Author Archives: Peter Levine

creation, not redistribution

I’m increasingly dissatisfied with programs to redistribute

wealth from the rich to the poor. To be sure, redistribution

can increase aggregate happiness and opportunity, since an extra dollar

makes much more of a difference to a poor person than to a rich one.

Also, there is some evidence that inequality

reduces health and longevity (regardless of the total amount of

wealth in the society). Nevertheless, I think that aiming for more

redistribution is politically foolish, since a majority of American

households are now wealthy enough that they do not imagine themselves

as the beneficiaries. Even some of those who might benefit from redistribution

consider it undesirable. It’s coercive; it’s divisive; it may be economically

inefficient (at best, it’s zero-sum); and it makes the recipient feel

beholden and dependent.

The alternative would be to increase people’s opportunities

to become creators of wealth. There could be two parts to

this agenda. First, we could strive to lower barriers to entrepreneurship.

This is a Republican goal, identified especially with Jack Kemp (who

has done good work). The problem is the standard Republican solution,

which boils down to tax cuts. Cutting taxes does nothing to increase

opportunities for people who don’t have much money to start with.

The Hope Street Group,

an organization of business executives, is working on much more serious

ideas for expanding real economic opportunity. They say:

"Equality of opportunity" is the notion that all Americans

should get a genuine chance to make the most of their talents and

efforts to benefit themselves, their families, and their communities.

It requires that children have the educational opportunities that

allow them to realize their own potential. It requires fair access

to job markets, capital markets, and the home market. It requires

that government lighten the burden of those who are just beginning

to build up their earning power and their savings. It requires a

system in which people can bounce back from failure, so that they’re

not afraid to take risks and to invest in themselves in the first

place.

While helping more everyone to contribute to the market economy,

we could also increase citizens’ opportunities to make public

goods. To do this, we would encourage public service by expanding

(rather than brutally cutting) Americorps; by opening new routes into

professions such as teaching and nursing; and by making such professions

more desirable and satisfying. Indeed, we would encourage all

the learned professions to recover their civic and public purposes.

And we would increase public contributions to the government itself,

for instance by asking citizens to collect GIS data on environmental

issues, or by assigning important regulatory issues to citizen juries.

Not all public goods are created in the state sector. For example,

as I’ve argued in several articles (for instance, this

one), there is a "digital commons" composed of the protocols,

the open-source software, and the free webpages of the Internet. The

Internet was built by volunteers, including teenagers and poor immigrants;

by nonprofit associations; by the government; by profit-seeking entrepreneurs;

and my major corporations. All these players were doing what Harry

Boyte calls "public work,"

that is, working together to build an accessible public good. The

Internet commons is now in grave danger from several directions (spammers

and virus-makers, corporate monopolists, government censors). However,

groups such as the New

America Foundation have lots of concrete ideas about how to expand

and protect the Internet and other public assets.

Putting all these policies together, we could have a movement

whose goal would be to make everyone a creator of wealth.

Yale and the unions

It’s Labor Day; the clerical and technical workers of Yale

are on strike; and I’m remembering Yale’s labor negotiations

in 1988. The two sides were working around the clock to finish a contract.

I was president of the student government, and the union asked me

and a bunch of other neutral representatives to observe—to make

sure that both sides were bargaining in good faith. Since the University

opposed the idea of observers, I sat on the union’s side of the room.

I was personally sympathetic to that side and have since written

favorably about organized labor; but I was carefully neutral as

a student leader. I think that the University’s negotiators deliberately

ignored me (not that I minded).

I remember that at about 2 am, the two sides took a long break. I

went home for a nap and asked a union guy to call me when they were

ready to start again. He called several hours later, and I asked to

be excused because I was too sleepy to get back out of bed. I’m embarrassed

that he made the call for no purpose.

Both sides complained about the cost of labor lawyers and their billing

practices. I also remember the union identifying slackness and idleness

in certain specific departments on campus that were staffed by their

own members. They blamed management for poor oversight, but their

motive was to save Yale money—so that the University wouldn’t

"outsource" union jobs as another way to reduce costs. This

is an example of collective-bargaining serving both sides.

I’m not sure why Yale has a uniquely bad strike record.

Part of the reason may be that the Yale unions are extremely well

run, strategic, motivated, and deeply supported by the community.

