Monthly Archives: September 2011

more information, less trust

I have argued here that experts and policymakers think of accountability in terms of information, whereas citizens think of it in terms of relationships. Giving people more information about things like public employees’ salaries, students’ test scores, or federal spending will not increase their trust if what they are looking for is contact (or a feeling of contact) with human beings.

That hypothesis has political implications: it suggests that if you want government to be important and trusted, you’d better make it interactive–which, in turn, requires decentralization (because hardly anyone can interact with a behemoth). By the way, I am not assuming that citizens are correct and experts are wrong. Sometimes information is a more valid basis for trust than relationships are. Sometimes a distant agency that discloses data is more trustworthy than a local sheriff or principal whom you happen to know. But citizens’ preference for relationships has some merit and is certainly an important political fact.

A major basis of my argument was some preliminary data that has now found its way into a published report by Public Agenda and the Kettering Foundation: Don’t Count Us Out: How An Overreliance On Accountability Could Undermine The Public’s Confidence In Schools, Business, Government, And More. One paragraph from the executive summary is particularly pertinent:

More Information ? More Trust. Perhaps Less!

Typically, people know almost nothing about specific [disclosure] measures, and they rarely see them as clear-cut evidence of effectiveness. Many Americans are deeply skeptical about the accuracy and importance of quantitative measures. Most are suspicious of the ways in which numbers can be manipulated or tell only half the story. Many members of the public feel confused and overwhelmed by the detailed information flying past them in the name of “disclosure” and “transparency.” Many fear they are being manipulated by the complex presentations. More and more statistics do not reassure, so in fact, more information can actually lead to less public trust.

the future of classics

(in Washington, DC)

Just as maiden, standing on the shore of the ocean, follows with tearful eyes her departed lover with no hope of ever seeing him again, and fancies that in that distant sail she sees the image of her beloved … we too have, as it were, nothing but a shadowy outline left of the object of our wishes, but that very indistinctness awakens only a more earnest longing for what we have lost, and we study the copies of the originals more attentively than we should have done the originals themselves if we had been in full possession of them.

–Johann Joachim Winckelmann, “Greek Art Under the Romans,” ca 1764.

The desire to recover and imitate aspects of Greco-Roman civilization has been one of the great motivating forces–not only in what we (quite arbitrarily) call “the West,” but also in the whole Islamic world and in the Orthodox nations from the Baltic to the Pacific. People have sought to emulate a great range of Greco-Roman models. Charlemagne tried to patch together a semblance of late Romano-Christian law and religion. English gentlemen thought they lived like Pliny the Elder under a new Augustan empire. Wordsworth believed he would “rather be / A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn” (a wild Greek savage) than a modern consumer or trader. Czars imagined themselves Byzantine emperors; New England patriots saw themselves as plain-spun citizens of a new Athens.

My father, Joseph M. Levine, wrote several books about encounters with antiquity. He argued that efforts to recover the classical world generally had practical–political and cultural–motivations. Whether you were a citizen of an Italian Renaissance city-state, finding models in classical oratory, or an English Whig politician, admiring the Roman Republic, you had forward-looking reasons to recommend the study of something called “classics.”

Because of these practical projects, the discipline of classical philology became the first and most ambitious form of professional scholarship. But classical scholars discovered the diversity, fluidity, imperfection, and sheer alienness of ancient civilizations. They showed that classical models could not work for the present or future. Thus, repeatedly and especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, classics made itself irrelevant.

I have some classical training, and still prize it because of the insights I believe it offers into the history of post-classical civilizations. Writers as diverse as Ayatollah Khomenei, James Joyce, and Thomas Jefferson were steeped in classical sources; knowing those sources and the languages in which they were written helps us to understand our predecessors. But we should not long mourn the decline of an enterprise designed for large-scale, practical purposes once it no longer serves those purposes.

Classics today can seem a discipline with an immensely long apprenticeship, a vast array of prior literature to sort through before one can write anything original, a limited set of original sources, ethnocentric biases, a modest audience, and a diminishing market share. Yet my classicist colleague Gregory Crane, editor-in-chief of Project Perseus and a pioneer in the digital humanities, has shown that classics offers excellent opportunities for diverse people to construct new knowledge together. For example, Crane enlists Muslim seminary students in the Middle East to help annotate the classical Arabic texts that are essential for our understanding of Greek sources. Beginning students in the US can collate Greek manuscripts (via images); and travelers can record geographical information.

Crane notes that Greco-Roman civilization “remains a major source for every form of popular medium – fiction and non-fiction, film and prose.” People who enjoy Percy Jackson or HBO’s Rome may want real historical information and context. But

the sources about the ancient Greco-Roman world are particularly challenging to work with – the original sources are in Classical Greek and Latin, and our knowledge about the Greco-Roman world has appeared in every written language from areas spanning from Morocco to Afghanistan. The physical world of Greece and Rome has left impressive remains behind to this day but we must reconstruct our understanding of this physical world from archaeological finds spread across thousands of miles.

