In a New York Review article in 2009, Timothy Garton Ash offered some generalizations about the “Velvet Revolution” [VR] as a historical phenomenon. Its archetype is Eastern Europe in 1989, but other important examples have occurred in South Africa, the Philippines, Chile, and now perhaps in Egypt. After the metaphor of velvet seemed to wear out, the language shifted to colors, so that we have now seen a Rose Revolution in Georgia, an Orange Revolution in Ukraine, a Pink Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, a frustrated Green Revolution in Iran, and a Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia. I haven’t seen much mention of a color in Egypt, but citizens there are clearly following the Velvet Revolution or Color Revolution script.

Ash writes:

Painting with a deliberately broad brush, an ideal type of 1989-style revolution, VR, might be contrasted with an ideal type of 1789-style revolution, as further developed in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and Mao’s Chinese revolution. The 1789 ideal type is violent, utopian, professedly class-based, and characterized by a progressive radicalization, culminating in terror. A revolution is not a dinner party, Mao Zedong famously observed, and he went on:

A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another…. To right a wrong it is necessary to exceed proper limits, and the wrong cannot be righted without the proper limits being exceeded.

The 1989 ideal type, by contrast, is nonviolent, anti-utopian, based not on a single class but on broad social coalitions, and characterized by the application of mass social pressure—”people power”—to bring the current powerholders to negotiate. It culminates not in terror but in compromise. If the totem of 1789-type revolution is the guillotine, that of 1989 is the round table.

Two other defining features of the Velvet or Color Revolution:

1) It locates the ideal outcome not in a hitherto unrealized future, but in a real past or in an actual existing situation from today’s world. I cannot speak for Egyptians, but I suspect they want a society more like today’s Turkey, Spain, or Sweden. In Velvet Revolutions, the actual parliamentary democracies of the present are treated as normal, and the goal is to attain normality. This is very different from trying to end history or achieve a novel kind of state.

2) It is self-limiting, concerned to avoid replacing the old tyrant with a new tyrant. Mass movements can easily be taken over by well-placed, professional revolutionaries who then become dictators. Mass nonviolent protests can easily turn violent, and once political killing becomes common, it is extremely hard to avoid civil war and then repression. Successful mass movements limit themselves by finding some bright-line rule, a restriction on their own power, that they demand their own members follow. Non-violence is one such rule, and it has the advantage of being clearly defined. But it is not the only workable rule. In Iran in 2009, protesters seemed to fasten on the rule: “Hurt the machines, love the human beings.” They would violently pelt Revolutionary Guard motorcyclists with stones until the Guardsmen were unseated, at which point they would give them medical assistance. In Egypt, one emergent rule is: “Molotov Cocktails yes, Guns no.”

My friend Archon Fung and others have built “Participedia,” an online archive of articles about public participation and democratic innovation around the world. It’s wiki-style, so anyone can add cases and edit the ones that are there already. The site says:

Participedia collects narratives and data about any kind of process or organization that has democratic potentials. A process is democratic when it functions to include, empower, or give voice to those affected by collective decisions in making those decisions. That is, the Participedia understanding of “democracy” is broad, and does not prejudge where these processes might be found, how they might be organized, or who might create them.

The site already contains main important examples. They are looking for failures, too, which is very important because we tend to collect examples of success even if the odds of replication are poor. Smart strategic planning requires learning from mistakes.

The “Charter” is an effort “to develop the concept of ‘Civic Participation’, which is mentioned in the European Constitution (art. 47 and art. 72, second part), but then not explained.”

It is a draft for public debate. It aims to address “the paradox” that, “while citizens and their autonomous organizations are usually asked to contribute with material and immaterial resources to filling the ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union, they are, at the same time, hardly considered and often mistrusted by public institutions.”

The “right to participation” is thus defined: “Each individual has the right to actively participate, through Autonomous Citizens’ Organizations (ACOs), in public life.” This may sound alarmingly collectivist–can’t individual Europeans participate directly in public life?–but I think the goal is to supplement the extensive individual civil and political rights that are already enshrined in European law with a formal acknowledgment of associations.

ACO’s are assigned rights in this charter, but most of them sound like rights already protected under laws concerning citizens’ free speech and assembly. For instance, the charter says, “Whenever citizens’ rights and general interests are at stake, ACOs have the right to intervene with opinions and actions.” European citizens already have rights to state their opinions, and they are within their existing rights if they choose to express themselves through associations. Thus the most interesting parts of the charter are the obligations imposed on governments to engage ACOs, plus the appendix that lists “best practices” for doing so.