Even though they are in a position to demand higher-than-average wages,

Yale resists paying much above the mean. The bargaining power of Yale

employees is unusual, for only 13 percent of private-sector workers

are unionized, and some of those face such intense competition from

non-union shops that they have to make concessions constantly. In

my view, the Yale locals are right to exploit their unusual power

(which they created themselves, and which other workers should also

enjoy). Yale should face reality and pay considerably higher-than-average

wages.

a conservative critique of civics

Here are some thoughts prompted by Where

Did Social Studies Go Wrong?, a new report from the Thomas B. Fordham

Foundation (edited by James Leming, Lucien Ellington and Kathleen Porter

and with an introduction by Chester E. Finn, Jr.). This is a conservative

alternative to The Civic

Mission of Schools, the joint CIRCLE/Carnegie Corporation report

on social studies and civic education released earlier this year.

The rhetoric of the Fordham Foundation report is angry. Chester Finn

says that “the lunatics have taken over the asylum”; that

the response of the “education establishment” to Sept. 11

was “despicable”; that the “keys of Rome are being

turned over to the Goths and Huns.” However, I think it’s

worth looking beyond these fighting words to the content of the report,

which differs interestingly (but not completely) from the content of

The Civic Mission of Schools.

The Civic Mission of Schools identifies a set of facts, behaviors,

and attitudes that students should obtain by 12th grade. It then lists

six approaches that seem to produce those outcomes. The main evidence

consists of aggregate statistics comparing students who have experienced

the recommended approaches with those who have not. Only one of the

approaches is formal instruction in history, government, and civics.

The Civic Mission does not go into great detail about what

content should be taught in social studies classes, although it does

stress the importance of factual knowledge and the need to connect it

to concrete actions. The Report calls for more research on pedagogy

and content.

In contrast, Where Did Social Studies Go Wrong? is almost

entirely concerned with what teachers are telling students in formal

history and government classes. Young people are repeatedly described

as woefully ignorant, and the blame is ascribed to pedagogical methods

and content selection in formal classes.

The authors focus on content and pedagogy for two reasons. First,

they believe that what teachers say matters a great deal. Mark C. Schug

contributes a chapter endorsing “teacher-centered instruction”

as the most effective pedagogy. Perhaps the authors do not think that

the other approaches have much effect at all. James S. Lemming argues

that discussion of controversial issues is developmentally inappropriate

for k-12 students, which is why many do not participate and those who

do talk don’t really deliberate (p. 138). Several contributors

disparage service-learning. There is no mention whatsoever of extracurricular

activities or student participation in school governance.

Secondly, the authors’ emphasize content and pedagogy because

of their extreme dismay at some of the things that they believe students

are being told in formal classes. “Why is social studies in such

deep trouble? The contributors believe one reason is the dominant belief

systems of the social studies education professoriate who train future

teachers. [Thus] in this book we exclusively focus upon, to use E.D.

Hirsch’s phrase, the ‘thought world’ of social studies

leaders’” (pp. i-ii). In practice, this means that the authors

quote textbooks on pedagogy; textbooks used in k-12 classes; and statements

of official groups such as the NEA, NCATE, and NCSS. These quotations

are supposed to prove that education professors and other experts favor

relativism, skepticism about all forms of truth, anti-Americanism, and

other objectionable doctrines. Education schools turn out teachers with

little knowledge and poor values; teachers impart what they

were told to their students; and students score badly on tests such

as the NAEP Civics Assessment. “Garbage In, Garbage Out”

is the title of chapter 6 and the theme of the whole volume.

Empirically, there are two weaknesses to this argument. First, I am

not at all convinced that the depiction of education experts (through

selective quotations) is fair or complete. For instance, no author mentions

Magruder’s American Government, which claims an outright

majority of the high school market. Unlike the textbooks that the authors

do quote, Magruder’s is quite congenial to their views,

so it would rhetorically inconvenient to mention it.

An example of pretty tendentious criticism is Jonathan Burack’s

reading of The La Pietra Report (by Thomas Bender and other

historians). He quotes a passage about the dangers of nationalism that

he calls “unobjectionable” in itself (p. 46). But, he says,

“the problems the La Pietra project claims to address

do not appear to be all that significant. This suggests that other agendas

may be at work. On the matter of American exceptionalism, for instance,

is the aim to temper uncritical pro-American bias, or is it to instill

indifference to any patriotic appeal at all, no matter how well founded?”

