Author Archives: Peter Levine

a “gift” from Bill Gates?

Microsoft is giving away free software to nonprofits, and critics

charge that this is a deliberate plot to undermine open-source alternatives

that were gaining ground in the nonprofit sector. I’ll have to leave it

to economists to decide whether Microsoft’s strategy is good or bad for

nonprofit organizations in strictly economic terms. (Economists might

also ask whether it is a good deal for taxpayers to let Microsoft take

a tax deduction for donating Windows, each copy of which actually costs

the company nothing). Likewise, I’ll have to defer to antitrust lawyers

about whether this strategy violates laws against anti-competitive pricing.

My concern is different from either of these. It may be that open-source

software is good for civil society because it promotes cooperation

in the writing and improving of the code; diversity (since

open-source products can be tailored for various purposes and produced

by many actors); and creativity by a wide range of individuals

and groups. Whether open-source products such as Linux actually have these

effects is an empirical matter than needs to be assessed. I suspect, however,

that nonprofits like to use open-source products for these reasons and

not merely to save money. If that is true, then Microsoft’s donation is

insidious.

the intellectual crisis of the Left

Adam Clymer has an article

in today’s New York Times about the Democrats’ search for a

broad and coherent message. The party is a coalition of disparate,

often antagonistic interest groups, according to this article—not

a movement inspired by coherent principles. The Republican pollster Ed

Goeas made the same charge at a public event I attended recently.

Democrats have had this problem for over a century: they used to be a

completely incoherent coalition composed of liberals, Northern white ethnics,

and Southern segregationists. The New Deal was much criticized for lacking

principle and merely representing the aggregation of these groups’ demands.

From that period until the 1990s, the Democrats consistently held a national

majority and controlled the House. This situation prolonged their reliance

on coalition politics—for two reasons. First, since they had a majority,

their leaders didn’t have to develop a broad, coherent agenda to win.

Instead, they tended to fight over the spoils of their regular victories.

Second, the House (with its 435 independently elected members) teaches

and rewards coalition politics, whereas the presidency is usually the

source of broad ideas.

In my view, the historic character of Democrats as a coalition party

was not a serious impediment until a separate phenomenon developed: the

intellectual collapse of the left. Conservatives

win elections, I believe, not because they cheat (that is, spend more

money, or get more support in the media), nor because they are better

than liberals at communicating their message. They win because they have

broad, coherent principles, which boil down to this: "Families use

their discretionary income to buy things that make them happy, to exercise

their freedom, and to enrich their spiritual lives if they so choose.

Therefore, we should maximize the aggregate disposable income of American

families. Government does not create income and tends to waste it, so

its size should be minimized."

The left has a set of cogent criticisms of this position. Contrary to

what conservatives say: (a) Government does create wealth by providing

necessary public goods such as universal education, research, and transportation.

(b) Maximizing aggregate wealth is not an adequate goal, because we can

achieve that end by making the rich much richer while leaving the poor

where they are—and this does not increase happiness or freedom. (c)

We should care about the prosperity of future generations, not about short-term

growth, and therefore we should not cut taxes if this will increase the

deficit. (d) All wealth circulates through households, but it most of

it also passes through corporations. Large firms have great power and

are not accountable to citizens unless regulated by the state. (e) Maximizing

aggregate wealth is not sustainable, because human consumption degrades

the environment. (f) Maximizing aggregate wealth is incompatible with

preserving traditional human cultures and cultural diversity. (g) Maximizing

disposable income should not be our only goal; we should also be concerned

about how safe, available, and rewarding work is. (h) Private goods

are not the only important things; nature, science, and art also matter,

and they require public support. (i) Unregulated capitalism is not meritocratic:

over time, it creates a class of wealthy and lazy heirs.

These are sensible criticisms, but they are somewhat at odds with each

other, and each appeals to a different set of Democratic constituencies.

Moreover, Democrats cannot conceal their differences by uniting in support

of a concrete national policy. Despite their criticisms of conservatism,

they do not believe in the traditional mechanisms for generating equity,

sustainability, safety, and the other progressive goods. Above all, they

do not believe in centralized state bureaucracies. Thus they fight fairly

half-heartedly in defense of traditional institutions, from public schools

to unions to the EPA, while failing to articulate a coherent, principled

message. And this is why they lose. In short, the problem is intellectual-ideological,

not merely tactical, and thus it will not disappear soon.

perils of fame

I received this year’s edition of The Higher Education

Exchange today, with an interview of me by

David Brown. The interview starts with me worrying about academics

who pursue fame. I think that the desire for fame is a major motivation

in academia; in fact, status and fame seem to be professors’ main selfish

goals. (Curiosity is one of their main unselfish motives.) I’m interested

in this because I think that both the pursuit of fame and its attainment

can have distorting—even corrupting—effects on scholars. I also

think that fame goes to the already famous in a way that’s unfair and

that undermines meritocracy in the university. This would be a good subject

for a serious philosophical article, I believe.

a debate about reading

Yesterday, our high school class interviewed a 30-year veteran teacher

at their school, mainly about racial issues. He said—among other

things—that people in his home county (Montgomery, MD) read, whereas

young people in Prince George’s do not. They just watch television, he

said; and if they read, it’s "trash." Montgomery is predominantly

White; Prince George’s is majority Black. After he left, I asked the students

what they thought about this particular comment. Some were evidently offended

and suspected that the teacher was relying on racial stereotypes. Others

thought that he was factually correct. We held a debate on the question:

"Do people read more in Montgomery?" I said that I honestly

didn’t know, but that I wouldn’t jump to conclusions just because Montgomery

is whiter and richer than Prince George’s. One male student who was offended

by the comparison said that girls read in Prince George’s—although

boys don’t. This comment received a lot of assent.

discipline or cooptation?

Here is an issue that arose several times at last week’s Argentine/US

conference on deliberative democracy. Citizens who are given the power

to deliberate and make formal decisions often learn about legal, political,

and economic constraints and recognize the necessity of making changes

one step at a time. They tend to drop their radical ideas and become critical

of outsiders who do not understand the process that they have mastered.

There are at least two ways to interpret this change in attitude:

First, we could say that giving citizens real power is a form of civic

education. Deliberators develop discipline and an understanding of real,

unavoidable constraints. They gain the skills, knowledge, and networks

needed to make tangible improvements in their communities. Civic

Innovation in America, by Carmen Sirianni and Lewis Friedland,

is (partly) the story of some "sixties radicals" who gained

civic skills and discipline by working within democratic institutions,

and thereby become highly effective agents of change.

Alternatively, we could say that incorporating citizens into a system

of constrained deliberation co-opts them. The process is biased in favor

of moderate, meliorist policies and cannot embrace radical proposals.

Yet there are good arguments for radical change, especially in a country

like Brazil, where the world’s most interesting experiments in deliberative

democracy take place in the context of massive inequality.