Category Archives: Artificial intelligence

the papal encyclical on AI

Magnifica humanitas (“Magnificent Humanity”) is Pope Leo XIX’s XIV’s first encylical, subtitled “On Safeguarding the Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence.”

Near the beginning, Leo makes a plea for “a shared discernment process.” He warns against worrying only about “contingencies” and “a succession of emergencies.” It is urgent to think ahout AI more deeply.

He observes that “most people are watching and waiting, observing from afar and merely hoping for the best. For this very reason, crucial questions impose themselves on our conscience and can no longer be avoided: Where are we going? Toward what goal do we wish to orient ourselves? What direction should we choose as a people and as a human community?”

When the Catholic Church practices “discernment” about social conditions, it “does not claim to offer ‘a definitive opinion'” but strives “to listen to and distinguish the many voices of our times and to interpret them in the light of God’s word.” Leo says that the Church is open not only to technical expertise but also to “a diversity of opinions” about values. Leo mentions previous papal letters with gratitude but also “gratefully acknowledges” the development of human rights doctrine through documents like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which did not originate with the Church.

Coming from outside the Church, I also welcome a basic inquiry into human intelligence at a time when computers are supporting a different kind of intelligence that poses risks for humans. The “central question” of the encyclical is indeed a basic question of our day: “what does it mean to safeguard our humanity?” I welcome the normative contributions of Catholic social doctrine, in much the way that Leo says he welcomes other views.

In paragraphs 11-14, Leo names four principles that are essential for “building a city founded on the common good.” The first is “a firm relationship with God.” I respect that idea but cannot follow it. But the second one is important and can be developed outside of Christianity. Leo says:

Today, the human desire for fullness of life is at risk of being misled by deceitful goals, such as the prospect of a technology that promises to free us from all weakness, and models of wellbeing that leave behind entire populations. All too often, we place our hope in unlimited ‘upgrades,’ in forms of progress that exacerbate inequalities, and in immediate solutions incapable of healing people’s wounds. As a result, while some pursue the illusion of unlimited self-assertion, many are deprived of basic necessities. The Church reminds us, with a firm yet humble voice, that true fulfilment is not achieved by eliminating weakness but through harmonious growth. It is found where freedom and responsibility are intertwined with mutual care and true solidarity, and where progress is measured by the dignity of each person and the good of all peoples.

This is very much like Hannah Arendt’s understanding of love for the world (amor mundi). We must love the species we happen to be (including the male portion, by the way). Our love for people should not be contingent on believing that we are good or smart.

When we can improve the human condition, we should. For example, if we can use gene therapy to cure a debilitating disease, then it is our obligation to do so. But the goal is never to perfect human beings. It is to help humans do the best we can with what we are, together.

Leo’s reference to a “city” based on love involves two Biblical stories that he briefly sketches near the outset. The Tower of Babel resembles a modern Large Language Model (LLM):

Fearing being scattered across the earth, [the people] sought to guarantee stability and power for themselves, and above all to ‘make a name’ for themselves. It was an impressive feat: a single language, a single technology, a single direction. However, the project concealed a profound danger. It was a project conceived without reference to God, supported by a uniformity that eliminated diversity and that chose homogenization over communion. When a city is built on pride and the claim to self-sufficiency, communication breaks down, languages are confused and people no longer understand each other. The result is not unity, but dispersion.

The other city is Jerusalem as it was rebuilt by Nehemiah–a story with deep civic resonance that I have discussed on this blog and in What Should We Do? A Theory of Civic Life (pp. 81-83)

The teachings of the Church are grounded in biblical narratives like these but have developed through previous efforts of discernment in modern times. Leo discerns the following components of today’s Catholic Social Doctrine: the equal dignity of all human beings; the supreme value of human rights; the principle of the common good; the principle of the universal destination of goods; the principle of subsidiarity; the principle of solidarity and the principle of social justice.

I will mention a few points that interested me from this framework.

