshapes the human psyche in problematic ways. And certainly it generates unequal wealth. But for the reasons stated above, unequal wealth no longer seemed to be the primary domestic economic problem in a country like France ca. 1968. And if markets subtly shape the soul, states do so more blatantly and more uniformly.

To be clear, I am not a libertarian; I want states and other strongly organized bodies to promote equity as well as freedom. Also, I recognize that many people with egalitarian instincts have absorbed libertarian ideas without abandoning the state. They have read Hayek as well as Marx and Foucault. But I think the left still is still wrestling with the realities that led Foucault to say nice things about neoliberalism in his last years.