Author Archives: Peter Levine

philosophers dispensing advice

Yesterday, for fun, I posted a clip of the philosopher Jonathan Dancy on the Late Late Show. His interview raises an interesting and serious question. Asked whether philosophers should dispense moral advice, Dancy says: No. I would agree with that, for reasons stated below. But Dancy goes further and suggests that philosophers shouldn’t address substantive moral issues at all. He implies that people’s ethical judgments are already in pretty good shape. A philosopher’s job is to understand what kind of thing an ethical judgment is. In other words, moral philosophy is meta-ethics.

That is a controversial claim. John Rawls, Peter Singer, Robert Nozick, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and many other modern philosophers have advanced and defended challenging theses about morality. Since the great renaissance of ethics in the English-speaking world (1965-1975), its ambitions have diminished, I think, and a distinction has arisen between ethics (which is very “meta”) and applied ethics (which is mostly about a given topic area, and not very philosophical). This split seems a harmful development, because the best moral philosophy is methodologically innovative and challenging and also addresses real issues.

Why shouldn’t philosophers dispense advice? Because what one needs to advise people well is not only correct general views (which, in any case, many laypeople hold), but also good motivations, reliability and attention, fine interpretative skills, knowledge of the topic, judgment born of experience, and communication ability (meaning not only clarity but also tact). There is no reason to think that members of your local philosophy department are above average on all these dimensions.

But correct general views are valuable, and philosophers offer proposals that enrich other people’s moral thinking. You wouldn’t ask John Rawls to run a governmental program or even to advise on specific policies, but your thinking about policies may be better because you have read Rawls. It so happens that he held some interesting ideas about meta-ethics, but those were merely complementary to his core views, which were substantive.

I’m afraid I detect a general withdrawal from offering and defending moral positions in the academy. Humanists like to “problematize” instead of proposing answers. Social scientists are heavily positivist, regarding facts as given and values as arbitrary and subjective (thus not part of their work). If moral philosophers begin to consider the offering of moral positions as beyond their professional competence, there’s virtually no one left to do it.

a philosopher hits the big time

I’m an adherent of a very small and obscure philosophical school called “particularism.” (Of course, because I’m an academic, I have to have my own special flavor of it.) The best known particularist is Jonathan Dancy, whom I only met once but who nicely reviewed a book manuscript of mine. And his work has had a big influence on me, even though I come at things from a different angle. Anyway, unbelievable as it may seem, here he is explaining particularism on Craig Furgeson’s “Late Late Show” on CBS:

I’ve never seen his show, but this Furgeson guy strikes me as pretty smart. And Dancy does a credible job in a terrifying situation. It turns out he’s the actress Claire Danes’ father-in-law. That relationship–rather than the arguments in “Are Basic Moral Facts both Contingent and A Priori?” (2008)–may be the reason for Dancy’s new TV career. Whatever the reason, long may it prosper.

students are not customers

Colleges and universities commonly talk about serving “customers.” For example, Tufts University officially promotes a “Customer Focus” for its employees, which means: “Pay attention to and focus on customer satisfaction • Develop effective and appropriate relationships with customers • Anticipate and meet the needs of both internal and external customers.”

I understand and even endorse the motivations here. Students and others pay us lots of money, and we should try treat them respectfully, efficiently, and in a way that satisfies them. We can draw lessons from consumer-oriented businesses. For example, we mustn’t make students wait on long lines for no apparent reason, as was traditional in higher education even 20 years ago.

But we aren’t actually a business, and we don’t have customers. Our main products are education and new knowledge. That means that the people we “serve” include students, readers (and other users of our research), and collaborators in research or educational projects. Students and readers are not customers, because the customer is always right. His or her preferences should be met, if possible. In contrast, our job is to challenge, guide, and assess, whether the student or reader wants that or not.

Further, a customer is basically passive. Consumers actively choose what they want, but the company produces it for them. In contrast, our students, readers, and community partners actively co-produce knowledge with us. They are colleagues rather than customers. We need to teach them to see themselves that way (not as people who have purchased services).

We also have obligations that are not to any individuals but to abstractions, like truth and fairness.

Finally, the implication that we are providing an expensive customer service leads not just Tufts but the whole sector (including public institutions) to spend lavishly on things like residences, student activities, and support services. Harvard, for example, employs 5,102 “administrative and professional” staff (excluding clerical and technical workers and those in “service and trades”). Harvard has 112 full-time professional and administrative workers in its athletics department alone. This compares to 911 tenured faculty (or 2,163 total faculty). Harvard students no longer have personal servants assigned to them, as their predecessors did in the Gilded Age. But they have a similar number of service workers at their beck and call.