First, the encyclical develops an interesting view of property rights in an era of data science and AI. Leo acknowledges that “certainly there is a right to private property, which has its own specific meaning and purpose.” (He does not explain the purpose of private property, but it could be to permit individuality and thus human dignity.) However, for Leo, private property is “always subordinate to the universal destination of goods,” which means that “the earth’s goods — soil, water, air and natural resources — are given by God to the entire human family to sustain the lives of all, and … every person has an inherent right to the use of such goods, both now and in the future.”

So far, this is established Catholic Social Doctrine, but the novel point in Magnifica humanitas involves intellectual property: “Today, among the goods that are universally intended for everyone, we must also include new forms of property, such as patents, algorithms, digital platforms, technological infrastructure and data.” Later, Leo says, “Data is the product of many contributors and should not be treated as something to be sold off or entrusted to a select few. It is necessary to think creatively in order to manage data as a common or shared good.”

Prevalent legal frameworks treat software and intellectual property as the work of human beings who have the right to own the fruits of their work. But Leo traces all goods back to God. When a human being invents software or a machine, there is no second creation. The output is still meant for the entire human family.

Leo also makes a strong argument against tech-bro economics:

It is important to ensure that this growth in appreciation of human dignity is not obscured by the pressure of new ideologies or very powerful interests in today’s world. Among these ideologies, I consider particularly insidious the one that suggests that every person must earn or justify his or her own worth, to the point of attributing greater value to those who are more efficient or effective. From this perspective, persons end up being reduced to a means of achieving results, a resource to be used and exploited, and are no longer recognized as a proper end in themselves who should never be instrumentalized. The value of persons, however, does not depend on what they achieve or produce. There are rights that apply to everyone simply by virtue of being human, and no human power can legitimately deny or arbitrarily limit them.

The practical concerns that the encyclical catalogues include propaganda and misinformation, loss of meaningful work, rising inequalities of power and wealth, and deadly militarism enabled by “autonomous” weapons systems.

These are valid topics, and the encyclical sometimes reads like a thoughtful but relatively conventional policy white paper.

At times, however, the specifically Catholic perspective lends additional depth to its conventional recommendations. For instance, here is some general advice regarding education in a time of AI:

We need adults to rediscover their vocation as artisans of education, prepared to work patiently each day, with the support of extensive and shared educational partnerships. Today, accompanying children and young people in using technology for developing responsible relationships, helping them to recognize the risks and choose what fosters inner freedom, is a concrete form of charity and will safeguard their dignity. Teaching new generations that technological evolution does not follow a predetermined path, but can be guided by personal and collective responsibility, constitutes one of the most valuable services to the common good.

A purely secular nonprofit could have written those sentences, although perhaps without the reference to charity (caritas). But only the Church would preface this passage with the preceding sentence: “Indeed, we must consider the digital world as a new continent to be evangelized, one that requires generous missionaries who are mature in the faith.”

I suppose I would have liked to read a bit more about the spiritual costs of intelligence that is artificial rather than an activity of the human mind. In the history of the Catholic Church, technology has repeatedly changed how human beings have formed and communicated ideas and meanings. The codex, the confessional, the cathedral, the printing press, and the broadcast studio have restructured individual and collective mentalities. We have survived such changes so far, as has the Church. But right now, we must think deeply and act effectively to prevent AI from reducing us to “data, a cog in a machine or a commodity” so that it can instead become an “instrument of growth, justice and fraternity.”


See also: Reading Arendt in Palo Alto; the Nehemiah story: on the pros and cons of walls; AI as Satanic; love of the world; the encyclical Laudato Si and the power of peoples to organize; etc.

attitudes about AI by age

In the New York Times, Michelle Goldberg writes that college students are jeering at tech oligarchs who give commencement speeches about the benefits of AI. A Wall Street Journal article begins, “The only thing growing faster than the artificial-intelligence industry may be Americans’ negative feelings about it—as former Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt saw on Friday” when he was booed at University of Arizona.

