Monthly Archives: July 2006

a light unto the nations

Richard Cohen’s Washington Post piece last week began, “The greatest mistake Israel could make at the moment is to forget that Israel itself is a mistake. It is an honest mistake, a well-intentioned mistake, a mistake for which no one is culpable, but the idea of creating a nation of European Jews in an area of Arab Muslims (and some Christians) has produced a century of warfare and terrorism of the sort we are seeing now.”

As you would expect, this opening sparked some fire in the blogosphere. In fact, it was the most blogged-about statement of the day, described variously as “poison,” “projectile vomiting,” the “asinine quote of the century,” and a “bizarre attack on Israel,” written by a “self-hating terror enabler,” a “Jew who can be relied upon to provide cover for … malignant pyschosis and racism.” (I quote from half a dozen different blogs.)

Cohen could have argued against the current Israeli military action without calling the country a “mistake.” I doubt that the debate he launched will be productive. It would be more timely to discuss whether the bombing and ground invasion of Lebanon comport with just war theory. We should also debate whether these actions can possibly advance the interests of Israel, rightly understood. As the Israeli Meretz Party is asking, Is there an exit strategy? Is there a plausible scenario in which the invasion leads to peace and security?

However, over the longer term, the question of Israel’s legitimacy is unavoidable. The Jewish state is a democracy that needs the voluntary and enthusiastic support of its own people and the authentic friendship of at least some foreign countries. Therefore, it is not wrong to raise the question of whether Israel is a “mistake”–and if not, why not.

Some complain that Israel is singled out for criticism, even though the neighboring tyrannies receive less scrutiny. But the governments of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt have no legitimate moral claims; they merely have guns. Men enlist in the Syrian army because they are drafted. Subjects obey the Syrian state because otherwise they will be tortured. Other countries deal with Syria because they have no alternative.

A democratic state is a different kind of project. It asserts a right to govern on the basis of justice. It is therefore an appropriate question whether the State of Israel state is just, whereas there is no need to ask that question in relation to Syria or even Jordan and Egypt.

Israel was created by a vote of the United Nations, and its citizens still want to be a nation. Even if the original Zionist project was a mistake, the state of Israel has a presumptive right to exist, just as the USA is legitimate regardless of the merits of Manifest Destiny. America was built on land stolen from the indigenous population so that it could be worked, in significant measure, by imported slaves. We nevertheless have a legitimate–indeed, an excellent–polity that rests today on the consent of the governed. Israel’s foundation was, at the least, less bloody that our own. Like any democracy, Israel must show that its current behavior and laws are just; its origins are history.

Thus, as a friend of Israel, I worry about the defenses of that nation that I read on English-language blogs in response to Cohen’s post. I don’t know how much of the Israeli population these blogs represent, but I have also encountered the same views in offline conversations. The main arguments are: (1) God gave Israel to the Jews in perpetuity; (2) Jews lived in what is now Israel for many centuries of antiquity; and (3) There were hardly any Arabs in Palestine before the Jewish immigration of the late 1800s.

I cannot accept the premise that Israel is God’s gift, nor should the United States or the global community. Unlike the argument that Israel deserves respect because its constitution is just, an appeal to scripture can move no one except fundamentalists. The premise that Jews are the original occupants of Israel is of dubious relevance. Similar logic would imply that those of European ancestry who live today in North and South America, Australia, and South Africa must go back “home” and leave those lands to the native populations. As for the argument that Palestine was “deserted swampland” between 68 CE and 1870–this raises a host of problems.

First, I doubt it’s true. It is hard to tell from the World Wide Web how many Muslim and Christian Arabs really lived in what would become British Palestine in 1890 or 1910. This is an intensely touchy subject, and many people have created responsible-looking websites that provide radically different estimates. Yehoshua Porath’s estimate of more than 200,000 sounds well-argued to me; it appeared in a respectable publication; and it’s perfectly consistent with contemporaneous descriptions of Ottoman Palestine quoted on the Zionist websites, which make the area seem relatively lightly populated but far from “deserted.”

