Monthly Archives: April 2003

modernism in dance

I know less about ballet than about any other art form, which

is to say, nothing. Thus I was fascinated to read Jennifer Homans’ article

"Geniuses Together,"

in the New York Review of Books some time ago. I have long believed

that "modernism" means a recognition that all the past

ways of representing the world have been arbitrary and culturally relative

styles. Once modernism arrives, we have three main choices: (1)

historicism, the effort to reproduce past styles accurately and

comprehensively; (2) abstraction, the effort to move beyond style

and representation altogether by taking inspiration from something universal,

such as mathematics or the unconscious; or (3) irony, the joking

recognition that there is no way out of style. I’ve argued that these

are the choices faced by the visual arts and also by philosophy. My friend

David Luban argues

that even law faces this dilemma. From Homans’ article, it appears

that the ballets of Stravinsky perfectly illustrate the same situation.

First came a historicist phase, around 1909, when Michel Fokine was Stravinsky’s

choreographer:

Ballet, [Fokine] said, was hopelessly "confused." It was

historically nonsensical for pink-tutued ballerinas to run around with

Egyptian-clad peasants and Russian top-booted dancers; ballet dancers

were ridiculously "straight-backed." … Ballet, Fokine insisted,

must be reformed, and it was here that his ideas dovetailed with Diaghilev’s:

a ballet, he said, must "have complete unity of expression."

It must be historically consistent and stylistically accurate. Petipa’s

French classical vocabulary was appropriate only for French classical

or romantic subjects. If a ballet was about ancient Greece, then the

choreographer must invent movement based on the art and sculptures of

that place and time. …. In Fokine and Diaghilev’s historicist aesthetic,

classical ballet was not a universal form, but a particular style. ….

And then came abstraction, with Balanchine:

Choreographically, Apollon Musagète created a stylistically

unified, Fokinesque "whole" world. But Balanchine broke with

Fokine in one crucial respect. …. For Balanchine, what mattered was

that the external shape, color, and tone of the movement capture an

important idea. He was not interested in historical accuracy or what

he called "petty, everyday" emotions: he was trying to show

something more elevated: "supplication."[7]

In 1957, Balanchine further simplified Apollo (as it was then

renamed) by dispensing with the ballet’s seventeenth-century sets and

costumes in favor of simple black-and-white practice cloths against

a plain backdrop. As such, he brought Apollo into aesthetic orbit

with his most recent Stravinsky collaboration: Agon. …. Agon

was the culmination of an aesthetic Balanchine first introduced in 1946

with The Four Temperaments, and it changed everything we know

about how to watch a dance. Agon has no clear narrative, no melodic

or lyrical line: rather, it piles blocks of movement and music one on

top of another. ….

Of course, dancing in plain lyotards in front of plain drapes is also

a style. In the other arts, sooner or later, minimalism and abstraction

are seen as arbitrary styles, at which point irony becomes the only option.

I wonder whether this has happened in dance.

unions and business ethics

My article on "The

Legitimacy of Labor Unions," which originally appeared in The Hofstra Labor

and Employment Law Journal, is going to be translated into Chinese

for the Global Law Review, a quarterly law journal published by

the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. I’m excited

because an argument in favor of unions is especially important in a country

where the right to unionize is barely recognized.

Here’s a quote to make you angry. According to an article

in the New York Times, after a White House meeting on the Bush

economic plan, "Lizann Sonders, the chief investment strategist

at Charles Schwab & Company, said the tax cut is ‘the answer to the

economy, is the answer to the stock market and maybe most importantly

it’s the answer to bringing back trust and fairness and faith in the system.’"

So a representative of a profession that has squandered public trust has

the gall to say that "trust and fairness and faith" can be restored

by granting her industry a massive tax break that would necessitate deep

cuts in programs benefitting the poor and disadvantaged.

ideology and deliberation on campus

At the Society for Values in Higher Education’s

conference on "Discussion, Dialogue, and Deliberation,"

some of us watched a video advertising a University of Michigan program

that involves students in "sustained dialogues" on race, gender,

and sexual orientation. It struck me that the video would drive conservatives

up the wall, because of the choice of topics, the assumption that the

personal is political, the psycho-therapeutic style, and the attempt to

raise consciousness by unrooting hidden prejudices even among apparently

enlightened students. It also struck me that there were hardly any conservatives

at our conference. This is a common experience in my life. I’m a "progressive"

on most issues myself; yet almost all my professional projects are defined

in strictly nonpartisan, nonideological ways; yet practically everyone

I meet and work with is on the left. I raised this issue at the conference,

illiciting diverse and interesting responses. I won’t try to characterize

other people’s views of this matter. For myself, I think we have three

choices:

1. We could decide that dialogue or deliberation, properly understood

and worked out, isn’t neutral. It’s a form of politics that’s inherently

more attractive to the Left than to the Right. (For example, some people

think that it must deal with racial and gender oppression, because

these topics are at the root of most important conflicts.) Thus, although

conservatives should be welcomed and respected if they choose to participate,

we shouldn’t expect them to join in large numbers, nor should we adjust

our styles and topics to attract them. To a considerable extent, deliberation

(at least on college campuses) will attract the traditional blocks of

the Democratic Party: liberal whites, racial and ethnic minorities,

gays. They have plenty of diagreements and plenty of hidden mutual animosity

to work though, so it is worthwhile to bring them together to deliberate.