I had been wondering about this topic. The students I know best tend to be highly critical of AI, but presumably their generation holds varied opinions.

The Quinnipiac Poll asked Americans their attitudes about AI, and here I show those broken down by age.

Older people are the most likely to say that they are not excited at all by AI. Millennials (now at least 30 years old) are the most likely to say they are very excited, although that it is true for only 12% of them. Among Gen Z (under 30), the most common response is “not so excited,” and only 4 percent of them are very excited.

When asked whether AI will do more good or harm to people’s own day-to-day life, most Americans say “more harm,” and that is true of 55% of Gen-Z. The youngest generation is the most likely to say that AI will harm education (68% think it will harm education and 29% that it will help).

Just over 40% of each generation is somewhat concerned about AI overall, with no age differences. A bit more than half of Gen Z are very concerned, but rates of concern are higher among Millennials, who are quite polarized on the topic.

Without access to the raw data, I can’t see how age, education, gender, ideology, race, and personal experience with AI relate to opinions about AI. However, respondents who have more education and income are generally more favorable to AI in this poll. Those patterns hint that current college students may be more sanguine about AI than their contemporaries who are not going to college.

people as clusters of attention

Attention is endangered. It is what Silicon Valley has learned to capture and commoditize. It is what LLMs pretend to offer by speaking in the first-person singular, often in a sycophantic voice. It is what my iPhone takes from me. It is what Donald Trump constantly demands.

To understand why our attention should be valuable to us, we need a satisfactory theory of it. We should not depend on the idea that we have a private, inner self that creates or determines its own attention and owns it like a plot of property. Yet our attention does not belong to Google and Meta or to Donald Trump, and we are worse off when they determine it. Here is an effort at an explanation.

1. The belief in a willing self

It feels as if we decide to do certain things. The reason they occur is that we will them. Other things happen to us, or just happen. For instance, I stand up because I decide to do so, but I fall down because someone pushes me or the leg of my chair breaks.

What am I? I am the thing that wills my own actions.

Sometimes we hear that this theory is “Western” or “modern,” but classical Indian Buddhist thinkers–who disagreed with the theory–nevertheless argued that all sentient beings believe it until they achieve enlightenment. The intended reader of a classical Buddhist text was neither Western nor modern yet believed in a self that willed its own actions. Classical Buddhist authors defined themselves as opponents of other Asian authors who explicitly endorsed this theory, including foundational Hindu texts.

I presume that most or all people believe in a willing self because it makes sense of experience. We are so constituted that we feel that we decide and choose some things, while other things happen to us.

This theory also supports significant and appropriate moral distinctions. We hold ourselves and other people accountable for choices, not for accidents. And just as we value and care for our self–which we credit with making choices–so we value and care for other selves.

When we begin by believing in our own willing selves, we naturally pose questions about other wills. Presumably, other human beings are just like us; to assume otherwise is solipsistic and maybe even psychopathic. But from there, the answers become trickier. Do other animals have selves, and if so, which animals? (My dog seems to, but it’s hard to believe that a bacterium does.) Can a group of human beings or a human institution have a will? How about a computer?

2. Drawbacks of the theory

The theory of a willing self has advantages but also limitations that many people recognize, in principle, even as our experiences keep convincing us that it is true.

For one thing, we have no direct knowledge of the self. It can seem like a magical exception in a universe otherwise determined by the causes that are known to science.

The theory of a self implies a sharp distinction between choices and accidents, even though many–possibly all–intentional behavior seems to be a mix of both. I assume that I have freely decided to stand up, but that behavior resulted from a series of neurological events that were affected, in part, by other people and objects.

Although the theory suggests a binary, the world seems to be shaded in grey. My dog Luca has a similar psychology to mine but not completely the same; a lizard is like Luca but also different from him; and an ant is further along the same continuum. A crowd of humans can have a kind of will, but not exactly like mine. A Large Language Model (LLM) exhibits will-like behavior but isn’t a person.

Finally, the notion of a freely choosing self violates important moral intuitions. It is incompatible with Moral Luck, the idea that we can be better or worse as a result of things that happen without our choosing them. For example, I didn’t choose to be an American citizen led by President Trump, but I am. It is wrong to distance myself from that fact on the ground that I didn’t will it. The theory can also encourage us to care too much about our own selves and to regard our freedom and survival as paramount while making us too judgmental about other people. In Buddhism, an enlightened person has shed the belief in itself.

But it is also problematic to deny the existence of selves in such a way that it no longer seems to matter whether we and other people have agency–or even whether we or they survive. A person is a thing of inestimable value even it’s not quite right to understand it as a self that has a will. And a dog is a being of great value even if it’s not on a par with a human person. Somehow, it must make sense to complain when a person’s private space has been violated.

3. Attention, not self

Here is an alternative. I am inspired by Jonardon Ganeri’s book Attention, Not Self (Oxford 2017), which is primarily an interpretation of Buddhaghosa’s The Path of Purification (written around 450 CE) and other works by this classical Theravada thinker, who (in turn) claimed to be faithfully interpreting the words of the Buddha as recorded in the Pali Canon. Indeed, Buddhaghosa claims that his whole Path of Purification, which is 853 pages long in the English translation by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, is a commentary on the second stanza of Linked Discourses 1.23 (which I have loosely translated here.)

It would be a thorny matter to decide whether I am interpreting Ganeri reasonably well, whether he offers an accurate reading of Buddhaghosa, whether Buddhaghosa is a reliable interpreter of the Pali Canon, and whether the Canon reflects the ideas of the actual Buddha. Instead, I will simply sketch a view that I’ve formed while reading Ganeri.

We can begin with attention. Although this word does not have a self-evident meaning, we use it successfully. Even a toddler can understand the phrase “Pay attention!” When I say my dog’s name, he attends to me, and when he barks, he wants to get my attention. In other words, Luca and I can play language-games involving attention even if he couldn’t learn the word. In this sense, “attention” is much more tractable than “consciousness.”

In its most general sense, attention is some kind of ordering of experience by an organism. An ant can attend to a leaf.

Ganeri argues that our attention has two general aspects: it functions like a window or aperture that removes most of what we could notice so that we are less distracted; and it directs or faces us toward certain phenomena within the window so that we can more deeply understand those things. When I stare at a tree, I am ignoring other objects in my peripheral vision and I am thinking about the tree. “I have reconstructed Pali Buddhist theory as consisting in the claim that the role of attention in experience consists in an exclusion-guided placing together with a directing towards, where there is no incompatibility between them” (Ganeri 117).

This is a general account of attention, at least for human beings. Ganeri further argues that “attention is disunified;” it comes in many forms.

Among the varieties of attention are focal and placed attention, retained attention, reflective attention, attention through language to the world beyond one’s horizons, attention to one’s own mind, attention to the minds of others through their poise and posture, and attention to one’s life in total. These varieties of attention are, as we will see, put to work to explain perception, memory, mindfulness, testimony, introspection, and empathy (Generi, 221).

Each person’s attention is differentiated from others’. For example, only I can remember my own past experiences, which is a particular way of attending. You can learn about my past and possibly even know facts about my past that I don’t know, but I alone can attend to my past as a memory. Likewise, only I can focus on my future as my own, which I do when I plan. I can attend to you in the way that we call empathy, which you cannot offer to yourself.

If you and I are sitting in a lecture, I may be paying attention while your mind is wondering (or vice-versa, of course). If there is a sudden loud noise, such as a thunderclap, both of us may have our attentions captured or “grabbed,” but this may feel different to each of us because I experienced an interrupted lecture while you experienced an interrupted daydream. Compare William James:

for what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it. Our feeling of the same objective thunder, coming in this way, is quite different from what it would be were the thunder a continuation of previous thunder. The thunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence; but the feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence as just gone; and it would be difficult to find in the actual concrete consciousness of man a feeling so limited to the present as not to have an inkling of anything that went before. (James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890, vol. 1, Chapter 9, p. 103.)

