The nucleus of our society, of our economy, it’s not government, it’s us, it’s We the People, it’s the individual, it’s the family, it’s those of us who live in Racine, in Janesville, all across this state.

— Rep. Paul Ryan at a Racine Tea Party Rally (transcribed from here)

I agree with Ryan that some forms of liberalism or progressivism are excessively state-centered. For instance, in a recent post, I argued that the individual reader drops out of Martha Nussbaum’s work; the government is her only agent of justice, her only guarantor of rights and capabilities. Nussbaum says (in effect) “there should be a government that protects rights”–without explaining how we are going to get such a thing. If she implies a responsibility for us (her readers), it’s limited to forming correct opinions about the rights that individuals should bear and then voting for the policies and politicians that will deliver those rights.

That’s an example from high theory, but when I served on two 2008 Obama campaign policy committees, I observed that liberal policymakers and policy wonks also have little appetite for public participation and voice.

Thus I agree with Ryan that the nucleus of any democratic society is its people, and the government is just one tool among many. But note how Ryan equates “We the People” with individuals and families. It’s reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher’s remark that “there is no such thing as Society.” Libertarian-leaning conservatives, just like state-centric liberals, see only two things in the world: governments and individuals. They disagree about the relationship between the two sectors, but both miss the role of collective civic or political action. Collaborative action is the role of “We the People.” In turn, the government ought to be one of our collaborative projects.

To be fair, Ryan has said (through his official Twitter account), “Limited, effective government should do what it does well, not suffocate the economy and crowd out civil society.” Possibly he holds a robust conception of civil society to complement his economic theory. But classical libertarians and the Supreme Court, in Citizens United, view civil society simply as a collection of private voluntary groups, defined by their independence from the state. The Court has defined corporations not as people–that’s a myth–but as associations, thereby eliding the difference between markets and civil society. I suspect Ryan shares the same view. The missing alternative is civil society as the domain in which We the People deliberate and solve public problems together, choosing when and whether to use the state as our tool. One of the most eloquent proponents of that view has been Barack Obama, at least in his pre-presidential writings and speeches.

Hot debates are underway about our voting process. Should people be required to show specific forms of government-issued ID when they vote? Should they be able to register on Election Day? Must they register at all before voting? Must they go to the polls rather than vote by mail (as everyone does in Oregon)?

While this debate unfolds, it’s helpful to return to basic principles–but people disagree about those, as well.

At CIRCLE, we have occasionally polled young people about whether voting is a right, a duty/obligation, or a choice. In fact, we will release current national opinion data on that question shortly. Youth tend to divide their responses fairly evenly among those three options, but we might add a couple more:

1. Voting is an individual right, reflecting the basic moral principle of equal respect for all citizens and enshrined in classic Supreme Court decisions. Whether an individual actually votes ought to be his or her choice, but the government may not impose obstacles or costs unless those are required by some other compelling constitutional principle. Thus, for example, a photo ID law is impermissible if any eligible citizens will be blocked from participating, unless (contrary to fact) manifest evidence of fraud has been uncovered and photo IDs are essential tools to prevent that. More difficult questions involve convenience. Is it, for example, permissible for a government to restrict voting to a single day? (Many states allow early voting.)

2. Voting is a duty, an obligation of citizens to their republic. If this is correct, then we might consider requiring everyone to vote, as Australia and several other democracies do. On the other hand, since it is a moral obligation, we can perhaps require people to take extra steps in the public interest. For example, maybe citizens have an obligation to go to a public polling place on Election Day in order to demonstrate their civic commitment and to sustain a national ritual. And perhaps they have an obligation to take affirmative steps to register to vote. As long as such requirements are imposed after due deliberation, by legitimate representatives of the public, they are appropriate.

3. Voting is a way to make the government representative of the population. The politicians and ballot initiatives that win–and the policies that emerge from the government–ought to be the ones that all Americans would favor if they all voted. It doesn’t matter if less than 100% of citizens vote, as long as the outcome is not changed by lower turnout. Thus all voting groups should participate in proportion to their prevalence in the population. “Voting groups” may be demographic, geographical, or ideological; they are fundamentally defined by whether they would vote alike in a given election. By this standard, any election law is bad if it disproportionately affects a voting group, and good if it moves us closer to equitable representation. On the whole, that means that we should reduce inconvenience, because low-SES and young people are underrepresented in elections and are disproportionately likely to be deterred by barriers.

4. Voting is way of gaining power over other people, and as such, it is a vulnerable aspect of a political system that is always on the verge of corruption. Ballot-box-stuffing, voting the dead, voting early and often: these are characteristic and unacceptable features of our politics. Even if there is some truth to the other views listed above, preventing fraud is a compelling need that may necessitate imposing some hurdles.

5. Voting is a means to preserve other rights. Because the Constitution does not explicitly define or protect voting, yet several constitutional amendments forbid discrimination in voting, the Court was at first reluctant to declare voting a right on par with due process, speech (or property). In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court held for the first time explicitly that voting was a fundamental right. “Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will under certain conditions, nevertheless [the political franchise] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.” Note that this is an empirical claim (i.e., voting protects other rights), which we might dispute. Sometimes majorities use the franchise to undermine rights.