I am not learned about Middle Eastern history and cannot settle the debate about how many Arabs lived in Palestine before the big Jewish immigration. But it does seem risky to tie one’s national self-respect to a claim that there weren’t many of another people present on your land before your countrymen arrived. Mrs. Netanhayu once told Queen Noor of Jordan, “When the Jews came to this area, there were no Arabs here. They came to find work when we built cities. There was nothing here before that.” What if that turned out to be false? Given her rationale for the Zionist project, must Mrs. Netanyahu reject the state of Israel if someone shows her that there were Arabs in Palestine in 1880?

Not only bloggers, but people I have known offline denigrate the old Arab population of Palestine, claiming that the few resident Arabs were pathetically poor and illiterate until the Jews arrived. This is an empirical claim that could, for the little I know, turn out to be true. But it’s morally dangerous to want to believe that another group was so bereft and despondent that their defeat at your hands was a blessing for them. That is a deeply condescending assumption that can easily become habitual.

The Jewish state needs a proper sense of self-respect and a national project that it can confidently defend. It still has a chance, I believe, to embody an inspiring story that unites and motivates its own people and impresses fair-minded outsiders. Its national narrative can still be about an oppressed but peace-loving people who have built a decent society in the face of adversity. But that self-image depends upon just behavior. To be the light unto nations, Israel must be law-abiding, moral, democratic, and a force for peace. Then when someone questions (or seems to question) the nation’s legitimacy, Israelis can reply by emphasizing its goodness.

It seems to me that in the first thirty years of the Jewish state’s existence, it was more sinned against than sinning, and its accomplishments were remarkable. But once Israel became an occupying power with a substantial and restive subject population of Muslims and Christians, the national narrative became untenable. At that point, claims that the country was a “mistake” really started to sting. Some defenders took refuge in caustic arguments about the inferiority of “the Arabs.” Those claims would, at best, provide a poor foundation for national unity. Because it is a democracy committed to the rule of law, Israel must be just if it hopes to survive at all.

on the road

I’m flying to Los Angeles today and staying for most of the week. Because I expect my Internet access to be sporadic, I’m planning not to blog until July 24. That’s probably a good thing, anyway. By the end of August, I owe a book manuscript about youth and the future of democracy. If I can spend a week without the distractions of email and blogging, I think I can get close to finishing the book. Besides, it’s hard to think about any topic of public importance right now other than the conflagration that seems to have engulfed most of the region from Mumbai to Gaza. On that topic, I have no insight, no expertise, no special knowledge–nothing but the Aristotelian response to tragedy: pity and fear.

what will happen to youth turnout in ’06?

This is a question that we’re being asked with increasing frequency at CIRCLE. [One person who has asked is Zachary Goldfarb, who published a good story on the topic in the Sunday Washington Post.]

Clearly, youth turnout will be lower than it was in 2004, a presidential election year during which participation of the whole population returned to a level last seen in 1968. Youth contributed more than their share to that increase, but will surely vote at a lower rate in the upcoming congressional elections. After all, many live in completely uncompetitive House districts in states with no Senate races. Thus the relevant comparison is not to 2004 but to the last congressional election (2002) or the last election that followed a big surge in youth turnout (1994).

The comparison to 1994 is interesting because that election was viewed as a test of us Gen-Xers. My generation had turned out in the Bush-Clinton-Perot race of 1992. Would we respond to the call of celebrities like Madonna (who, wrapped only in an American flag, told us, “If you don’t vote, you?re going to get a spankie?), or would we prove to be slackers? We were slackers, voting at a 22% rate in the momentous election that gave Republicans control of the House. For the Millennials, 2004 was a banner year like 1992; and 2006, like 1994, will be viewed as something of a test.

What will happen next November depends on why there was a big surge in 2004. The reasons may include:

1. Generational replacement. The Millennials are different from X-ers in some basic and attractive ways; for example, they are more engaged in their communities, more optimistic, and more trustful of major institutions (other than the press). These qualities might explain higher turnout in ’04 and would help again in ’06.

