{"id":14603,"date":"2014-12-03T10:59:13","date_gmt":"2014-12-03T15:59:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/?p=14603"},"modified":"2014-12-03T10:59:36","modified_gmt":"2014-12-03T15:59:36","slug":"method-mapping-moral-commitments-networks","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/?p=14603","title":{"rendered":"a method of mapping moral commitments as networks"},"content":{"rendered":"

I have been developing a method for representing moral beliefs as networks of ideas<\/a>. Various friends have also been contributing to the devel\"\"opment of this approach. So far, we have\u00a0asked\u00a0individuals to name\u00a0their own beliefs, given\u00a0them back their lists, asked\u00a0them to note which pairs of beliefs\u00a0seem connected, and generated network maps of their beliefs and connections. I’ve also asked individuals\u00a0to share their\u00a0maps with peers and to consider making changes in response to other people’s arguments. I have mapped the ideas of multiple people as one network. Instead of using surveys, one\u00a0could interview people or groups about their moral thinking on a\u00a0given\u00a0topic and identify the beliefs and connections implied by their speech–or use a rich text, such as\u00a0a poem<\/a>, to discover an implicit network map. Major moral theories also have network shapes that can be diagrammed. Virtues, for instance, are important nodes in Aristotle’s conceptual network, and he says that the virtues are all connected by way of one central concept, practical wisdom.<\/p>\n

I do not see this network approach as a\u00a0model of moral thought, an empirical theory about how we actually think, or a normative theory about how we should<\/em> think. Instead, I see it as a technique of analysis that is relatively neutral with respect to models and theories, yet\u00a0it does have certain substantive implications.<\/p>\n

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/a>, there is little clarity\u00a0or consensus about what defines\u00a0a theory<\/em> versus a model<\/em>. But let me propose two analogies:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. A Lego car is a model of a real car. It can be used to develop and test theories about the performance of actual\u00a0cars. These theories prove true or false when tested in real cars; the Lego model is reliable\u00a0to the degree that the theories pan out. Making Lego models is a technique that is more or less helpful for engineering. Its value depends on the context and the available alternatives. For instance, Lego is almost certainly a better material than soap for making models of cars. It is a less precise medium than 3D printing, but it is also cheaper and easier. A good theory is true; a good model is valid and reliable; and a good technique is useful.<\/li>\n
  2. In economics, I would call each equation a theory and use the word “model” to mean a whole set of equations, along with definitions and explanations of\u00a0the hypothesized mathematical relationships. Working with equations is a technique. It is pretty obviously an essential technique for economics, but some have argued that it has been valued\u00a0to the exclusion of other techniques, such as collecting better data, looking for\u00a0natural experiments, or\u00a0identifying important topics. Paul Krugman wrote<\/a> recently: “It has been all too obvious that there are people with big reputations who can push equations around but don\u2019t seem to have any sense of what the equations mean.” Like building with Legos, mathematics is a technique whose value varies with the context.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Likewise, I would propose that\u00a0mapping moral networks is\u00a0a technique with which one can build models and test hypotheses. It is fairly flexible and can accommodate a range of substantive views from both psychology and\u00a0philosophy. But its relative value (compared to other techniques) varies depending on some assumptions about morality.\u00a0I’ll compare it to two prevalent alternatives.<\/p>\n

    First, some moral philosophers construct systematic views. An example would be the sophisticated utilitarianism of Henry Sidgwick (which we could call “utilitarianism 3.0,” if Bentham’s was 1.0, was Mill’s was\u00a02.0). Sidgwick held that there is\u00a0just one ultimate moral principle:\u00a0maximizing human happiness.\u00a0But it generates a set of important moral rules, such as being kind and telling the truth. These precepts, in turn, imply many ordinary moral judgments, such as\u00a0telling the truth to your mother.<\/p>\n

    Sidgwick’s structure was mainly philosophical, not empirical. He did not say that everyone is<\/em> a utilitarian (in fact, he explicitly denied that), but that everyone’s judgments should be consistent with the results of utilitarian reasoning. There was, however, an element of empiricism is his view. He doubted that we\u00a0can\u00a0directly apply the utilitarian principle to real cases, which is why\u00a0subsidiary rules are valuable.<\/p>\n