In the more famous Reynolds v Sims case, 377 U.S. 533 (1963), Chief Justice Warren said, “Undeniably, the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal, elections.” Many voting cases had been decided in the 80 years between these two cases, and Warren drew the lesson that voting rights were “individual and personal in nature.” Voting, he held, “‘touches a sensitive and important area of human rights,’ and ‘involves one of the basic civil rights of man.'” He quoted the Yick Wo decision to the effect that voting preserves other rights, but he emphasized voting as an individual right–option #1, above. I think that this remains the dominant view in constitutional law, whereas #3 is more influential in political science.

Empirical evidence is relevant to this debate. For example, #4 is weakened by a lack of evidence that the relevant kind of fraud (voting when you don’t have the right to) occurs at any significant rate. To some extent, political interests drive the debate and line up behind the policies that benefit their side. But there is at least a residue of genuine moral disagreement here.

Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen (2006) estimated that 5.3 million citizens were ineligible to vote on Election Day in 2004 because of felony convictions. This number had increased rapidly since 1980, mainly because of rapid growth in felony convictions. About one quarter of the felony-disenfranchised in 2004 were incarcerated; the rest had formerly been imprisoned but were now living in communities. A disproportionate number were African American men; in fact, five states had disqualified more than 20 percent of their Black populations (pp. 76-79).

Several studies find that these laws depress the turnout of people who were never convicted of felonies, especially African Americans, in part by reducing the amount of election-related activity in their communities (McLeod, White & Gavin 2003; Bowers, M., & Preuhs, 2009).

These are the results of policy choices, which vary widely. Maine and Vermont have no felony disenfranchisement provisions, but “possession of an ounce of marijuana can result in lifetime disenfranchisement in Florida” (Manza and Uggen, 2006, p. 9). (RespectmyVote.com has a list of the states where you get your right to vote back, because people with criminal convictions in their past shouldn’t refrain from voting out of a misunderstanding.)

Voting is a pro-social act. You don’t get want you want by voting (because too many other people also participate), but you do get to say what you think is best for the community. Ex-felons who choose to vote are surely taking a step toward rehabilitation. Blocking them from voting not only deprives them of a fundamental right but may also discourage them from becoming constructive members of their communities.

 references

• Bowers, M., & Preuhs, R. R. (2009). Collateral consequences of a collateral penalty: The negative effect of felon disenfranchisement laws on the political participation of nonfelons, Social Science Quarterly, 90(3), 722-743.
• Manza, J., & Uggen, C. (2006). Locked out: felon disenfranchisement and American democracy: Oxford U Press.
• McLeod, A., White, I. K., & Gavin, A. R. (2003). The locked ballot box: The impact of state criminal disenfranchisement law on african american voting behavior and implications for reform. Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law, 11, 66-88.

I have been very quiet about Americans Elect, the organization that obtained open lines on the presidential ballot in 29 states, reserving those spots for whomever its members chose as nominees for president and vice president.

On the one hand, I disagree with several aspects of the organization’s diagnosis and strategy. On the other hand, their leaders were kind enough to meet with me early in the process to discuss youth participation, and my lengthy discussion with them gave me confidence in their motives and made me doubt the most hostile attacks. Yet I couldn’t really rebut those charges except by citing a superficial personal relationship, which needn’t persuade anyone else.

Now that they have decided not to field a nominee, I feel more free to comment.

One take on Americans Elect is that they want to be a moderate alternative to the polarized Democrats and Republicans. I happen to believe that the national Democratic Party is a moderately conservative one, that there is little daylight between the two parties, and that the only space left between them should be filled by the Republican Party itself, once its moderates strengthen their hand. So I am uninterested in building a centrist third party. On the other hand, the Americans Elect website does not prominently cite either moderation or centrism, and its leaders emphasized to me that their ticket could be taken by, for example, a Democrat and a Green. They required that the two nominees come from different parties, but not necessarily one from the left and one from the right.

Another read of Americans Elect is that they wanted to offer voters an alternative because both major parties had failed. That is closer to their own rhetoric and I don’t completely disagree with it. The problem is tactical. In a close presidential reelection race like the one we face in 2012, a third party is just a spoiler. Anyone who votes for the third-party candidate is actually helping Obama or Romney but cannot know which one. That is the opposite of empowering; it means giving up your vote for a random draw. A case can be made for greater political pluralism, but a close presidential reelection campaign is the worst time to add a third choice.

A different interpretation is what the leaders stressed to me. They argued that the major parties’ nominating systems are corrupt and broken. Why, after all, should one state vote at a time, starting with two almost entirely white and heavily rural states, and reaching California and New York well after the contest is over? Why should you have to vote on one particular day but register a month before? Why should the “money primary” (the race for private funding) be so important?

By getting on the ballot in 29 states and promising an entirely different nominating process (online, deliberative, simultaneous), Americans Elect reminded us that alternatives are possible. Our political system is the oldest in the world and is now sclerotic and corrupt. We take things like the parties’ nominating systems for granted when those are eminently changeable.

The main reason Americans Elect failed to field a candidate was the unwillingness of serious contenders to participate. Some presumably preferred either Obama or Romney and didn’t want to play a spoiler role. Others were put off by the prospect of a national race that would require half a billion dollars to be reasonably competitive. The campaign finance system of the general election is beyond the control of Americans Elect and represents a very serious obstacle to decent politics. But the experiment did remind us that our existing national parties could completely change their own nominating processes. At this point, the question is: Why don’t they?