Fortunately, we now have “open content collections,” such as Project Perseus; and a “new decentralized culture of intellectual life has taken hold among students of the Greco-Roman world, with student researchers emerging as key participants in colleges and universities in the United States and Canada.” These scholars and students can serve the broad public by providing information and background to complement popular versions of classical civilization.

I think that Project Perseus represents the bright future of classics, not only because of its content, but especially because of the collaborative process that feeds it.

great new jobs in civic engagement

Jobs are scarce, but there are at least a few excellent openings in civic engagement:

a panel on civic education

This National Conference on Citizenship’s “Civic Innovators Forum” was held in Philadelphia on September 15, 2011. It was co-sponsored by the Case Foundation and Philanthropy for Active Civic Engagement and held at the National Constitution Center. This video presents the panel about the new Guardian of Democracy report. The opening comments are by Michael Weiser, chair of NCoC, and Mabel McKinney-Browning, chair of the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools. Panelists are me, Brian Brady of the Mikva Challenge, Kathleen Hall Jamieson of Annenberg Public Policy Center, and Mabel McKinney-Browning. The moderator is John Bridgeland of Civic Enterprises.

Video streaming by Ustream

rebirth without metaphysics

Death, according to Martin Heidegger, was a fundamental fact about human existence. Life was movement through time toward an end.

Birth, for Heidegger’s critical ex-student Hannah Arendt, was the fundamental fact about human beings as moral or political creatures. At birth, our life course is maximally open, unpredictable, and, in that sense, free. Birth or “natality” symbolizes our power to start anew.*

Rebirth, for the man we call the Buddha, was the fundamental fact about life. At least according to one tradition, he did not mean a literal transfer of the soul into a different body at death. When one of his monks taught that doctrine, the Buddha apparently rebuked him, saying, “From whom have you heard, you foolish man …, that I have explained the dharma in that way? Foolish man, have I not declared in many ways that consciousness is dependently arisen …?”**

What then did he mean? Here is a sympathetic reconstruction:

  1. I cannot directly perceive my self or its effects. All I perceive is a sequence of sensations, judgments, desires, and other ideas. The Buddha is a strict empiricist. If we cannot perceive something by any means, it is nothing. As David Hume wrote, I am “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.”
  2. Each of these ideas has a cause. It does not arise from nothing but depends on something before it. We might identity the causes of ideas as other ideas or as physical processes in the brain. That is merely a difference in the level of analysis. Either way, the core premise is “dependent origination” (pratityasamutpada). Every idea is part of a long causal chain.
  3. My ideas do not have the same span as my life. When I was one day old, I had none of the ideas that now fill my brain. Many of the ideas that I had when I was 5 or 15 are forgotten, although their indirect effects may linger. Some of the ideas in my mind today were in my father’s head before I was born. I will forget some of my ideas while they still are alive in other minds.
  4. I was not born free, in the sense of having a self capable of choosing its beliefs and desires. I was born as a thinking organism which learned its beliefs and desires from experience, strongly shaped by the already-living people around me. As Karl Mannheim wrote in 1928, “even if the rest of one’s life consisted in one long process of negation and destruction of the natural world view acquired in youth, the determining influence of these early impressions would still be predominant.”
  5. My thoughts may have consequences (“karma”) for others, going beyond my lifespan. Even if you sharply disagree with me, by sharing my idea with you, I have affected you.
  6. If the self is a bundle of constantly changing ideas that are caused by other people’s ideas and shared in part with other people, then the moment of my biological birth was not the beginning of “me,” nor will my biological death be the end. The bundle that is me is constantly being reborn, in my consciousness and in other minds.
  7. Notwithstanding 6, different minds are not the same. I am not you. Individuality is real, in some sense, and biological death matters.
  8. Notwithstanding 2, the sensation we have of choosing and controlling our ideas is valid (morally, if not metaphysically).

Rebirth captures this combination. A birth is a new beginning but not ex nihilo. It is wonderful but not literally miraculous, being the result of regular natural processes.  It marks a break with a past, yet the newborn is completely dependent on and thoroughly influenced by adults. We might view rebirth as a metaphor for life, but if one thinks (with the Buddha and Hume) that the “self” is fictional or metaphorical, then what is metaphorical is the assertion that life begins in infancy. Literally, life is continuous renewal, and that makes rebirth more literal than birth.

*This paper argues that the contrast between Heidegger and Arendt on birth/death is overblown.
**Quoted in Pankaj Mishra, An End to Suffering: The Buddha in the World.