    Sidgwick’s\u00a0structure can\u00a0be diagrammed as a tree-like\u00a0network, and that is somewhat\u00a0illuminating. Individuals’ actual moral networks could\u00a0also\u00a0be mapped\u00a0and compared to Sidgwick’s diagram, as a form of moral assessment. However, if Sidgwick was right, then network analysis has\u00a0limited value. After all, his proposed network is\u00a0quite simple, and some of the\u00a0power of network modeling (e.g., detecting subtle clusters in large fields of data) would be wasted. Thus …<\/p>\n

    P1.\u00a0Network\u00a0techniques become more useful if we presume that real people hold many different structures of moral thought, that a\u00a0theoretically driven\u00a0structure like utilitarianism\u00a0is\u00a0not necessarily ideal,\u00a0that some\u00a0structures are much more complex than Sidgwick’s, and that comparing structures is illuminating.<\/em><\/p>\n

    Second, the moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt currently proposes six “moral foundations<\/a>,” although his theory is subject to testing and improvement, and he is open to finding\u00a0more than six foundations.\u00a0One technique he uses is factor analysis. Many individuals are asked many questions about moral topics, and Haidt and colleagues look for unobserved variables (“factors”) that can explain a lot the variance in the answers. In\u00a0developing\u00a0statistical models that predict\u00a0the actual results as a function of a few variables, they seek parsimony and fit. “Parsimony” means that fewer factors\u00a0are better, but “fit” means that the unobserved variables should explain the actual survey answers without too much\u00a0error.* Once the data yield statistical factors, Haidt and colleagues consider whether each one names\u00a0a\u00a0psychological instinct or emotion that 1) would have value for\u00a0evolving homo sapiens,<\/em> so that we would have developed an inborn tendency to embrace it, and 2) are found in many cultures around the world. Now bearing names like “care” and “liberty,” these factors become candidates for moral foundations.<\/p>\n

    Network analysis\u00a0could represent Haidt’s model, just as it\u00a0can represent Sidgwick’s very different conception.\u00a0Each of Haidt’s foundations would be a central node connected to many concrete beliefs by one-way arrows. However, if Haidt is right, then network analysis is not as valuable\u00a0a technique as the one he uses, factor analysis. First, network analysis\u00a0is not nearly as parsimonious. A network map may show\u00a0hundreds of beliefs clustered to varying degrees. Instead of generating\u00a0six nameable foundations, a network map\u00a0might\u00a0yield\u00a0fifty somewhat vaguely defined and partly overlapping clusters.<\/p>\n

    Second, the network method presumes that people’s explicit connections are meaningful. I diagram subjects’ networks using their\u00a0assertions that their own\u00a0beliefs are\u00a0linked–for example, I link A to B when someone\u00a0thinks that A gives her\u00a0a reason to think\u00a0B. But Haidt and colleagues argue\u00a0that we do not know<\/em> which beliefs are meaningfully connected. We reach conclusions\u00a0because of unconscious biases and use reasons as mere rationalizations, gerrymandering our arguments to fit what we want to believe because of the underlying foundations. Sidgwick (like most philosophers) held that in morality, “as in other departments of thought, the primitive spontaneous processes of the mind are mixed with error, which is only to be removed gradually by comprehensive reflection<\/em> upon the results of these processes.” But Haidt et al. believe that such reflection is basically ineffective, for\u00a0only the primitive spontaneous processes of the mind really count. If that is the case, than the very items that matter most (the unobserved foundations) will be missing from a network map that is derived from people’s explicit connections. Thus …<\/p>\n

    P2 Network techniques\u00a0become more useful if people have many clusters of moral ideas, if important information is lost by seeking parsimonious statistical models, and if reflection on explicit, conscious\u00a0ideas and connections is valuable.<\/em><\/p>\n

    *Graham, Jesse et al. \u201cMapping the Moral Domain.\u201d Journal of personality and social psychology<\/i> 101.2 (2011): 366\u2013385. PMC<\/i>. Web. 1 Dec. 2014.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    I have been developing a method for representing moral beliefs as networks of ideas. Various friends have also been contributing to the development of this approach. So far, we have\u00a0asked\u00a0individuals to name\u00a0their own beliefs, given\u00a0them back their lists, asked\u00a0them to note which pairs of beliefs\u00a0seem connected, and generated network maps of their beliefs and connections. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[29,5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14603","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-moral-network-mapping","category-philosophy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14603","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=14603"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14603\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14627,"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14603\/revisions\/14627"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=14603"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=14603"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/peterlevine.ws\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=14603"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}