(Written in Camden, Maine) On August 16, the Washington lawyer Robert

F. Bauer wrote an interesting opinion piece on the California

Recall election. He noted that the recall is competitive, largely

non-partisan, short, and intensely engaging to the public and the media.

These are the very qualities that reformers usually find lacking in

our long, partisan, low-turnout elections. Thus, Bauer says, reformers

should be delighted with the recall as an alternative to "politics

as usual." Instead, they rail against it as a "circus"

or even a "tragedy." That is because it is not "the controlled,

tidy, deliberative politics that some of them profess to care about:

‘serious’ candidates engaged in ‘serious’ debate mediated by political

‘experts,’ such as themselves, in an established, familiar setting."

Bauer thinks that reformers are sanctimonious and also impractical;

normal politics is much better than they believe. The specific progressive

reform that led to this election—allowing governors to be recalled—was

really an attempt to banish "politics." That is what progressive

reformers always want, Bauer thinks, and the results always

backfire.

Implication: progressives should rethink their support for campaign

finance reform, regulation of lobbying, and other "anti-political"

ideas that will, like recall elections, create disasters.

I think Bauer’s criticism applies to Ross Perot and some Nader-type

reformers, who really are anti-political and therefore would like to

see less campaigning, weaker parties, less campaign spending, and less

ideological mobilization. Hence their support for term limits, initiative

and referendum, and spending limits. I have never belonged to this camp,

and neither do some of the leading reform groups, such as Common Cause.

I think parties are good, and that it is helpful for them to

mobilize mass support. I don’t believe that elections last too long;

in fact, I think the presidential primary season may soon become too

short. And I don’t think that too much money is spent on elections.

Last time I checked, the total amount was not more than $16 per capita,

which is not much to communicate to a mass public.

However, we do not have just two alternatives: the California "circus,"

and politics-as-usual. We could have a political system that was less

influenced by private money, more "serious" (in the sense

of being more closely connected to weighty choices that we need to make),

fairer, more competitive, and more engaging to all people, including

those with less money and education.

To me, the California election is a fiasco, because it represents a

failure of Californians to control their own futures. If Arnold Schwartzenegger

wins, it will not be because a plurality of Californians are moderate

Republicans (which would be a tolerably democratic result). Instead,

he will win because a plurality of Californians don’t have any idea

what is going on in state government, so they imagine that a macho new

leader can simply banish all their fiscal problems. This will show that

they have no grasp of the ideological differences that have led to a

budget impasse. Democrats oppose deep budget cuts, and Republicans oppose

tax increases—principled positions that create huge deficits when

put together. Citizens need to choose one position or the other (or

split the difference). But Schwartzenegger claims that he can just clean

up the mess: a totally unprincipled position that sounds impressive

only to people who have never seriously considered the difficult choices

implied by a budget crisis. Thus, if Arnold wins, it will show that

many Californians feel no personal responsibility for the way their

own government has acted in the past.

Saturday’s Washington

Post quotes a California citizen who supports Arnold Schwartzenegger’s

gubernatorial bid: "His eyes brightened behind his glasses as he

discussed how someone like Schwarzenegger would bring fresh ideas and

an eagerness to correct the state’s problems. "’I’m hopeful that

he will be independent enough in his thoughts that he thinks like a

citizen and not as an experienced politician,’ [the citizen] said, ‘so

that he can do the right thing." Echoing Schwarzenegger’s ‘Tonight

Show’ line that he could not be bought, [he added]: ‘Everyone who comes

to work with him knows that they’re going to get nothing in return except

the satisfaction. We know he’s not looking for money, and that’s a plus.’"

This quote perfectly exemplifies what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call

"stealth democracy" (See my

review of their book.) According to them, Americans believe that

there is no need for debates about policy, because all reasonable people

share the same goals. The fact that heated debates actually take place

proves that professional politicians are trying to gain some kind of

advantage over each other in a competitive game. And the reason they

play this game is that they want to obtain personal wealth from holding

political office.

I have no doubt that some Americans believe all this (including some

highly sophisticated people whom I have met). We’ll

see from the California recall campaign whether it’s the dominant view

in that state.

Since the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform legislation is clearly

benefiting Republicans and harming Democrats, why did most Republicans

vote against it and most Democrats support it?

There are cynical explanations. For example, maybe neither party predicted

the effects correctly. Maybe they all assumed that campaign

finance reform would have to be good for Democrats, and they voted pro

and con accordingly. Or perhaps the reform was viewed as bad for incumbents

as a group (which it is). Republicans may care more about protecting

incumbents, since they have majorities in both houses.

However, I think that a non-cynical explanation is at least partly

true. Republicans stood to gain from McCain-Feingold, but most were

still against it, because philosophically they oppose state regulation

of a financial exchange that they consider completely legitimate. Democrats

stood to lose from McCain-Feingold, but most voted for it, because philosophically

they oppose private financing of campaigns and they want to regulate

donations. Sometimes, arguments and reasons count.

A new book is causing quite a stir among people who work for in civic and democratic reform. John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse argue that the public doesn’t want a bigger role in government and politics. In fact, people would like to have a smaller role, but they suspect that elites are corrupt, so they believe that citizens must periodically intervene just to prevent sleaze. These are some of the themes of Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs about How Government Should Work (Cambridge University Press, 2002)

According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, people do not rate their fellow citizens as informed or intelligent. They do not want to participate in government or politics themselves, nor do they want a political system in which there is much public involvement. They do not dislike the policies adopted by our government. In fact, they have few policy preferences and are generally satisfied with the policies that are in place.

