Human beings have invented a vast and diverse set of institutions that coordinate behavior and allocate resources.

These forms include disciplined organizations headed by leaders, voluntary groups that strive to operate by consensus, procedures for voting directly on policies, elected bodies that deliberate and vote, courts that decide cases and controversies (with or without juries, which may or may not be randomly selected), bureaucracies characterized by hierarchies of defined positions, markets with or without firms (which may themselves by mini-dictatorships, bureaucracies, or co-ops), markets for capital, informal norms defined by a widespread assumption that everyone else will behave in certain ways, scientific disciplines organized by peer-review and replication, and networks that newcomers can join by agreeing to relay messages to other members.

This list is not meant to be comprehensive and is not closed. Several important forms are no more than 300 years old, and the last one originated within the past half century. In the future, new forms will be invented.

We should not view current institutions complacently, since many originated in injustice and still perpetuate bad outcomes. To name just one example, the Dutch East India Company, founded in 1602, pioneered essential features of capital markets, including shares that could be resold on the world’s first stock market and a board accountable to shareholders. Its major activities included conquest, ethnic cleansing, and slavery. And I do not mean to cite a corporation alone, since governmental forms are also rooted in cruelty.

But I do start with the assumption that each of these forms has been invented and has survived because it serves significant functions and offers distinctive advantages. Also, each one can be improved. Progress is by no means inevitable, but we can identify and enhance changes that are beneficial. A certain kind of arrogance is required to assume that any one of these forms is simply bad and should be dispensed with.

In that case, we must decide which institutional forms should be used for each social purpose. And a second-order question: which institution(s) should decide this matter?

A decision about which institution should play any given role typically looks like a law (although it might technically be a constitutional provision, a decree, or a regulation). For example, to have an independent, private press or else a governmental media system requires a law. Likewise for health insurance.

Which institutions can yield such laws? Not a market, which simply doesn’t offer products that look like laws. Nor are people invited to reason about the role of various other institutions when they are participating in market exchanges.

A king, dictator, high priest, or junta can decide which institution will do what. Instead of grabbing all power for himself, a ruler may favor courts or markets (think of Frederick the Great or Augusto Pinochet). Regardless, we do not want rulers to make these decisions for two major reasons. First, they cannot be trusted to decide which institutions work best for all, when they stand to profit for making them work mainly for themselves. Besides, even in the rare case of a benign despot, he cannot know enough about how each institution affects all the people of the society to be able to decide wisely.

In the US system, courts sometimes decide which kinds of institutions may do what. In the 1905 Lochner decision, the Supreme Court notoriously gave control over wages and working decisions to companies rather than the state. When judges seem to be deciding such cases on the basis of their own views (a charge against the current Supreme Court), then they appear no different from juntas. The special advantage of a court is not allocating responsibilities among institutions but interpreting and applying laws created by other institutions to adjudicate specific cases.

Science might be able to decide which institution works best for each purpose–if this turns out to be a tractable research question. Coase’s Theorem is supposed to be a result of research that proves the superiority of competitive markets for many purposes; some versions of Marxism are supposed to prove the deep flaws of capitalism.

I view these claims as useful inputs to reasoning about which institutions are best for various purposes. Research should be taken seriously and should develop further. I doubt it will ever resolve the discussion, because the choice of institutions involves conflicting values and interests, not merely empirical claims, and also because the world keeps changing as a result of people’s uncontrollable behavior. Any institution that is neatly designed according to a theory will soon be subverted by people who understand it and “hack” its design.

If the decision about which institution should do what looks like a law, and we don’t want rulers, judges, or specialized experts to make such laws, then the best candidate is a democracy. As Knight and Johnson (2014) argue, a democracy elicits views about the role of various other institutions, it gives everyone an equal opportunity to affect the decision, and it permits continued reflection once a decision is made.

One does not need optimistic assumptions about individuals’ wisdom or their tendency to learn from other people to believe that our best available way to decide the role of other institutions is to have an ongoing debate in civil society, then to empower elected, accountable representatives to vote, and then to debate the results and reconsider the decisions.

In fact, a reasonably healthy democracy seems to be one in which political competition is about the role of other institutions. For example, things would be going better if US voters were thinking about whether the government of the United States should channel resources into “green” technologies or else leave the allocation of capital to markets. I mention this example because the 2024 election is not about the pros or cons of Biden’s channeling more than a trillion dollars into green industries, but about who counts as a real American.

The above argument is deeply inspired by Knight and Johnson. Paul Aligica (2014) dissents in part. He sees all the different kinds of institutions as more or less on par within a polycentric order. He argues that institutions should and do grow and change as a result of decentralized decisions made by many actors across the society as a whole. In that sense, the people rule through all the institutions. Aligica defends an elected, democratic government but emphasizes that it cannot assess and influence the other institutions wisely unless they develop robustly and independently and demonstrate successes and failures.

I think Aligica makes valid points, but the gap between him and Knight and Johnson is not very wide, and I’m inclined to endorse the priority of democracy as long as we remember (as Knight and Johnson do) that a plurality of institutions is an asset for democratic government.

Sources: Jack Knight and James Johnson, The priority of democracy: Political consequences of pragmatism. Princeton University Press, 2014; Paul Aligica, Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and Beyond. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. See also polycentricity: the case for a (very) mixed economy; modus vivendi theory; what if people’s political opinions are very heterogeneous?; China teaches the value of political pluralism, etc.