deliberation and philosophy

I have been thinking a little about the contrast between public deliberation

and the professional discipline of philosophy. Philosophers

like to make and explore novel distinctions. In part, this is because

they pursue truth, and an ambiguity or equivocation is an obstacle to

truth. Philosophers can do nothing about faulty or inadequate data, but

they can show that A is logically different from B, even when it has hitherto

been seen as the same.

A second reason is that philosophers, like academics in general, need

to say something new. Only original arguments can be published and otherwise

rewarded. Since the most obvious distinctions are well known, philosophers

get ahead by finding obscure ones.

In contrast, citizen deliberators tend to gravitate toward language that

is vague enough to suppress distinctions, when possible. This is because

there is always some pressure to gain agreement, and distinctions drive

groups apart. Citizens may care about truth, but often their top priority

is to reach acceptable agreements, and to that end they may be willing

to overlook vagueness. There is even an art to devising rhetorical formulas

that can accommodate different positions. (Diplomats speak of "creative

ambiguity.") Also, unlike philosophers, deliberating citizens don’t

care much about novelty or originality. Sometimes a new perspective can

have a powerful effect in a public conversation, because it can break

a deadlock or reinvigorate the participants. But at least as often, novelty

per se is an impediment, because people don’t have time to absorb

a completely new idea. Besides, a novel argument may be associated too

closely with its author, so others will not endorse it wholeheartedly.

Thus it will often be easy for professional philosophers to tear apart

a consensus statement issued by a large and diverse group of deliberators.

But professional philosophers would not be able to run a democratic community.