Monthly Archives: October 2005

Karl Rove and the first amendment

Some time ago, I wrote a post entitled “Why I Don’t Care About Karl Rove” that provoked passionate criticism on a few other sites. I was concerned about all the excitement that the Plame investigation was causing on the left, because I thought the scandal was a distraction. The Bush administration is on its way out, and the only thing that matters now is the national debate about issues and ideologies.

The problem with the administration has always been its overt priorities and decisions, not the secret behavior of key players. If Rove is convicted of a crime, that will have little effect on the future of politics, because he and his chief client will not be on the ballot in ’06 or ’08. I doubt very much that voters will draw the conclusion that Republicans are law-breakers. They have plenty of experience with Democrats who have been convicted of more mainstream crimes. Instead, they will be reminded that politics is a hard-ball game played by crafty Washington professionals that has little to do with ideas and makes little room for citizens.

Those were the important points, but I realize that I have another qualm about the Plame investigation. If Karl Rove did identify Valerie Plame to reporters, then he shared information with the press. Our presumption should always be that such speech is protected by the First Amendment. It is precisely when we despise the speaker and his motives that we should be most careful about constitutional rights.

There is a law (“section 421”) against revealing the name of a covert CIA agent “when the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the United States.” I guess this law is constitutional. However, I’m not sure I like it; I’m not sure I like any law that is very little known and hardly ever enforced, especially if it prohibits the release of true information to the public. If the statute is enforced in this case, then it must apply to everyone who leaks the names of covert agents–not just political operatives like Karl Rove, but also patriots who want the press to know that the CIA is involved in bad behavior. If the Special Prosecutor ignores section 421 and instead uses a broad conspiracy or espionage charge, then we should be even more concerned about an expansion of state power and new restraints on the press.

William Kristol seems to think that Democrats are deliberately trying to criminalize conservative leaders, as shown by the ongoing investigations of Frist, DeLay, Rove and others. I don’t see how that can be true, since several of the investigations are controlled by Republican appointees or civil servants working in the Bush administration. Harry Brighouse has a simpler answer: Lots of criminal investigations are underway “because there seems to be prima facie evidence that prominent conservative Republicans were up to their eyes in criminal activities.”

My thought: People who are under investigation are innocent until proven guilty. The political consequences of any convictions would probably be bad for Bush, although they might provoke a backlash favorable to his interests. In any case, it is crucial not to focus on the short-term political consequences for any person or party, but rather on justice and the long-term consequences for law and our political culture. To be sure, failing to investigate people like Rove, Libby, Frist, and DeLay could create a culture of impunity. On the other hand, targeting politicians for prosecution can be just as damaging, if it makes public service appear dangerous, if it convinces the opposition party to rely on criminal convictions rather than arguments about policy, or if it causes us to ignore constitutional principles (as was clearly the case in the Ken Starr investigation). Rove has done “collateral damage” to American political culture, but that doesn’t excuse prosecuting him in ways that would make matters even worse.

could manufacturing back the Democrats?

It is a truth universally acknowledged that a party without possession of Congress or the White House must be in need of some rich donors. I wish this weren’t true; for two years, I worked for Common Cause, advocating campaign finance reform. But private money still runs campaigns, and so the question is, on whom will the Democrats depend for funding in 2008?

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Mobilizing American’s Youth (MAY)

I had an inspiring meeting this morning with folks from Mobilizing American’s Youth. MAY has more than 25 “mobilizer teams” across the country that bring together youth of diverse ideological perspectives to discuss issues and develop common agendas. They train these teams, partly using their Mobilizer’s Guidebook. They also have an online Youth Policy Action Center that provides information about issues and easy ways to make one’s voice heard. MAY is a perfect example of the core values of the “civic renewal movement,” as I’m calling it. MAY is ideologically open-ended and pragmatic, deliberative, collaborative, committed to political engagement (voting and beyond), and oriented to the civic development and leadership of the next generation. Whenever you are about to despair about our political culture, you need to interact with a group like this one.

thoughts about game theory

The Nobel Prize for Tom Schelling (which is enormously exciting for everyone in Maryland’s School of Public Policy), makes me think of a few points about game theory:

1. It’s a form of political theory that harkens back to classical authors from Hobbes to Rousseau (with echoes of Plato’s Crito and other ancient works). That is, it makes certain assumptions about the preferences and goals of “players”–usually individuals or states–and then asks what must happen when they interact. This is the same method that led Hobbes to believe that individuals, motivated by the goal of minimizing pain, would kill one another absent a state. Hobbes’ conclusions were rejected by other theorists, but his method remains alive in modern game theory. There is a rival tradition of political theory that treats people as deeply embedded in cultural contexts. For Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey, Foucault, Habermas, and others, the important question is how and why culture has changed, not how individuals will act under specified theoretical conditions. Some results of game theory seem to generalize across all existing cultures–which wouldn’t have surprised Hobbes or Locke.

2. Since game theory starts with players and models their interaction, it can handle markets, wars, and votes equally well. Schelling’s work is typical in that it doesn’t fit within the borders of his own field (economics), but could equally belong to political science or–in the case of his famous model of racial “tipping points”–sociology. There is something impressive about a theory that explains human behavior without arbitrary limits.

3. Some people assume that the “players” in game theory are selfish. That is not true. A game-theoretical model can work very well to explain behavior driven by any motives. Usually, altruism makes human interactions turn out better, and then games are uninteresting–but not always. Consider, for example, the bad outcomes that can result when X and Y are picking a restaurant, and X only wants to eat at Y’s favorite place, and Y only wants to go where X wants to go. They may withhold information about their own preferences, causing a big mess, even though their motives are selfless.

4. If game theory has a limitation, it is not an assumption of selfishness but rather a presumption that the players have preferences and identities prior to interacting. For instance, if the players are the USA and USSR (as in Schelling’s classic work), then their identities are those of the two nations and their goals are assumed to be security, or domination, or whatever. However, a person’s identity as a representative of the USA or the USSR is not just given; it is forged as a consequence of social and historical change, and it can fall apart. Soviet officials were supposed to bear the identity of “international Communists”; they really identified with the USSR or narrowly with their individual security interests; and then suddenly around 1990 most began to see themselves as Russians or even Europeans, but not as Soviets. This was a massive political change.

Even given players with fixed identities, it is not obvious that they will want any particular goals (such as security, pleasure, dominance, honor or salvation). We may start wanting one thing and persuade ourselves to value something different. It’s not clear that these processes of identity-formation and preference-setting can themselves be modeled as games. When we deliberate about who we are and what we want, the reasoning is not strategic in the same way. However, this is not a criticism of game-theory, simply an argument that it belongs in a broader context.