Meanwhile, the cost of higher education has far outpaced inflation for several decades, and four-year colleges have ceased growing even as the young-adult population expands. I am not sure that their core educational mission benefits from all this spending, but problems of access are becoming acute.

joining the Tufts Roundtable

As of yesterday, all my blog posts are being syndicated on the Tufts Roundtable. That’s a student-run organization that started with a regular magazine devoted to policy issues. The magazine deliberately mixes liberal and conservative (and other) articles, all highly substantive. It still appears regularly but has now been joined by blogs, radio- and video-casts, and a whole social network. The Roundtable is the Huffington Post of Tufts, only with better quality.

So I’m pleased to be appearing there by automatic RSS feed. And for those who are encountering this blog for the first time on the Roundtable, let me say: Hi. I’m a scholar at Tufts, I direct CIRCLE in the Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service. I blog every work day (except last Monday, when my site was down) about civic engagement, ethics and moral philosophy, and some cultural and personal topics that just happen to interest me.

bringing loyalty back

I understand “citizens” as members of communities (of any size) who take responsibility for building and improving those communities, along with the other members. In his short, classic book entitled Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Albert Hirschman argued that we have two basic options when we are dissatisfied with any institution or group, whether it is a restaurant, a church, a municipality, or a nation-state. We can leave it and join a different institution (“exit”), or we can try to persuade our fellow members to change it (“voice”).

Exit is a human right: except in extraordinary situations, people should not be trapped in institutions. Besides, exit can improve the world, because institutions that lose members are forced to reform. That is the logic of market competition, and it works.

But voice is also valuable, and it is the harder path. When a city is de-industrializing or a school system is failing, exit will simply strip it of members and resources. It will not die completely–American Rust Belt cities and their school systems are not going to vanish like ancient Carthage and Thebes–but it will suffer from shrinking. Those who are left behind will be the weakest and the most vulnerable. These communities need internal reform and rebirth, and that requires voice. As Hirshman argued, loyalty is what causes people to exercise voice when exit is an option.

It would be difficult to measure the ratio of exit to voice in modern America, especially if one tried to assess the quality as well as the mere frequency of voice. Since I do not know how to measure this ratio, I cannot demonstrate that we are substituting exit for the voice and loyalty that we once had. But problematic examples of exit are widely visible.

Wealthy parents exit public school systems, and middle-class families exit cities for suburbs. Partisans exit politically heterogeneous communities in favor of homogeneous ones so that they do not have to persuade fellow citizens to agree with them. (Bill Bishop argues in The Big Sort that Americans now live in counties—and other fixed geographical jurisdictions—that are far more politically homogeneous than they were in previous generations, because we “vote with our feet.” ) During the last third of the twentieth century, the composition of American civil society changed profoundly as people exited associations that were diverse in terms of occupation, social class, and ideology (but rooted locally) and instead joined single-issue organizations that advanced causes they favored. You don’t have to use voice within a single-issue organization: it speaks for you. You can exit as soon as you cease to agree with its agenda. Finally, millions of Americans have exited public life altogether in favor of purely private concerns and networks.

Overall, it is my impression that we are substituting exit for voice. That may be a natural (although undesirable) process, because voice is the more difficult mode. But there are counter-trends, particular efforts to enhance voice. Three efforts exemplify the moral consequences of loyalty.

Positive Youth Development: The traditional way of thinking about adolescence (ever since G. Stanley Hall coined the word in 1904) has been in terms of risk and potential failure. An “adolescent” is becoming an adult—that is what the word means—but crises and tragedies can interfere along the way. Thus society’s obligation is to monitor adolescents for signs of delinquency, academic failure, risky behavior, and depression and to intervene whenever such problems loom. The intervention may be punitive or supportive, but it is always aimed at preventing a deficit state and returning the teenager to the normal path, which leads out of adolescence and into adulthood. There is nothing intrinsically valuable about being a teenager.

In the 1990s, strong evidence emerged that this model was counterproductive. Prevention programs generally proved unsuccessful in rigorous evaluations. Constantly monitoring adolescents for signs of failure conveyed the message that they were problems and encouraged them to feel alienated. This approach set a low bar, allowing many teenagers to evade adult guidance as long as they obeyed the law and did their homework. And for those who broke the law or dropped out of school, the interventions were usually unsuccessful.

Thus Positive Youth Development (PYD) arose as a theory that adolescents would “flourish” or “thrive” better if they were treated as assets and given opportunities to contribute through community service, the arts, or spirituality. Young people had distinctive assets, such as enthusiasm, creativity, and flexibility, that could be tapped to improve communities and to give them a sense of purpose and belonging. Evaluations of programs that used a PYD framework showed strongly positive results, as participating teenagers were less likely to drop out of school, become pregnant, and otherwise cause damage to themselves and others.