There is such a thing as voluntary or intended attention. We can tell by the fact that such attention requires effort. Maybe I am forcing myself to pay attention to the lecture while you are allowing yourself be distracted by someone else in the room, by a feeling of hunger, or by a memory.

James argues that “the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds” yet there is a clear difference between trying to attend to something and doing so because we failed to try or because something else compelled our attention. The difference matters morally:

The question of fact in the free-will controversy is thus extremely simple. It relates solely to the amount of effort of attention or consent which we can at any time put forth. Are the duration and intensity of this effort fixed functions of the object, or are they not? Now, as I just said, it seems as if the effort were an independent variable, as if we might exert more or less of it in any given case. When a man has let his thoughts go for days and weeks until at last they culminate in some particularly dirty or cowardly or cruel act, it is hard to persuade him, in the midst of his remorse, that he might not have reined them in…. But, on the other hand, there is the certainty that all his effortless volitions are resultants of interests and associations whose strength and sequence are mechanically determined by the structure of that physical mass, his brain; and the general continuity of things and the monistic conception of the world may lead one irresistibly to postulate that a little fact like effort can form no real exception to the overwhelming reign of deterministic law (James, vol; 2, chap 35, p. 497).

Ganeri posits that “Attention is the active organization of experience and action into centred arenas, and Buddhist anatta [the doctrine of no-self] is the claim that there is no room for something real at the centre doing or observing the ordering” (p. 26).

4. Consequences and applications

This theory has the advantage of explaining why each person’s attention is different from others’ without positing a self behind the curtain. It allows us to care whether a given person, including me or you, remains alive and free. A person is a unique cluster or concentration of attention that can attend to its past and future in a unique way. The world will be less when it is gone.

Yet there is also a continuum of qualities and degrees of attention, so that I am very similar to Luca and yet not completely like him. My attention while I write this post is not the same as your attention while you read it, but they connect to each other via the text and our shared experiences. When I am gone, some of what I attended to will be forgotten and some will still receive attention.

Most examples of attention have many causes, some of which can be located mostly inside the organism and others beyond it. There are no sharp boundaries between self and other or between freedom and necessity, but there is a difference between an intense, effortful, deliberated, and concentrated experience of attention versus a complete accident, such as a thunderclap that interrupts a lecture. There is also a difference between reading a novel or listening to a friend and being directed by an algorithm.

Moral responsibility waxes to the degree that we do–or could–expend effort on our own attention. Thus we can be blamed for focusing on bad things or for failing to attend to our responsibilities.

I think we can blame a dog for failing to attend, although much less censoriously than we would blame an adult human being; and we can blame an institution, like the Supreme Court, although we should excuse a dissenting minority.

Ganeri’s theory (to the extent that I have captured it here) is perennial, developed in dialogue with authors who lived in Asia more than 1,500 years ago. It is a theory about human beings, or perhaps about all sentient creatures. But it also feels timely and urgent because human attention is so badly threatened now.

I am currently on vacation in Penzance, Cornwall. I asked Google Gemini’s LLM whether it could summarize a long text for me, and it replied:

I would love to! Please go ahead and upload or paste the text.

Since I’m in Penzance, I’m ready to dive right into your document and pull out the key points, actionable items, or core arguments so you can get the information you need at a glance.

What would you like me to focus on?

Gemini is here in Penzance? That is just creepy. Nevertheless, I uploaded the poem from the Pali Canon that had absorbed Buddaghosa for 853 pages. Gemini “focused on it” and cheerfully gave me a summary in four bullet points. All that was lost was any possible advantage of my attending to that text.

You might think the same of this blog post. if you have read this far, you have devoted some time to my essay, whereas you could instead have read a bit of Ganeri’s book, or the 5th-century Buddhist classic that he interprets, or the original Pali Canon. The fact that I attended to my writing whereas Gemini automatically generated its summary does not make my text better for you.