The answer is probably the former. In any case, one could easily apply

Burack’s interpretive methods to his own article. One would quote

selectively, argue that the problems he addresses are “not all

that significant,” and darkly allege that “other agendas

may be at work.”

Second, there is not much about what teachers say and do in

their classrooms. Schug thinks that real teachers (those who survive

their first-year of hazing by students) ignore what they were taught

in education schools (p. 101). Ellington and Eaton cite evidence that

teachers are considerably more conservative than education professors

(p. 72). Burack thinks that the relativism preached by education experts

may be “triggering an understandable, if in some cases equally

mindless, reaction against it” (p. 41). Nevertheless, most contributors

assume that education professors are causally responsible for poor student

outcomes. If teachers pay little attention to their professors, then

this cannot be true.

Each contributor to Where Did Social Studies Go Wrong?”

ends with recommendations, but I think they can be roughly summarized

as follows: History is the core subject matter. Teachers are responsible

for teaching it, and there are limits to student-centered, experiential

approaches. American history should be taught “warts-and-all,”

but most current textbooks are far too critical about American institutions.

(Several authors emphasize that the United States is the single best

polity in history; see, for instance, p. 27.) The scope and sequence

of social studies education is misconceived, because students do not

have to start with their own neighborhoods and work outward (p. 115).

Learning about heroes and struggles from the past is inspiring at any

age. Teachers must be careful not to try to reform society through social

studies education, but they should impart rigorous knowledge of the

past.

On his website, Finn gave The Civic Mission of Schools a

“C+.” Given his explanation of poor student outcomes (he

blames groups like the NEA and NCSS), it would have been awkward for

him to give the report an “A.” But he couldn’t give

it an “F,” either, because there are too many points of

common ground. In particular:

• There is not a whiff of relativism in the Civic Mission

of Schools, which emphasizes the importance of factual knowledge

and “moral and civic virtues.” We do say that “competent

and responsible citizens” are “tolerant of ambiguity and

resist simplistic answers to complex questions”; but this does

not imply skepticism or relativism. Diane Ravitch says something quite

similar: “teachers and textbooks [must] recognize the possibility

of fallibility and uncertainty” (p. 5).

• Finn thinks that one problem with social studies is the emphasis

on testing in reading, writing, and math. He argues that “what

gets tested is what gets taught,” and therefore “NCLB is

beginning to have deleterious effects” on civics. This is also

a theme in the Civic Mission.

• J. Martin Rochester cites the same evidence of student disengagement

that we cite (e.g., declining turnout), and endorses Kids Voting because

of its thoughtful combination of knowledge and experience (p. 28).

• I personally share Burack’s criticism of superficial multiculturalism

that doesn’t go into depth on any culture or ever address the

negative aspects of cultures other than our own (p. 50).

In short, the two reports are not worlds apart, although there are

significant differences, and several contributors to the Fordham report

bitterly criticize the very groups that signed the Civic Mission.

who are the anti-globalizers?

(posted on Friday morning) I am curious about the "transnational

activists": those young people who organize movements and stage

protests about global issues. In particular, I wonder about

their knowledge levels. In the 1999 IEA

Civic Education Study, American 14-year-olds ranked dead last (out

of 28 countries) in their knowledge of international issues and institutions.

I presume that the transnational activists are more knowledgeable than

their peers are, although that should be investigated. I wonder whether

knowledge is a predictor of activism, and/or whether people gain knowledge

through participation.

It is possible that interest in transnational issues has risen because

knowledge of local and national issues and institutions has fallen.

A lot of young people are fairly perplexed about how and why they might

participate in local or national issues. Before they can participate,

they must form opinions about private actors (such as corporations)

and also about elaborate sets of public institutions. For example, if

they want to get involved in US environmental issues, they may find

that they have to understand the role of the EPA and the courts, the

differences between Democrats and Republicans, their own state’s regulations,

and many other matters that polls show they do not grasp. They also

have to understand and consider a wide range of potential actions, such

as voting for particular candidates, joining parties, and criticizing

specific public officials. At the international level, however, the

public institutions are very weak and can more easily be ignored. I

realize that activists often choose to protest outside the existing

international public institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF.

