Robert Putnam is mainly famous for reviving the concept of “social capital.” As he measures it, social capital is the aggregate of certain habits and attitudes that individuals possess–especially trust for other people and membership in groups.

There are two main interpretations of social capital theory. The political interpretation says that people deliberately develop organizations and networks in order to solve public problems. Trust is a by-product of this work; it is also something that people deliberately enhance by developing personal relationships and by raising children as members of communities. It is good to develop social capital because it enhances a community’s capacity to solve problems in the future.

The apolitical interpretation assumes that social capital goes up or down because of large social forces and trends, such as suburbanization, the work environment, and exposure to television. (TV makes people less trusting and less sociable.) The reason we should care–according to this interpretation–is that social capital correlates with mental health, longevity, and good educational outcomes. Therefore, if we can, we should tinker with big institutions to increase social capital.

Although these two theories reflect different values, there are also empirical differences. It is either true or false that people can create social capital through deliberate action at the local level. I’m optimistic that they can, but I’m not sure how strong the evidence is.

For several years, I’ve been developing a moderate version of moral particularism, which says that the appropriate things to judge are situations, choices, or events, not concepts or categories (such as lying, happiness, or justice). I am therefore skeptical about the more ambitious forms of moral philosophy, which do focus on concepts. Lately, I’ve become interested in literary themes as an alternative.

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I love Gareth B. Mathews’ Philosophy & the Young Child (1980). It’s full of dialogues in which kids between the ages of 4 and 10 explore profound issues of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics with an adult who’s genuinely interested in their perspective. They supply fresh vision and curiosity; the adult provides some useful vocabulary and provocative questions.

Mathews believes that it’s hard to think straight about fundamental philosophical questions once you’ve been encumbered by a bunch of conventional theories–and once you’ve been told that most deep questions are really simple and obvious. For example, we’re inclined to think that a kid is silly if she asks why she doesn’t see double, since she has two eyes. Actually, this is not such an easy question to answer, but most of us are soon socialized to dismiss such matters as childish.

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In ethics, the words “universal,” “general,” and “particular” are used in three entirely different contexts. First, there is the issue of cultural difference. Some people say, “Morality is universal,” meaning that the same rules or judgments ought to apply to members of any culture. Their opponents reply that at least some moral principles are particular to cultures (they only bind people who come from some backgrounds).

Meanwhile, some people say, “Obligations are universal,” meaning that we have the same duties to all human beings. For instance, perhaps we are required to maximize everyone?s happiness, to the best of our ability, not favoring some over others. Opponents of this kind of universalism reply that we have stronger obligations in particular people, such as our own children or compatriots. (See, for example, this good article by blogger and public intellectual Amitai Etzioni.)

Finally, some people say, “What is right to do in a particular case is shown by the correct application of a general or universal moral rule.” Their opponents reply that we can and should decide what to do by looking carefully at all the features of each particular case. They agree that there is a right or wrong thing to do in each circumstance; but general rules and principles are unreliable guides to action. Any rule or principle that makes one situation good may make another one bad.

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I see libertarianism and modern democratic Socialism as flawed for similar (or parallel) reasons:

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