Indeed, it would be better to read a classic than my blog, but it is also true that we have limited attention and cannot contemplate everything. Summaries are not intrinsically bad, so long as they allow us to focus seriously on other things. Even Gemini’s four-point summary of a poem attributed to the Buddha could enrich a person’s attention if that person then turned to other works.

If we are clusters or concentrations of attention, then each of us has the opportunity to improve their own cluster. What makes attention better is a matter for discussion, but I would nominate complexity, depth, distinctiveness, and service to other people as criteria that we can strive for. A technical tool, such as an LLM or an iPhone, can help, but it can surely erode each of those values if we are not vigilant about it.


See also: The Tangle (a translation of 1.23); AI as Satanic; what should we pay attention to?

AI as Satanic

“Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves before the LORD, and Satan came also among them. And the LORD said unto Satan, Whence comest thou?

Then Satan answered the LORD, and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from walking up and down in it” (Job 1:6)

Iain McGilchrist quoted this verse in a keynote that I just heard him deliver at a conference at Duke. McGilchrist ranged from neuroscience to theology in a long and rich talk. His premises were scientific, metaphysical, moral, and political, and I wouldn’t endorse them all. But his description of artificial intelligence as satanic is worth serious consideration on its own.

For me (although perhaps not for McGilchrist), Satan is a metaphor. But we need metaphors or models to make sense of phenomena like AI, and Satan provides a valuable alternative to some other metaphors, such as AI as a tool, a machine, a mind, a person, or a social organization.

The Satanic metaphor draws our attention to temptation, which is Satan’s favorite trick. It presents AI as not new but instead as an appearance of things that have been walking to and fro all along, such as greed and power-lust. It explains why AI might seem like a god to some (for instance, Silicon Valley tech-bros), since Satan is known to appear as a false savior. Large language models also speak to us as if they were people, talking sycophantically in the first-person singular, much as Satan does. (“Then Satan answered the LORD, and said, Doth Job fear God for nought?”) Finally, the metaphor poses the classic question of whether AI is an active force or rather a manifestation of human freedom.

See also: Reading Arendt in Palo Alto; the design choice to make ChatGPT sound like a human, etc.

AI as the road to socialism?

Just under 40% of occupations jobs in the USA may be replaced by AI if it proves to be as powerful as some think it will be.* As a thought-experiment (not as a prediction), imagine that 40% of current workers, or about 60 million Americans, are no longer employed because AI does their former work. However, their former employers are still producing the same goods and services. These firms are therefore far more profitable.

The profits flow to shareholders. Individuals are already taxed now, but with tens of millions of new people out of work, there would be more political will to raise taxes. Therefore, imagine that a set of competing tech. firms have become responsible for a substantial portion of the whole economy and are heavily taxed. The proceeds flow back out of the government in the form of cash payments, perhaps a Universal Basic Income (UBI). Recipients are able to pay for the goods and services that machines now heavily produce. Meanwhile, jobs that are not automated are relatively well paid, because the UBI enables individuals not to work unless they want to.

Silicon Valley ideologues like Sam Altman tend to envision a UBI on the scale of $1,500/month. Today’s white collar workers earn a median income of about $5,000/month. Therefore, the kind of UBI that Altman imagines would result in a massive loss of income for millions of people, which would have cascading effects. All the former office-workers who now live in nice houses and buy costly services would have to give those up, causing additional unemployment and declining demand for the products produced by the tech. companies.

However, the public might demand a UBI more like $5,000/month. Then half of today’s white collar workers would be worse off, but half would be richer–and none would have to work.

Looking a little more deeply, we might notice that AI tools are not simply machines. They process text and ideas that human beings create. Therefore, we could see this whole system as deeply socialistic. Billions of people’s mental output would be processed by relatively few AI models that produce generally similar output. These tools would generate profits that would be distributed equitably to the people. Most individuals would receive $5,000/month, neither more or less. Since they wouldn’t have to work, they could spend their time as they wish. And–via electoral politics–the people could regulate the AI companies.