2. Mobilization: Anecdotal evidence suggests that the parties and interest groups invested a lot of money in 2004 in techniques that work for young voters (such as face-to-face canvassing). They also specifically targeted youth. The level of mobilization will be lower this year, but probably at least as high as it was in 2002. An additional piece of good news is that mobilization in one election still motivates people in the next–as shown by careful experimental studies.

Partisanship: Although young voters skew toward moderates and independents and are still forming their political identities, they are increasingly hostile to the incumbent party. That anger was a motivator in 2004 and might again turn out the youth vote in ’06. However, Republican youth may not turn out unless the GOP works to mobilize them. The net result if Republicans stay home will be a bad year for youth turnout.

Attentiveness: Following the news is a leading indicator, because you must know what’s going on before you can vote. Young people’s news consumption rose sharply after 9/11/01. I see no evidence that it has increased since 2002. In fact, I would guess that it has fallen off.

international law and the current mideast conflict

I think that Hamas, Hezbollah, and Israel are all in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 33-34: “No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited. … Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited. … The taking of hostages is prohibited.”

Hamas and Hezbollah took hostages, not just prisoners, if they captured soldiers for the purpose of exchanging them for Israeli prisoners. But Israel admits that its response is a form of collective punishment. For instance, “Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert held Lebanon directly responsible for the ambush and promised a ‘painful and far-reaching response.'” The pain, evidently, is to be suffered by the Lebanese collectively, not just by Hezbollah as a military organization.

The Fourth Geneva Convention clearly binds Israel and Lebanon, which are signatories. When the PLO was responsible for the occupied territories, it filed a letter expressing a desire to sign as well. (The Swiss Federal Council replied “that it was not in a position to decide whether the letter constituted an instrument of accession, ‘due to the uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or non-existence of a State of Palestine.'”) In 1977, some countries–including the US but not Israel–accepted an addendum that would even more clearly render illegal some of the recent actions taken by Israel. I think the addendum is morally appropriate, although one could debate whether Hamas fits the description in Article 1 of “peoples fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”.

The text of the addendum is below the fold. [I see that Chris Bertram on Crooked Timber has a similar take.]

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box score political reporting

One of the standard clich?s of journalism is the treatment of political news as if it were a sport. Each event is described as a victory or a defeat for a particular politician. For instance, here’s how the two papers that I read over breakfast this morning reported the latest Administration policy on prisoners:

The New York Times: The new policy “reverses a position the White House had held since shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, and it represents a victory for those within the administration who argued that the United States’ refusal to extend Geneva protections to Qaeda prisoners was harming the country’s standing abroad.”

The Washington Post: “The developments underscored how the administration has been forced to retreat from its long-standing position.”

The Administration’s change of position was a defeat: that’s a fact. And it’s undeniable (almost tautological) that the shift was a “victory” for those who opposed the status quo. But reporters could choose many other facts to provide: for example, information about what has been done to various prisoners. The reliance on political wins and losses has the following serious drawbacks:

1) It encourages laziness. You don’t have to do any actual reporting to figure out that an event is good or bad for a politician.

2) It reinforces the notion that politics is a spectator sport, in which the important question is “Who’s winning?” (not, “What’s happening?”).

3) It adds to the political cost that incumbents incur when they change course for good reasons. When George Bush found out that Abu Zubaydah, whom he had described as Al-Qaeda’s chief of operations, was mentally ill and of no consequence, he supposedly told CIA Director George Tenet, “I said he was important. You’re not going to let me lose face on this, are you?” If that’s true, it’s evidence of almost criminal irresponsibility. But Bush also knew that if he changed his position, the press would report that as a sign of weakness–a “setback” or “defeat”–instead of allowing the president to take credit for learning. Reporting politics as a box-score only increases the odds that leaders will act like Bush.

(In fairness, I should note that after I read this morning’s papers and decided to write this post, I looked around for other examples of box-score journalism on the prisoner issue. The AP, Reuters, and L.A. Times stories really did not use that frame.)