Most of the literature on PYD concerns its impact, which inevitably varies from one program to another and from one young person to another. Much evaluation research still remains to be done. One could also debate (with empirical evidence) how prevalent are various assets and deficits in our young people–for example, how many have musical talents versus how many are abusing drugs. But what interests me here is not the empirical evidence, which can cut either way; it is rather the desire of PYD scholars and practitioners to find models that treat young people as assets and that promote their thriving. Why should they hope that PYD works, when surveillance and intervention might be cheaper and more reliable? Why, when particular PYD programs do not work, do they look for improvements rather than drop the whole approach in favor of prevention and remediation?

The answer, I suspect, is a fundamental moral commitment. We should strive to treat the other people who inhabit our communities as fellow citizens, not as threats or problems. We should use voice to engage them, which means both talking to them and genuinely listening. We should invest in their civic skills: leadership, effective speaking, and organizing. Those premises apply even if our fellow citizens happen to be younger than 20. Thus PYD is fundamentally a manifestation of civic loyalty.

Asset-Based Community Development: Just as the standard model of adolescents emphasizes their problems and threats, so the standard view of poor urban or rural communities stresses their pathologies and lack of resources. In both cases, these assumptions have an empirical basis: teenagers actually get into trouble (sometimes fatally), and poor neighborhoods really do have problems.

Just to mention one example, in the 53206 zip code of Milwaukee, WI, during the pre-recession year of 2007, 62 percent of the men in their early thirties were in–or had been in–state prisons. Due to premature death and incarceration, women in their 30s outnumbered men by three to two. The average income of tax-filers (a small proportion of the population) was just $17,547, and 90 percent of these individuals were single parents. (Data thanks to Lois M. Quinn.)

It is easy and appropriate to catalog the deficits of this place. But the net effects of a “deficit model” of urban development can be harmful. It suggests that indigenous people and their networks have little capacity, so outside agencies must provide resources. But resources that simply flow from outside tend to be misallocated or otherwise wasted. Consider, for example, that 90 percent of the people who declared any income from working within Milwaukee’s 53206 zip code in 2007 lived outside it, and 56 percent of these filers were white (even though 97 percent of the zip code’s residents were African American). Welfare, police, and health funds intended for this community subsidized public employees who lived elsewhere. A deficit approach also encourages authorities literally to bulldoze buildings and other assets that have value, and it may motivate residents to try to exit.

Hence John L. McKnight and John P. Kretzmann have developed a model called “Asset-Based Community Development” (ABCD), which begins with making an elaborate public inventory of the assets, both tangible and intangible, of any community. Outside resources, such as funds, experts, and volunteers, are not supposed to flow until the community has assessed and discussed its own strengths. ABCD and Positive Youth Development come together in “community youth development” (CYD), which typically involves teenagers in assessing their communities’ assets. CYD is an alternative to the kinds of programs that remove “at-risk” teenagers from dangerous settings to work or study apart. Instead, CYD treats their relationships with their home communities as potentially positive for both. Again, there is a strong emphasis on developing the voice and skills of participants.

Like PYD, ABCD raises empirical questions: How many assets do our poorest communities possess? Does it “work” to emphasize their assets rather than their liabilities? Does this approach lead to better policies and outcomes? Once again, I think these issues are important and should cause us to refine and improve any specific ABCD program. But the underlying commitment is moral and immune to empirical evidence (short of a proof that ABCD always fails). The moral commitment is loyalty.

Relational Organizing: Survey data show that most Americans have no idea what “community organizing” means, but presumably the most famous example is ACORN, the large and controversial community-organizing group that now faces bankruptcy. ACORN exemplifies strategic organizing, which always starts with some kind of policy agenda, such as saving civilization by reducing carbon emissions or saving unborn children by ending abortion. Strategic organizers need to recruit and motivate strong supporters, find non-supporters who might be persuadable, and mobilize people who have special assets to contribute to the cause (e.g., money, skills, serious commitment, network ties, or fame).

In contrast, relational organizing does not start with a cause, but rather with a set of people–for instance, all the residents of a neighborhood or all members of a congregation. Relational organization groups such as the Industrial Areas Foundation in Texas or the PICO and Gamaliel Networks usually recommend a long initial process of listening and discussing to decide what the common cause should be. Because their commitment is to relationships, not to predetermined outcomes, their organizers do not select which individuals to mobilize because of what they can contribute to the cause. There is an ethical commitment to the relationship itself that can survive differences of opinion or failure to contribute effectively to the cause.

Relational organizing can occur within a homogeneous group, but it is related to “broad-based” organizing, in which there is a commitment to connect and listen to all sectors or perspectives within a geographical community. A broad-based organizer will want to make sure that liberals, conservatives, industries, environmentalists, religious and secular people are all “at the table.” In this case, as in the cases of PYD and ABCD, the fundamental commitments are loyalty and voice.