It all sounds like Karl Marx’s early utopian vision:

In communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. (The German Ideology, 1845)

Problems:

  1. The transition to this imaginary equilibrium might be chaotic, violent, and destructive– perhaps to such a degree that we wouldn’t make it through.
  2. Modern people tend to derive dignity and purpose from work. Perhaps this is a contingent fact about today’s society. In the future, maybe we will be happy fishing in the afternoon and writing criticism after dinner. Or perhaps we will be deeply depressed without jobs. To make matters worse, would we really spend our time writing or playing music or even fishing, if machines can do all those things better? This is not a problem that confronted Marx, because in his day, machines automated tasks that people would not do voluntarily.
  3. It’s easy to posit that the people can tax and regulate AI companies through the device of a democratically elected government, but millions of people’s interests and values do not automatically turn onto one public will. Interest groups have agendas and power. At large scales, democracy is complicated, messy, factional, and very easily corrupted. In this case, the AI companies and investors would be political players.
  4. It could be that not only AI companies but also the models themselves become players that have interests. Sentient, self-interested AI is the source of much current anxiety. I am not sure what to make of that concern, but it surely adds a layer of risk.
  5. I have discussed the USA alone, but how would this look for people in a country without competitive AI companies? US citizens might demand that Silicon Valley provide them with a UBI, but it’s implausible that US citizens would demand a global UBI. And how would people in Africa or Latin America gain leverage have over US policy?
  6. For the people to govern the “means of production” (to use the Marxist term), they must understand it. Industrial workers have understood industrial machines, so they can run factories. None of us understand Large Language Models, not even the developers who design them. Can we, therefore, govern them? (Having said that, we also do not fully understand the human brain, yet people have governed people.)
  7. Even if democracy works well, the public will not really control AI. So far, I have suggested that AI is like a machine that can be regulated by people through their government. But AI also shapes our knowledge, values, and understandings of ourselves in ways that are controlled either by the designers and owners of the platforms, or by the machines, or–perhaps–by no one at all. Evegeny Morozov writes:

Now imagine a future in which a [public] Investment Board, under pressure to avoid bias and misinformation, mandates that AI systems be fair according to agreed metrics, respect privacy, minimize energy use, and promote well-being. Call this woke AI by democratic mandate–an infrastructure whose outputs are correct, diverse, and balanced. Yet it still feels like it was designed over our heads.

Morozov suggests a different path. Instead of allowing corporate AI to grow and then trying to regulate it and capture its value, develop non-corporate AI:

A city government might maintain open models trained on public documents and local knowledge, integrated into schools, clinics, and housing offices under rules set by residents. A network of artists and archivists might build models specialized in endangered languages and regional cultures, fine?tuned to materials their communities actually care about. 

The point is not that these examples are the answer, but that a socialism worthy of AI would institutionalize the capacity to try such arrangements, inhabit them, and modify or abandon them—and at scale, with real resources. This kind of socialism would treat AI as plastic enough to accommodate uses, values, and social forms that emerge only as it is deployed. It would see AI less as an object to govern (or govern with) and more as a field of collective discovery and self-transformation. 

I should say that I am not a socialist, partly because available socialist theories have not persuaded me, and partly because I am also drawn to liberal ideals of individual rights, privacy, and negative liberties. However, “socialism” is a broad and protean term, and socialist thought may offer resources to envision better futures. Confronting the massive threat–and opportunity–of AI, we should use any intellectual resources we can get our hands on.


*I have aggregated the categories of office and administrative support; sales and related; management; healthcare support; architecture and engineering; life, physical, and social science; and legal from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I omitted education (5.8% of all jobs) on the–probably vain–hope that my own occupation won’t also be automated. If that happens, raise the estimate of obsolete jobs to 45%.

See also: can AI solve “wicked problems”?; Reading Arendt in Palo Alto; the human coordination involved in AI (etc.)