Here’s a proposal for how to think about evolution if you want to believe in divine providence: Even if science explains the “efficient causes” of evolution, God can be the “final cause.”
Category Archives: philosophy
against “systematizing” in ethics
In a recent comment, Metta Spencer asks, “I?m … curious about your notion that systemizing ethical principles is not a good way to go. I would love to hear more about that. I suppose it?s more than just not being a Kantian, but i can’t fill in the blanks to guess what you mean, and there aren’t citations in these blog thingies.” I thought an answer would be worth a full post, so here goes. My position could be summarized as follows:
empathy versus systematic thought
For the second day in a row, here’s a response to an opinion piece in The New York Times. The new article, entitled “The Male Condition,” has two distracting features. First, it takes Larry Summers’ side in the argument about women in science. Second, it’s written by someone called Baron-Cohen–not the very funny Sascha, but his distinguished cousin Simon. If you get past Larry and Sascha, the article is as interesting as it is disturbing.
Tony Blair and the Doctrine of Double Effect
Reflecting on the July 7 bombings, the leftist MP George Galloway (on whom I have written before) said, “London has reaped the involvement of Mr. Blair’s involvement in Iraq.” Most people to Galloway’s right–which means most people–think he is wrong to blame Blair for the terrorism. Yet it seems likely that a causal chain does connect the bombings to British participation in the Iraq invasion. Extremist Muslim radicals attacked UK targets only once they had become incensed by the presence of British “crusaders” in Iraq. The use of terrorism against civilian British targets was a fairly foreseeable result of the invasion and occupation.
I wouldn’t try to deny Blair’s causal role, but I would argue that someone can be a cause of something without being morally responsible for it. Blair set in motion a chain of events that led to the bombings, but the bombers are completely responsible for what they did, and Blair is completely innocent of it. Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Double Effect comes in handy here. The New Catholic Encyclopedia, as quoted in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, explains that the Doctrine excuses an act (in this case, the invasion) that has bad results under these conditions:
1. The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent. 2. The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may permit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary. 3. The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect. In other words the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed. 4. The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the allowing of the bad effect.
Thus, to take Tony Blair’s side, we would say: The act of invading Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein was morally good. Even if its net consequences turn out to be bad for Iraq (mainly because of the incompetent US leadership), British participation was well-intentioned and reasonable. Blair did not will a terrorist response to the invasion, even if he had reason to predict it. The removal of Saddam was a direct consequence of the invasion; the London bombings were highly indirect results. Finally, the end that Blair willed was sufficiently good to compensate for the death of Londoners.
why moral positions should be explicit in literary criticism
During a conversation with a friend on Wednesday, I realized why most contemporary literary criticism bothers me–from a moral perspective. (I use the word “moral” broadly, to mean any issue about how we should live or how our institutions should function.) Although there are some exceptions, whom I admire, most critics have moral agendas that they keep implicit.