Category Archives: The Middle East

“every subject’s soul is his own”

(Continuing Friday’s theme. …) There is no doubt, after Nuremberg, that soldiers must question the justification of their side’s conduct during a conflict–and disobey any immoral orders. But should they worry about the purposes and legitimacy of the whole war? “Adam K. Anonymous” argued “no” on this blog. “In a democracy,” he wrote, “the military is a tool, subjected to our elected representative[s], who should worry about the legitimacy of the war. The military, who don’t represent the people, should not be in a position to make autonomous decisions about the legitimacy of the war.” One could add that soldiers don’t have all the information available to high elected officials, so they should simply follow orders about whether to wage war.

On the other hand, it might seem that soldiers in a democracy bear a particularly heavy responsibility for deciding whether to participate in a war. In a dictatorship, it’s very hard to obtain information relevant to a moral assessment of your country’s foreign policy. If you want to object, you may have no practical options; you certainly can’t agitate publicly against the government. And passive resistance will probably just get you killed. All of these problems are less serious in a democracy, so perhaps the individual soldier must treat the decision to participate in a war–and thus to help kill other human beings–as a matter for personal judgment.

I’m not sure what to think, but I’m struck by the relevance of Henry V, act IV, scene 1.

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just war theory

I’ve been thinking about just war theory, mainly because my colleagues and I discussed a good paper on that topic by Judy Lichtenberg today, but also because of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis’ recent comments (“Actually, it’s a lot of fun to fight. You know, it’s a hell of a hoot. It’s fun to shoot some people. I’ll be right upfront with you, I like brawling. … You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years because they didn’t wear a veil. …You know, guys like that ain’t got no manhood left anyway. So it’s a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them.”)

Just war theory, with its roots in medieval Christian theology, traditionally separates jus ad bellum from jus in bello. The former deals with justifications for waging war; the latter, with acceptable behavior during a war. For instance, some would say that a just conflict is one waged in self-defense or one authorized by the Security Council to promote human rights. Meanwhile, just behavior during a war requires, for example, not deliberately harming civilians, protecting captives, and not taking hostages.

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Carothers on democracy-promotion

It appears that voting has gone very well in Iraq. I take this from the Guardian and Le Monde as well as the US media. Michael Ignatieff is right that we should celebrate free elections in Iraq, mourn those killed as they tried to campaign or vote, and condemn the opponents of Iraqi elections as “fascists.”

Nevertheless, the broader issue remains: Can the US directly promote democracy in the Middle East? On Friday, I had a chance to hear Thomas Carothers speak at Maryland. Carothers directs the “Democracy and Rule of Law Project” at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a supremely sensible, cogent, experienced thinker about democracy. I did not take notes, unfortunately, but here are some key points as I remember them.

While American administrations have traditionally believed that our national interests are best protected by stability in the Middle East, the Bush people believe that the existing autocratic regimes hurt us, and that we would be better off with democratic ones. Many liberal types in Washington agree with this goal, although they doubt the administration’s competence and sincerity. Thus “democracy-promotion” has achieved consensus in DC, at least as an ideal. However, in Western Europe and the Middle East, absolutely everyone is against a project of US-sponsored democratic regime change.

Carothers feels that the project will be extremely difficult, at best. The US lacks credibility with Arabs and Muslims because of our traditional support for autocratic regimes, our tilt to Israel, and our botched invasion of Iraq. Many powerful actors in the US have mixed motives, wanting to preserve cosy business relationships or to cooperate with Arab police states in the “war on terror.”

Above all, democracy-promotion is difficult because regimes like those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, and Morocco are well-established, well-funded, and ruthless. They have plans for the orderly succession of power and face no dangerous insurgencies other than al Qaeda. It is extremely rare in human history for democratic movements to succeed under such conditions. This is not an argument that Arabs are unready or unsuited for democracy. However, democratic reform is always difficult, and the stars are very badly aligned in the Middle East.

Carothers doubts that there is any trick, any silver-bullet, any comprehensive strategy that we could employ to boost democracy in the region, even if our intentions were reasonably good. In theory, however, we could make democracy-promotion a consistent goal and then constantly seek opportunities to advance it: in diplomacy, military exchanges, trade policy, progaganda, and economic aid. If we also sought opportunities to work multilaterally–indeed, if we sometimes hid behind trusted third parties, such as the Nordic countries–then we could make incremental progress. At a minimum, we could gradually improve our credibility and thereby put ourselves in a position to help substantially if the situation ever changed in the Middle East.

why does the quality of journalism matter?

I have an article in the Fall 2004 National Civic Review entitled “Journalism and Democracy: Does it Matter How Well the Press Covers Iraq?” It’s not online yet, but I’ve posted a .pdf of the final draft that I submitted to NCR. The same issue of the Review also contains articles by my friends Cole Campbell, Rich Harwood, and Lew Friedland on various aspects of journalism and public life. Many similar themes are evident in all three pieces.

My article mostly appeared first in this blog, in short segments. I submitted it many months ago, so it describes the 2004 election as a future event and Andrew Sullivan as a pro-war blogger (no longer true). I think I pose a fairly difficult question about why the quality of press coverage matters. I am not persuaded that we merely need good reporting to help us decide whom to support in the next presidential election; so I consider some alternative rationales. Unfortunately, my piece does a better job of raising questions than answering them.

notes on the mideast after Arafat

I have a colleague who’s an excellent guide to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, almost uniquely qualified to explain it. I can’t reconstruct his crystal-clear summary of recent events, but I think I can accurately recollect a few key points:

1. Before Arafat died, there was some potential for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from all of Gaza and selected parts of the West Bank. Sharon had decided to go that route, and he, perhaps alone of all Israeli politicians, had the stature to confront the settler movement and achieve some degree of withdrawal. After all, he was the architect of the settlements, so he could argue that some of them must be removed. Further, there was a consensus in Israel that Arafat was not a possible negotiating partner. Paradoxically, this made the left despair about fundamental negotiations and support modest Israeli withdrawals. In general, the Israeli people want negotiations, but not with Arafat. That desire created political momentum for an alternative strategy of unilateral separation. (Whether a withdrawal could possibly have led to a fair and sustainable outcome is another question.)

2) With Arafat dead, the Israeli right is now calling for negotiations with his successor, and playing on popular hopes that somehow the two sides will be able to reach an overall agreement. This stance will help them block Sharon’s strategy of unilateral withdrawal.

3) But Arafat was never as much of an obstacle as most Israelis have believed. His successor will inherit the same basic situation. Moreover, the Israeli right is calling for the Palestinian authority to wage a civil war to defeat Hamas, as a precondition for sitting down with Israeli negotiators who are not pre-committed to any particular position. This is an utterly unrealistic expectation.

4) So there is little ground for hope, and the death of Arafat has probably made things worse (although hardly anyone mourns him as a human being). The best path is probably still for Israel to withdraw from Gaza, in which case it is conceivable that the Palestinian authority and Hamas will work out a modus vivendi to govern the area, will converge ideologically, and will be able to negotiate together with Israel. The likelihood of that outcome strikes me as very low. But every other scenario I can imagine seems worse.