The big guns of the blogosphere are suddenly discussing moral relativism and particularism, topics about which I’m supposed to know something. It all started when Eugene Volokh came to liberals’ defense, arguing that we lefties are not the moral relativists that conservatives call us, because we tend to believe strongly in moral principles that apply everywhere. Besides, liberals and conservatives agree that principles “admit of exceptions.” Matthew Yglesias (who has good philosophical training) then argued that relativism is a position without any practical consequences; it’s a meta-ethical view that tells us something about the nature of our moral beliefs, not how we may or should act. Brian Weatherson, on Crooked Timber, considered all the claims made in the earlier posts and concluded that Volokh was talking about “particularism,” not relativism. Furthermore, Yglesias was partly mistaken, since relativism sometimes has moral consequences.

Philosophers love to make distinctions, and maybe these will be useful:

These columns are completely independent; you can mix and match answers from the top and bottom rows.

In my view, the distinction in column #1 makes no practical difference. It doesn’t matter whether moral principles derive from Reason or from human thinking, because they govern us either way. The distinction only matters if you think that morality comes from God, and God’s will is knowable from a source such as the (inerrant) Bible.

A lot of post-modern leftists favor cultural relativism (column #2), to the annoyance of conservatives–but I think that’s a mistake. True progressives and liberals have always believed that certain moral principles apply universally, regardless of what anyone may think in the local culture.

Communitarianism (column #3) is controversial on both sides of the political spectrum. However, some neoconservatives and many liberals share a belief in Wilsonian universalism and oppose a narrow commitment to national interests. They mainly differ in the means they favor for improving the world (unilateral force versus multilateralism).

Finally, I don’t see a left/right tilt in the debate between particularists and moral universalists (column #4). In the 1960s, there was a fairly silly view called “situation ethics” (which Kevin Drum rightly mentions as a backdrop to today’s debates). Joseph Fletcher and other situation-ethicists of the sixties emphasized that moral rules were subject to frequent exceptions; they used these examples to argue against the whole of conservative religious morality. Understandably annoyed, religious conservatives are still prone to see particularism as a threat. But sophisticated particularism is not lax and permissive, nor is it the enemy of religious orthodoxy. Indeed, Jesus was a particularist compared to the Pharisees (see John 8:2-11 and elsewhere).

On Monday evening, I?ll be speaking to a bunch of young volunteers who serve through Greater DC Cares, a large ?coordinator of volunteerism and corporate philanthropy? in our area. I think I?ll start by pointing out that young Americans often view volunteering as a substitute for political engagement. Voting by people under the age of 25 has declined by one third since 1972, although turnout by older people has not fallen in that period. Yet young people have become more likely to volunteer over the last 15 years. In a 2002 survey, CIRCLE?s colleagues found that young people were just as likely as older people to be heavily involved in ?civic? activities, such as volunteering, working on local problems, and belonging to groups. However, they were considerably less likely to be involved with electoral politics. When Campus Compact hosted a summit of campus leaders in 2001, many said that they deliberately rejected formal politics?for reasons of principle?and preferred helping people face-to-face.

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I took a Greyhound bus to Charlottesville on Tuesday, all dressed in my best suit to speak at UVA. It turns out that the bus to Charlottesville continues on to Atlanta, mainly on smaller roads so that it can stop in places like Orange, VA. The guy next to me had been hitching from the suburbs of Philadelphia toward the Gulf coast of Mississippi, but with all the rain coming up with Hurricane Ivan, he had decided to backtrack to Virginia and get on a Greyhound. He had about 18 hours left before Mobile, where a friend would pick him up.

The driver was friendly and had a rapport with the passengers, who were going to be with him for a long time. He said that he was required to announce that alcohol and drugs are forbidden on the bus–but (he added) most everybody had just been given a drug test, anyway. This wasn’t a joke, to judge by the passengers’ response. I wondered why most people on a Greyhound would have been drug-tested very recently. Is it because they work for companies that constantly test their employees’ urine?

In this and many other respects, a Greyhound trip through the rural south is different from the USAir shuttle that I took last Friday. I don’t mean in any way to romanticize the life of the people on the bus. But nobody on the shuttle offered me half of his peanut butter crackers and told me his life story. Nor would all the passengers immediately try to help if there were a minor mechanical problem on USAir–as they did when the back door wouldn’t close on the Greyhound.

I recommend an article by Craig Calhoun, President of the Social Science Research Council, entitled Toward a More Public Social Science (pdf). I endorse all of Calhoun’s key points:

1. “Engagement with public constituencies must move beyond the dissemination model. It is not enough to say that first scientists will do whatever ‘pure’ research moves them and then, eventually, there will be a process of dissemination, application, and implementation.” Instead, social scientists need to develop appropriate two-way relationships with journalists, librarians, non-specialist readers, policymakers, and others.

2. “Public social science does not equal applied social science. More ‘applied’ research may be helpful, but the opposition of applied to pure is itself part of the problem. It distracts attention from the fundamental issues of quality and originality and misguides as to how both usefulness and scientific advances are achieved.”

3. “Problem choice is fundamental.” There is no pure scientific agenda; the choice of what to study is always a matter of values. These values should be articulated publicly, acceptable to non-scientists, and informed by public deliberation.

4. “A more public social science needs to ask serious questions about the idea of ‘public’ itself. What is ‘the public’? How are its needs or wants or interests known?'”

I’m on my way to Charlottesville for a panel discussion, organized by Prof. Larry Sabato, on “Young People and the 2004 Election.” I’ll be the geek on the panel, which will also include Rock the Vote President Jehmu Greene, “American Candidate” Malia Lazu, and others. I’ll probably summarize some points I’ve made here before. Meanwhile, the Cleveland Plain Dealer quotes me on the same topic:

Peter Levine, deputy director of CIRCLE, said there are increasing signs that young people are paying attention to this election and that turnout among young Americans could climb.

How many are likely to vote?

“I think that depends on how the two parties conduct themselves,” said Levine. “If it turns into a ‘hackfest,’ I think that’s going to turn off young people.”

Update, Sept. 15: The New York Times has a very optimistic front-page story that cites CIRCLE and quotes my colleague Carrie Donovan. Probably as a result, our server can’t handle the traffic and keeps going down.