But my sense is that these bodies are viewed mainly as symbols of multinational

capitalism. They don’t exercise as much power as national governments

do, and they give average people no opportunities for influence. Paradoxically,

their weakness and undemocratic nature may make them easier to understand.

the 18th century comments on Campaign ’04

(Written while stuck in the Manchester, NH, airport, and posted on

Thursday): Imagine that some of the major political philosophers of

the eighteenth century are observing modern politics from their permanent

perches in Limbo. What would they say?

Edmund Burke: We should normally maintain the status

quo (whatever it may be), since people have learned to adjust to it

and it embodies the accumulated wishes and experiences of generations.

I am especially skeptical of efforts to reform societies quickly by

imposing ideas that came from other cultures or from the exercise of

"universal reason" (as if there were such a thing). Good conservatives

are hard to find today. This Newt Gingrich person represents the polar

opposite of my views. Daniel Patrick Moynihan was sensible throughout

his career, from his days opposing Great Society programs to his battles

to preserve welfare (always in the interests of maintaining an existing

social structure). Some modern leftists are Burkeans, in their efforts

to conserve indigenous cultures against markets. The IMF and the World

Bank remind me of the British Raj—they are arrogant purveyors

of a rationalist philosophy that will backfire in distant lands. I’d

vote Green, just to shock people.

Edward Gibbon: The Roman Republic exemplified the

main civic virtues: patriotism, military discipline, sobriety, love

of the common good, and worldly reason. These virtues were undermined

by Christianity, which was other-worldly, pacifistic, superstitious,

and hostile to national pride. I have a soft spot for your deist Founding

Fathers, but I can’t find anyone to like these days. Conservatives share

my list of virtues, but they’re revoltingly pious. Things continue to

decline and fall.

Thomas Jefferson: The New Dealers used to like me

because I was a civil libertarian and a political populist. They built

me a nice monument. Now conservatives love to quote statements of mine

like "That government is best which governs least." But I’ve

given up on politics. I don’t know what to make of a society in which

independent family farmers represent much less than one percent of the

population. I was surprised when governments started enacting expensive

programs with the intention of benefiting ordinary people; that never

happened before 1850. Did the programs of the Progressive Era and the

New Deal represent popular will, or did they interfere excessively in

private life? I can’t decide. In any case, my own dead hand should not

weigh heavily on the living, so I advise you to ignore any advice I

gave in my own lifetime. I now spend my whole time working on labor-saving

gadgets.

James Madison: I sought to construct a political system

that would tame the ruling class (to which I admit that I belonged)

and align our interests with those of the broad public. The ruling elite

in my day included Southern planters and Northern traders, manufacturers,

and bankers. They had reasons to care about their own families’ reputations

(especially locally), and thus could be induced to play constructive

roles. Also, they had conflicting interests: planters stood on the opposite

side of many issues from manufacturers and shippers. Thus each group

could be persuaded to check the worst ambitions of the others. I expected

men of my class to hold all the offices in an elaborate system of mutually

competitive institutions. They would seize opportunities to feather

their own nests, but they would also care about the long-term prospects

of their home communities, the institutions within which they served,

and the United States. Therefore, they would act in reasonably public-spirited

ways. In contrast, today’s ruling class consists of large, publicly

traded corporations. They have no concern with their political reputations,

and no loyalty to communities or the nation. You moderns need to look

for a different mechanism for inducing today’s ruling class to serve

public purposes. I do not view the system that I created as adequate

for that purpose.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: All patriotic, decent people

have the same interests and goals. Disagreements arise because people

chatter together privately in little groups or factions, and also because

some people mislead others with their clever rhetoric. A perfect democracy

would have no factions and no debate. I am heartened to read in a book

by Hibbing and Morse that millions of Americans are Rousseauians.

They hate political debate, parties, legislatures, and professional

politicians, for they realize that all decent people have the same interests.

I like this Schwartzenegger fellow; he seems so natural.

Tom Paine: Most Americans still agree with me, and

yet the aristocrats run things. I’m going to endorse Dean.

Adam Smith: Everyone realizes now that international

trade creates wealth, that markets encourage specialization (and thus

efficiency), and that official monopolies and trade barriers are bad

for the economy. Fewer people pay attention to my moral philosophy and

my account of civil society. I get plenty of praise, but some of it

from embarrassing quarters.