Yet people strongly dislike government. This is because they suspect very selfish and greedy behavior on the part of political elites. For instance, they think that elected officials get rich from government service. People dislike disagreement and debate and view these things as evidence that elites are self-interested. They believe that there is public consensus on issues, yet agreement is mysteriously absent in Congress.

A majority of people (about 70%) agree with two or three of the following propositions, which is enough to make them believers in “Stealth Democracy”:

• “elected officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take action on important problems” (86% agree)

• “what people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles” (60%); and

• “our government would run better if decisions were left up to nonelected, independent experts rather than politicians or the people” (31%) or “our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business people” (32%)

Although people do not want much public involvement in government, they think that both Democrats and Republicans want even less. They consider the parties to be more elitist than they are. Therefore, they support reform ideas such as devolving power to the states (63% support); using more initiatives and referenda (86%); and limiting campaign spending (91%). Fifty percent would like the government to be run more like a business. There is also considerable support for billionaire politicians and technocratic experts, since neither can profit from their own decisions.

Hibbing and Theiss-Morse append two whole chapters in which they argue that deliberative democracy (in its various forms) will not solve the problems that they identify from their survey results, and may make matters worse. These chapters are useful as a compendium of hopeful hypotheses advanced by proponents of deliberation and negative empirical results. However, the evidence here is selective and the argument is separate from the meat of the book, which is a set of claims about mass public opinion in the US.

One can quibble with these findings. For example, I thought that several of the key survey questions were somewhat ambiguous. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse stress that the results are tentative. However, let’s assume that the results are roughly right. How can proponents of deliberative democracy, civic engagement, participatory democracy, strong democracy, or public work respond?

First, we can speculate that some of the phenomena described in the book are features of our very specific political circumstances, rather than traits of Americans’ character. For example, people say that private money has an enormous influence on politics. It does. Money has always been the mother’s milk of politics. But what we have today is a system of massive private contributions plus quite complete disclosure. In my view, this is a recipe for public dissatisfaction with the process of government. It is natural to tune out all the details of policy debates if one is presented with a list of special-interest groups that fund each side. No one seems credible.

Likewise, there is a dearth of political debate at the local level, because congressional (and often state legislative) districts have been jerrymandered to be dominated by one party. No wonder people think that there is a consensus at home and discord only in Congress. Districts have been engineered to have no discord at the local level.

The upshot is that we might be able to get quite different attitudes from a reformed political system, one with competitive election districts and public financing for campaigns. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse favor campaign-finance reform, but they don’t think it will make much difference. We can afford to be more hopeful.

A second reply is more radical. It says: Of course people opt out of “politics,” considering what they’ve been served under that name. We can’t poll people about whether they would like to participate more, because they have no way of knowing what active citizenship would look like in a better regime. Reform political institutions, improve civic education, change the way the news and entertainment media cover public life, and experiment widely with new forms of participation (often outside of the state sector)—and then ask people what they think of “politics.”

This is not a foolish answer, but clearly it requires very ambitious, systemic reforms. And those reforms will be harder to achieve given what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse say about public attitudes.

A third reply would emphasize equity (something that’s largely overlooked in Stealth Democracy). It’s all very well to have a system with low public participation and little public interest in politics—if the policies that result serve your interests. But laws and institutions tend not to serve low-income people. Moreover, knowledge is not evenly distributed. As Scott Keeter and Michael Delli Carpini showed in What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters (1997), wealthy people have a good grasp of politics, ideology, and issues; poor people don’t. But if people generally don’t want to get more involved, then we can’t expect a great upsurge of support for participatory or deliberative democracy. What we may need, instead, is a small set of powerful organizations that have political power and answer to less advantaged citizens.

I doubt that people were much more favorable toward “politics” 50 years ago. However, in 1953, a third of all non-agricultural American workers belonged to unions, and 47 percent of voting-age Americans identified themselves as Democrats. The top brass of the AFL-CIO and the Democratic Party knew how to play politics, even if the rank-and-file did not. Union membership has been halved since then and both parties are much weaker. Reviving these institutions or creating substitutes would be an answer to the problem outlined in Stealth Democracy.

In fairness, I should say that the authors’ own answer is sensible enough, in its way. That is to reform civic education so that students are taught to expect and even value controversy. Then they would be less offended by the sight of debate in Washington.

The

Senate has passed a bill that would represent a very important experiment in

public deliberation. It is the Wyden-Hatch

bill, now section 620 of S. 1, the Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement

Act of 2003. If this provision survives the rest of the legislative process, it

will "provide for a nationwide public debate about improving the health care

system to provide every American with the ability to obtain quality, affordable

health care coverage; and …. provide for a vote by Congress on the recommendations

that result from the debate."

A large and diverse commission of stakeholders,

experts, and citizens would be appointed that would hold hearings; issue a public

"Health Report to the American People"; hold facilitated public deliberations

across the country (based on the Report); and then generate final recommendations.

The President would be required to comment formally on the results, and Congress

would have to hold formal hearings. The bill embodies the most advanced thinking

about how to organize public deliberations, and it would be a wonderful showcase.