2. We could decide that a properly deliberative approach requires the

participation of underrepresented groups. In the case of this conference,

there was pretty good participation by people of color, but to my knowledge

there were no Republicans, evangelical Christians, or people with any

current connection to the military. Just as we would act affirmatively

to increase the representation of an underrepresented minority group,

so we should take affirmative steps to invite the Right to participate.

We should make sure we identify potentially interested conservatives

and ask them to participate. We should evaluate our public statements

and image to make sure that they don’t appear hostile to the Right.

We should include conservatives as partners from the beginning of our

projects, asking them to help us frame our questions and concerns. And

we should not presume to speak for them in their absence. I sense, for

instance, that they would dislike the University of Michigan’s dialogue

program, but it is up to them to express their own views of it. I thought

some of the characterizations of conservative views at the conference

were stereotyped and inaccurate.

3. We should do a bit of both. Some useful exercises (for example,

dialogues on racial identity) are going to be dominated by leftish participants,

and that’s fine. Others will naturally attract conservatives.

Choice #3 seems attractive because it is moderate, but I believe it

is impractical. Given very limited energy and resources, the movement

for deliberative democracy is going to have to choose between #1 and

#2, I believe, and not imagine that we can manage a bit of both.

the evolution of deliberation as a field

I made a presentation today at the Society

for Values in Higher Education’s conference at a beautiful rural retreat

in northwestern Connecticut. This was my outline:

Deliberation is a hot topic in philosophy, law, and political

science, generating shelves of books and articles. I believe that there

are three reasons for this:

  1. Until the 1960s, many scholars assumed that politics was mostly a

    struggle among groups with fixed interests. Often, groups’ goals were

    assumed to be selfish, although the really important point was that

    they were inflexible. Therefore, discussion, argument, and reason-giving

    were inconsequential. This was the Marxist view, but it was also the

    view of "pluralists" and "realists" in political

    science, many of whom were quite conservative. So it a broad ideological

    spectrum agreed that rhetoric was politically insignificant. Politics

    meant the deployment of power in competitive situations.

  2. Then the power of argument, persuasion, and rhetoric was rediscovered.

    But rhetoric is not always a good thing; people can be persuaded to

    hate others against their self-interests. Conceivably, a society of

    rational individuals who maximized their own interests would not be

    racist, since racism is irrational. People are persuaded to be

    racists.

    If persuasion is politically significant, but often harmful, then we

    clearly need to figure out how to improve it. "Improved talk"

    is a rough definition of "deliberation."

  3. Until the 1960’s, the positivist distinction between facts and values

    held sway in English-speaking countries. Facts were testable and debatable;

    values were just subjective matters of opinion. There was no debating

    morality.

    Then, around 1970, moral philosophy was revived, demonstrating that

    there can be powerful, rational arguments for moral conclusions. However,

    almost all contemporary political philosophers are democrats. They

    do not believe that philosophers can decide what is right by sitting

    in their studies and applying philosophical methods. This approach

    would be undemocratic; it would also be foolish, since good decisions

    require the input of many people with different backgrounds, values,

    and experiences.

    A belief in rational moral argument plus a belief in democratic

    participation yields a commitment to deliberation.

  4. "Civil society"—an old term—suddenly became hugely

    influential in the 1980s and 1990s, for various reasons. Definitions

    of "civil society" vary, but a core idea is that societies

    form "public opinion" in nongovernmental groups such as clubs,

    civic associations, newspapers, and political parties. This means that

    no public opinion can form at all where civil society has been suppressed

    or destroyed (e.g., in Iraq?). It also means that democracy depends

    upon having a good institutional base for civil society. Thus there

    has been a lot of research into what institutions support good discussions

    and valuable public opinion.

These three trends have led to a lot of research on two types of deliberation:

  1. Deliberation in formal, decision-making bodies such as legislatures,

    official juries, and appeals courts. The research mostly asks: "Do

    good arguments count in these fora?" and "How could we make

    them count more?"

  2. Society-wide deliberations occuring in civil society and the media,

    e.g., America’s discussion of gender-roles since the mid-1800s.

Meanwhile, there have been many interesting experiments that involve

actual citizen deliberations at modest scales outside of the government.

Many of the groups that promote such experiments are now gathered into

the

. Their work is influenced by the intellectual trends described above,

but it also continues an American tradition going back to the Chautauqua

Movement, the Freedom Schools of the Civil Rights Movement, etc.

These experiments have not been much studied. We need to ask: What is

the point of convening a group of citizens to discuss a public issue,

if the group is not a legislature or some other decision-making body?

What outcomes should we hope for from such experiments? Are they intrinsically

valuable, or only valuable as part of a movement that somehow "goes

to scale" or changes official institutions? What are the best ways

to structure citizens’ deliberations? And what makes them successful?

civility in time of war

[Written

when the war appeared to be going very badly for the US, at least according to

the pundits on TV. …]

Passions are running high over the war, as

they should. Invading Iraq may turn out to be a disastrous decision leading to

massive suffering and death in the Middle East and permanent damage to our own

republic. Yet it is important not to let the passionate seriousness of the issue

ruin our national political culture. Perhaps we ought to keep these points in

mind:

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