In a comment on last Thursday’s post, Michael Weiksner argues that political theorists employ a “high risk/high return” strategy for social change. They develop comprehensive, sometimes radical arguments that can be used in public debates. Mostly, such arguments have little influence, if only because there is no organized constituency or institution with the capacity to realize them. “But every now and again, you have Machievelli or JS Mill or Rawls, and their frameworks impact society for decades or longer.” In contrast, Michael says, people like me take a “hedged position.” We work closely with practitioners and communities. This strategy increases our odds of making a small difference but rules out any major effect. For instance, as a result of the projects I’m involved in, some day there may be better civics courses in high schools. There will definitely not be a new social order.
One problem with the high-risk strategy is that it may achieve catastrophically bad results. From Plato through Calvin to Marx, many of the most influential theorists have been, in my opinion, disastrously wrong. They have been wrong precisely because they have not been anchored in practical experience.
But there are also drawbacks to the low-risk strategy. Some thinkers who are deeply immersed in practice suffer from narrow horizons or excessive caution. John Dewey was an exemplary “engaged scholar,” yet he made some spectacularly bad calls (applauding World War I and opposing US entry into World War II, for instance). In any case, there is nothing dangerous about most of today’s highly abstract political theory. For example, Elizabeth Anderson’s arguments against natural property rights, posted on left2right, were what originally got me thinking about the role of political theory. If Anderson were somehow to influence popular opinion, no harm would follow–perhaps some good.
Nevertheless, I’m against the high risk/high return strategy for a different reason, one that’s specific to our time. Mainstream political philosophy has long been consumed with questions of distribution–who should get what goods and rights. For most liberals, property should be redistributed (to some limited degree). For most libertarians, existing property distributions should be left alone. I suppose that on a completely theoretical level, I lean the liberals’ way. But I see two problems with this whole debate: